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Abstract 
Practices of cultivation and control over land are deeply entangled matters in Israel-
Palestine. By the turn of the twentieth century scientists had begun to systematically 
examine the cultivation practices of Arab farmers. Around the same time, the area was 
the scene of major land struggles as both Palestinian Arabs and Zionist groups sought to 
establish control over land. In the study of modern Historic Palestine, the cultivation 
practices of Palestinians and the contest for control over land have each constituted 
abundant but generally separate scholarly arenas. However, the relationship between the 
two furnishes a productive sphere of empirical and conceptual inquiry into the broad set 
of relations between forms of political community and claims to land. The entangled 
relation is illustrated by the legal distinction between cultivated and uncultivated land, 
which is an important basis for the reclassification and appropriation of land by Israel. 
Thus, I argue that the question of cultivation, both of land and of people, emerges as a 
central problematic in the imagination of Israel-Palestine as a geographical realm.  
 This dissertation explores the question of cultivation through two central modes of 
inquiry. Cultivation in the first sense is understood to be an abstract concept that allows 
the state to enact technologies of rule. Cultivation in the second sense is a concrete 
practice of farmers who leverage the capacities of the land to affirm claims to territory. 
Drawing from literary and historical concepts as well as fieldwork, I show that modern 
colonialism requires the classification and adjudication of cultivation practices to justify 
land appropriation. I further illustrate that this reliance on cultivation paradoxically 
produces a site of contestation that at once engages and unsettles legal categories. 
  vi 
This study requires rethinking the history of cultivation not as linear development 
but rather through a series of contingent moments or shadow spaces. These moments 
produce a narrative that summons traces of past events and folds them into the present. 
More generally, such an understanding of history and geography enables me to explore 
not only what was foreclosed at a given conjuncture, but also better understand the 
present condition.  
 
 
  vii 
Table of Contents 
 
List of figures……………………………………………………......………viii 
 
Introduction: Toward a Vernacular Theory of Shadow Spaces…….…..…….1 
 
 
PART ONE: CULTIVATION AS ABSTRACT CONCEPT 
Chapter 1: Emergence of Cultivation as Index………………………..………27 
 
Chapter 2: Cultivation and the Juridical Order……………………..…………72 
 
PART TWO: CULTIVATION AS CONCRETE PRACTICE 
Chapter 3: On the Durability of Rainfed Farming. …………….…………….114 
 
Chapter 4: Cultivation and Infrastructures of Recalcitrance………….………163 
 
 
Conclusion: Thinking Shadow Spaces……………………………………….199 
 
Works cited……………………………………………………………...…….206 
  
  viii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Crop Yields from Elazari-Volcani (1930)……… ………………52 
Figure 2: Photographs from Elazari-Volcani (1930)……… ………………53 
Figure 3: Photographs from Elazari-Volcani (1930)……… ………………57  
  1 
Introduction  // Toward a Vernacular Theory of Shadow Spaces 
 
Being young, I could not ascertain what was wrong or right, whether as a son I was 
responsible for fate itself. To me, the Spirits were ever-present regardless of ceremony. 
They and no one else decided. Could they not forgive? Or was that a Western concept?  1 
 
Ray A. Young Bear, “Black Eagle Child,” 1992 
 
 
 
 
Come let us divide the light by the force of the shadow 
Take what you want of the night 
and leave for us two stars to bury our dead in the celestial sphere 
Take what you want of the sea  
and leave for us two waves to catch fish 
Take the gold of the earth and the sun 
and leave for us the land of our names2 
 
Maḥmūd Darwīsh, “Khuṭbat al-Hindi al-Aḥmar” (Speech of the Red Indian), 1992 
On the 500th anniversary of the Columbian encounter 
 
 
Introduction 
Around 1923 the residents of Tel al- ͑Adas, an Arab village on the sprawling Marj 
Ibn ͑Amer plain near Nazareth, were expelled by the new owners of the village land, the 
Palestine Land Development Company. One thousand hectares of farmland had been 
purchased by representatives of the Zionist movement from a Lebanese businessman who 
sold the area to subsidize investments elsewhere. The sale would appear to be a fairly 
pedestrian event in the history of land speculation in Late Ottoman Palestine were the 
                                                
1 (Young Bear, 1992, p. 61) 
2 Translation by the author from the Arabic (Darwīsh, 1992) 
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buyers not planning to expel the local peasants and settle the area with non-Ottoman 
subjects. Still more intriguing and salient however, is what happened between the sale in 
1916 and the expulsion in 1923. After the sale, local Arab peasants whose land had been 
sold out from under them, continued to cultivate it. This brought an interim period of 
eight years when trained agricultural scientists and farm managers from the Zionist 
movement undertook a study of what they inaugurated as the “The Fallaḥ’s Farm” or The 
Peasant’s Farm. They meticulously recorded the yields of key crops like wheat, barley, 
and lentils produced by the farmers of Tel al- ͑Adas and surrounding villages. For eight 
seasons, scientists collected data on yields, tillage practices, and cropping patterns. Then, 
when plans for the new Zionist settlement were finalized, the peasants were expelled 
from the village, and the settlement of Tel Adashim was established in its stead. As was 
the case in several area villages, sporadic violent reprisals from displaced peasants and 
futile efforts of sympathetic Ottoman officials failed to return control of the land to the 
Arab peasants.3 Laws of private property were invoked, and Ottoman authorities enforced 
the sale with force of arms. Scientific study of Arab peasants’ cultivation techniques was 
also conducted in Jinjār, Jebāta, and Tel al-Fir, among other villages, “until transferred to 
the new colonists.”4 The purpose of this series of agricultural studies was to provide the 
“basis for analytical comparison” between different kinds of farms in the grain belt of 
Palestine.5 The local peasants whose existence had been tied to the land for generations 
                                                
3 (Khalidi, 2010) 
4 (I Elazari-Volcani, 1930, p. v) 
5 (I Elazari-Volcani, 1930, p. III) 
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were described in the studies as “tenant farmers.”6 Part of the study was published in 
Hebrew in 1928, and the expanded English version emerged in 1930. This treatise, The 
Fallah’s Farm, was but one contribution in a series of subsequent academic studies over 
at least six decades by the Zionist movement and later the State of Israel to inventory and 
evaluate Palestinian Arab cultivation practices.7  
Territorial sovereignty lies at the heart of the conflict between Palestinian Arabs 
and Jews in Historic Palestine and, as such, its discussion has constituted a major source 
of the historiography of the area.8 While both the dispossession of peasants such as those 
in Tel al- ͑Adas, and the scientific pursuits of the Zionist movement have been documented 
separately by scholars, the empirical relationship between the two has not been explored.9 
The relationship outlined above also furnishes a productive sphere of conceptual inquiry 
into the broad set of relations between settler-colonialism and forms of political 
community arrayed in opposition to it. 
I approach cultivation not as a self-evident concept, but rather as a hermeneutic 
that opens questions about a wider set of relations between agriculture as science and 
practice, the workings of law, the land question, and the politics of belonging. Each of 
these themes is woven into the dissertation chapters that follow. Cultivation, both of land 
and of people, holds a central place in the imagination of Palestine as a geographical and 
political realm. My dissertation excavates evolving relations between objects, ideas, 
people, and the land through the prism of cultivation.  
                                                
6 (I Elazari-Volcani, 1930, p. V) 
7 (Arnon & Raviv, 1980; I Elazari-Volcani, 1930; Isaac Elazari-Volcani, 1938; J. Elazari-Volcani, 1935) 
8 (Khalidi, 2010; Kimmerling, 1983; Shafir, 1989; K. W. Stein, 1987) 
9 (Kamen, 1991; Karlinsky, 2005; Khalidi, 2010; Penslar, 1991) 
  4 
Technologies of scientific measurement have changed over time, but land use and 
cultivation practices remain crucial objects of analysis in Israel-Palestine today. While 
seemingly detached from wider processes of settlement, the scientific evaluations of Arab 
cultivation form the basis for a system of reclassification of land.  Today, decades after 
The Fellah’s Farm, the nature of cultivation practices (or lack thereof) of Palestinians 
serve as warrant for appropriation of land through juridical mechanisms, such as the 
declaration of large tracts as “state land.” In fact, Israeli control over land in the West 
Bank in recent decades has depended heavily on the distinction between cultivated and 
uncultivated land and other legal justifications based on land use.10 On the one hand the 
practices of Arab farmers have been the subject of intensive scientific scrutiny. On the 
other hand, land cultivated by Arab farmers has been the focus of interest for bringing 
areas under Israeli control. The processes of gaining control over land invoke bodies of 
scientific analysis, legal precedent and other past events, to facilitate the settlement 
enterprise. This context gives rise to the central question of this dissertation: What is the 
nature of the relationship between cultivation practices and the control over land in 
Israel-Palestine? I refer to this rich field of investigation as the Question of Cultivation. 
The dissertation considers this question through two central modes of inquiry, 
comprising Part 1 and Part 2 of the dissertation respectively. The first deals with the 
politics of representation that settler-colonialism depends upon to consolidate control 
over territory. More specifically, control over land requires legal mechanisms for 
appropriation of territory. This juridical realm in turn relies on an index used to evaluate 
                                                
10 (Btselem, 2010) 
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cultivation practices and land use. This index was produced through regimes of scientific 
experimentation and the creation of a hierarchy of land use practices. In short, a politics 
of representation based on science and law produced Palestinian cultivation as an abstract 
concept. The first two chapters, or Part 1, deal with the production of that abstraction. 
The next two chapters, or Part 2, deal with the politics of persistence arrayed in 
opposition to settler colonialism’s land enterprise. More specifically, I show the 
dependence of law on an index of cultivation also produces cultivation as a site of 
contestation. In other words, because legal orders based on land use are required to 
appropriate land, Palestinians are able to contest them on that basis. In this way, 
cultivation emerges as both the basis for appropriation and its limit. This limit, what I call 
the politics of persistence, gestures to the prospect of Palestinian political community or 
being, not as pre-determined by essential forms of collectivity, but rather as the potential 
to not be or be otherwise.  In concrete terms, the (often contestatory) cultivation practices 
of Palestinian farmers should be understood, I argue, as practices of persistence that 
instantiate themselves in ongoing demonstrations of attachment to the land. While they 
these may take a state form, they do not necessarily see it as their ultimate objective.  
To summarize, my dissertation pursues two modes of inquiry into the question of 
cultivation: cultivation as abstract concept and cultivation as concrete practice. While 
every abstract concept is itself the outcome of concrete practices, I mean to differentiate 
here between outcomes that take a stratified form (an objectification such as a land use 
hierarchy) in the service of territorial control and those mobile practices (a politics of 
persistence) that strive to unsettle state stratifications.  
  6 
Why does the question of cultivation matter? Very simply, because the 
classification and evaluation of land use has historically played a central enabling role in 
the appropriation of land in Historic Palestine. Modern settler-colonialism is distinct from 
other forms of rule (for example extractive colonial projects) in its focus on the 
continuous consolidation of control over land. Thus, as its distinguishing feature, control 
over land through the question of cultivation is both its ambition and its limit. Moreover, 
science and law circulate and travel across different settler-colonial contexts shaping the 
development of mechanisms of land appropriation.   
In order to explore the two modes (representation and persistence) of the question 
of cultivation, I argue that scholarly analysis of land issues in Historic Palestine must be 
reconsidered. The longstanding land struggles (land question) are reshaped by the 
question of cultivation because a chronological telling produces a narrative of linear 
continuity. In contrast, I submit that the question of cultivation is best considered through 
a series of conjunctural moments in which the past is constantly invoked and put to work 
in a present situation. Rather than accepting the standard model of causality – a cause 
having an effect – this dissertation shows how a given effect may call its cause into being 
by summoning it from the past. To return then to Tel al- ͑Adas, this understanding of 
method (and by extension, time) means that the expulsion of the village’s residents likely 
included reaching back into the cultivation index created in scientific studies, to provide 
warrant for appropriation of land.  
To explore this matter, my dissertation excavates the historical connections 
between vernacular histories and practices of cultivation. These connections have been 
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obscured by a series of separations enacted in juridical and scientific realms, such as the 
division between ‘cultivated land’ and ‘uncultivated land’. Exploring the connections is 
another way of saying that I seek to recover those practices, ideas, and processes that 
inhabit the shadow spaces between and in excess of established historical narratives. As I 
show in detail below, I derive the concept of shadow spaces from the Arabic word ẓill, or 
shadow, as it might be read in the work of the poet Mahmud Darwish. In my reading, ẓill-
shadow is understood in two senses. First, shadow spaces are traces that unsettle 
dominant, linear narratives of history. One might think of the traces left by places such as 
Tel al- ͑Adas, both material and figurative, that haunt our understanding of its history. 
Second, shadow spaces shelter a potentiality that awaits possible activation. One might 
consider how the embodied practices of cultivation of Palestinian farmers are put to work 
with the heterogeneous capacities of land to animate ‘lost’ histories and reimagine both 
past and future. Building on Michel Foucault’s method of genealogy, the shadow as trace 
becomes the “disqualified knowledge” that continually mark the presence of the past in 
virtual form.11 In line with this genealogical method, I understand a given situation not as 
part of a sequence of chronological events (a narrative of historical progress where the 
present supersedes the past), but as a conjuncture or a moment in which elements of the 
past are constantly refigured for the present. I argue that the horizons that emerge out of 
these moments are not necessarily legible through the grid of established political orders 
or historical narratives.12 Thus the question of cultivation emerges through the double 
movement of both modes as (a) the scientific index and legal warrant for the 
                                                
11 (M. Foucault, Burchell, & Gordon, 1991) 
12 (P. J. C. Scott, 1999, 2009) 
  8 
appropriation of land and, consequently, as (b) a site of contestation through embodied 
practices of cultivation.  
As previously noted, the dissertation is divided into two parts. Part 1 examines 
how cultivation becomes an index that allows the state to enact technologies of rule, such 
as law. Appropriation requires law, and law in turn seizes the index of cultivation as its 
justification for the state to territorialize itself. However, this also means that cultivation 
practices emerge as a site of politics in the attempt to requisition land from Palestinians. 
In this sense, the land question under settler colonialism is marked by the agronomic 
justifications the state must invoke to justify its territorialization. Part 2 explores how a 
variety of Palestinian writers have addressed the question of political being through the 
practice of cultivation. I argue that these texts illustrate how farmers constantly affirm 
their attachment to the land through cultivation.  
A central contribution of the dissertation is to focus on the concrete historical 
practices of measurement, representation, and contestation, which I argue re-imagines 
political community without reliance on a political ontology that finds culmination in the 
state form. This ontology does not disavow the state form as such, but rather refuses a 
teleological understanding of the state form. A political ontology that finds expression in 
a politics of persistence challenges dominant narratives of Palestinian political 
contestation that read it through the grid of a ‘national’ proto-national subject whose 
desire is for the state-form. Instead, my dissertation explores those practices that seem to 
evade classification within the frame of state politics as part of opening space for 
alternative forms of political community that do not inevitably take recourse to the state, 
  9 
even when that state claims an anti-colonial identity. In this sense, I both embrace an 
explicitly postcolonial critique of representation and also try to extent the ambit of such 
critique by injecting into it the indeterminacy of political being. 
 
 
Background on problem 
The dissertation hinges on two central problems originating in scholarship on modern 
colonialism and political life.  First, the emerging field of comparative settler-colonial 
studies has identified the land question and the circulation of materials and knowledge 
between colonies, but not in relation to juridical practice. Second, notions of Palestinian 
political being are generally restricted to established state-based political subjectivities, 
but this dissertation shifts the focus to practices of cultivation and attachment to land that 
produce novel political horizons. The dissertation confronts the foregoing oversights in 
Part 1 and Part 2 of the dissertation respectively. To illustrate the importance of the two 
problems identified above, I turn next to current debates on those topics. 
 
Dispossession and Law 
What is gained by an emphasis in this dissertation on comparative settler-colonialism? A 
focus on settler-colonialism necessarily draws Israel-Palestine into conversation with 
other colonial encounters.13 The relationship of past conquest with the present is an 
important theme explored across colonial contexts by the poet Mahmud Darwish. He 
                                                
13 (Lockman, 2012, p. 35) 
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captured this notion aptly when he wrote in the voice of the Native American addressing 
colonizers on the 500th anniversary of the Columbian encounter, “It will be a long time 
for our present to become the past like us.”14 In doing so, he affirmed the entanglement of 
the ruins of the past in the problem of the present.  
Modern settler-colonial projects, whether in the United States, Canada, or 
Australia, must relentlessly territorialize15 themselves through exclusion.16 Though 
dwarfed by the devastation wrought upon native and enslaved peoples in the Americas, 
Palestine’s Manichean spheres of human habitation offer a prism to consider the 
conceptual underpinnings law, dispossession, and the question of cultivation.  
What binds Palestine to other settler-colonial spaces is the focus on control over 
land. The land question was discussed extensively in the 1970s in relation to settler-
colonialism in Palestine,17 but the comparative settler-colonial framework has seen a 
resurgence of interest in recent years. The land question has emerged at the center of 
these recent debates. For example, David Lloyd contends that the land question sets 
settler-colonialism apart. He writes: “For what distinguishes a settler colony from an 
administrative or extractive one is in the first place the settlers’ focus on the permanent 
appropriation of land rather than the political and economic subordination of the 
indigenous population, the monopolization of its resources or the control of its 
markets.”18 Thus for Lloyd the settlers’ interest in an enduring control of the land 
                                                
14 Translation by the author from the Arabic (Darwīsh, 1992) 
15 Territorialization generally refers to the state practices of reorganizing territory for the purposes of control, resource 
extraction, and management of the population (Sivaramakrishnan, 1999, pp. 153–156). 
16 (Abdulhadi et al., 2012; Bruce Braun, 2002; Kauanui, 2008; Warrior, n.d.; Wolfe, 2007, 2012) 
17 (Abu-Lughod & Abū-Labān, 1974; Kayyālī, 1979; Kimmerling, 1983; Rodinson, 1973). 
18 (D. Lloyd, 2012, p. 66) 
  11 
produces a distinct array of logics and policies designed to actively and continually 
territorialize the state.  
Similarly, Mamdani has recently argued that the land question remains crucial to 
understanding U.S. politics. Comparing the situations of African-Americans and Native 
Americans in the United States he remarks: “For the settler, African-Americans signified 
labor, in contrast American Indians were the source of land.”19 This for Mamdani marks 
the role of what he calls the “native as political identity,” a concept that forces a 
rethinking of social justice in the United States because the “native question” remains 
unaddressed even as the “race question” is explored.20 He thereby shows how the “thrust 
of American struggles has been to deracialize but not to decolonize.”21  
If the centrality of the land question to settler-colonial studies has been 
established, then how does this dissertation extend the analysis? In their introduction to a 
special journal issue dedicated to settler-colonialism in Israel-Palestine, the co-editors 
Salamanca et al. call for academic attention into the “the settler-colonial structure 
underpinning” Israeli government policies.22 This attention to structure crucially reorients 
the more common approach of describing diverse tactics of subjugation of the Palestinian 
population toward studying settler-colonialism as a highly adaptive political formation 
focused on control over land. In this vein, Lockman has recently weighed in on the 
plasticity of the Israeli settlement enterprise. He critiques the assumption made by Shafir 
in his classic work on the land question in Palestine that the essential character of 
                                                
19 (Mamdani, 2012) 
20 (Mamdani, 2012) 
21 (Mamdani, 2012) 
22 (Jabary Salamanca, Qato, Rabie, & Samour, 2012, p. 2) 
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Zionism was forged by 1914 in labor Zionist policies of economic separatism and that 
what unfolded afterward could be explained through that early Zionist thought.23 Thus, 
for Shafir the 1967 annexation of the West Bank by Israel constituted an aberration that 
diverged from its original character. Taking issue with this assertion, Lockman argues 
that the successes of the Zionist strategy cannot by explained solely from an assumed 
essential character, but rather through a complex of other factors including “state action, 
various forms of coercion, and violent conflict”.24 It might be said, then, that the adaptive 
and solvent features of settler-colonialism attach themselves to various juridical, 
economic, and coercive processes to effect dispossession of land.25 The difficult scholarly 
task then becomes exploring the effaced historical connections that illustrate the 
structural qualities of settler-colonialism in varied contexts.  
Structural relationships around the question of land and cultivation have largely 
remained unexamined, especially between the circulation of knowledge and materials 
among settler colonies and the legal practices required to bring greater areas of land 
under control. Postcolonial studies and the emerging field of settler-colonial studies in 
particular have addressed the centrality of the land question and the circulation of 
materials and practices among colonial powers. However, scholars have been slow to 
explore the empirical relationship of Israeli agricultural sciences and control over land in 
Israel-Palestine. Equally important, at the conceptual level, this nascent field of inquiry 
has elaborated the circulation of political practices but not in conversation with the 
circulation of legal practices.  
                                                
23 (Lockman, 2012; Shafir, 1989) 
24 (Lockman, 2012, p. 29) 
25 (Gidwani, 2008a) 
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My dissertation argues that the circulation of materials and knowledges around 
agriculture must be considered in relation to the legal practices that enabled dispossession 
of land. It is precisely this vantage point from the settler colony that extends, for example, 
important recent work of Esmeir on the production of the “human” in the law of colonial 
Egypt.26 In contrast to extractive colonial spaces such as Egypt, the land question in 
Palestine put priority on the collective dispossession of entire groups, rather than the 
enrollment of individuals as modern subjects.  
 
Political Being-in-Common 
The question of being is one of the most widely debated themes within Western 
metaphysics. I will not attempt any kind of comprehensive summary here, but one of the 
most important things one must say is that being is never static: that is to say, it is always 
emergent and in the process of becoming. Here Fanon’s formulation of the opposition of 
colonized people is instructive.27 Most forcefully, Fanon warned against a fixed, modern 
understanding of subaltern consciousness rooted in the land. He described the tactics of 
departing colonial authorities, noting that the colonized, the fallaḥin (peasants), are not 
persuaded by colonial overtures because of their material relationship to the land. 
According to Fanon: 
For a colonized people, the most essential value, because it is the most 
meaningful, is first and foremost the land: the land which must provide bread and, 
                                                
26 (Samera Esmeir, 2011, 2012) 
27 One does not have to endorse Fanon’s contentious positions on anti-colonial violence, which alone constitute a 
scholarly debate, to derive powerful insights into his reading of the political ontology of being. (Gidwani, 2008b)  
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naturally, dignity. But this dignity has nothing to do with “human” dignity. The 
colonized subject has never heard of such an ideal.28 
This assertion presents many possibilities for reflection. One reading might be that Fanon 
is essentializing peasant life29; I would instead like to emphasize how Fanon distinguishes 
“bread” and “dignity” on the one hand from “human” dignity on the other. For Fanon, 
“human dignity” is an empty concept of liberal humanism unless backed by the material 
conditions that can enable its realization. Thus, Fanon affirms a substantive practice of 
dignity and freedom that is not mediated by state logics or individual personhood. It is 
instead anchored to a collective freedom that provides both sustenance and self-respect. 
While Fanon underscores the importance of  “bread” and “dignity” he does not try to 
circumscribe the social form that may embed them. For Fanon, land is a significant aspect 
of belonging to political and social community, whereas a “human” relationship to land 
forged in law effectively strips the governed subject of their politicalness. Qualification 
as rights-bearing individuals in the formal realm of law wrenches people from political 
community into an abstract sphere of “human dignity” or “rights”. Correspondingly, 
Fanon’s acclamation of freedom and dignity anchored in land should not be construed as  
affirmation of fixed territorial identities or, for that matter, a nativist politics that asserts 
exclusive claim to land.  
Fanon concluded that colonial overtures, what he calls “culture, values, and 
technology,”30 must be rejected and replaced. Fanon’s critique is insightful for two 
                                                
28 (Fanon, 2004, p. 9), emphasis added 
29 (Tamari, 1992, p. 76) 
30 (Fanon, 2004, p. 9) 
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central reasons.31 First, he unsettles the exclusionary undercurrents of a certain liberal 
humanism by affirming collective freedom in opposition to individual freedom.32 This 
individualism seeks to establish a “human” connection with land and agriculture that is 
territorialized through new juridical and legislative structures to guarantee rights-based 
protection. Fanon does not reject humanism altogether but writes against individualistic 
humanism from his vantage point within the independence movement.33 The constitution 
of a “human” subject for Fanon is intimately related to the mechanisms of colonial 
processes. Reading the centrality of land for colonized peoples through Fanon 
underscores the complex relationship of Palestinian subaltern consciousness and modern 
conceptions of the land. It is in these linkages, as I show in subsequent chapters, that the 
possibility for new political imaginaries emerges, seeking to neither essentialize the 
relationship to land nor allowing it to be effaced by colonial “forgetting”. This argument 
echoes that of Esmeir, who points out in her discussion of “juridical humanity” that 
Fanon “refused the notion that colonialism could confiscate the humanity of the 
colonized.”34 In short, rights or humanity are not qualities to be endowed (meaning they 
can also be revoked) but rather to be understood as inhabiting a “prior” space, or if we 
prefer, situated on an ontological plane that is not exhausted by law.35  
                                                
31 Fanon’s critique can be taken up in my argument, but his conclusion regarding revolutionary violence cannot. I 
thank Ajay Skaria for a clarifying discussion on this point. 
32 In Keywords, Raymond Williams (1983) defined liberalism as “a doctrine of certain necessary kinds of freedom but 
also, and essentially, a doctrine of possessive individualism” (p. 181). Humanism, for Williams, later became 
associated with “post-Enlightenment ideas of history as self-development and self-perfection” (Ibid p. 150). 
Following Williams, it might be described as the pursuit of individual self-improvement. 
33  There is considerable debate on Fanon’s humanism and on humanism in general. For examples, see Said (2004). 
34 (Samera Esmeir, 2012, pp. 6–8), also see her evocative piece, (S. Esmeir, 2006) 
35 (Samera Esmeir, 2012, p. 8) 
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I have claimed that the question of political being as it comes from Western 
metaphysics, while instructive, is inadequate for understanding the Palestinian practices 
of cultivation I describe in Part 2 of this dissertation. I propose to demonstrate that while 
these practices of being-in-common do not necessarily culminate in a nation-state 
imagination, they nevertheless give expression to a sense of political community that is 
bound up with a refusal to abandon the land.  
 
A Vernacular Theory of Shadow Spaces 
To recapitulate, this introduction has been discussing the ways that the question of land, 
made central by settler-colonialism, is bound up with the cultivation practices of 
Palestinians both in terms of dispossession and contestation. In response, I propose what 
might be called a vernacular theory of shadow spaces as a hermeneutic to explore the 
question of cultivation as outlined above. This theory is composed of four interlocking 
parts in which the two modes of the question of cultivation map onto the two senses of 
the concept of zill-shadow. Schematically, this can be depicted as follows: 
The first sense of ẓill-shadow is the ruin or trace that haunts historical narratives 
and landscapes. The second sense of ẓill-shadow, as shelter, denotes a field of virtual 
potential that is concrete yet immaterial. The traces and ruins that haunt can be activated 
to generate new forms of political being. These two senses of ẓill-shadow, in turn, map 
on to the two modes associated with the question of cultivation: the politics of 
representation and the politics of persistence. In Part 1, of the dissertation, I show 
cultivation as formed by a practice and politics of representation that sediments 
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cultivation as an abstract concept meant to ground a (purportedly scientific) land use 
taxonomy. Specifically, I reveal how science and law combine in an effort to disembed 
Palestinian cultivation from its particularities and de-politicize land use, but how this 
effort to territorialize land for settlers is riddled by traces and ruins that serve as constant 
reminders of the contingencies and violence that have underwritten the settler-colonial 
enterprise. In Part 2, of the dissertation, I unpack cultivation as the mainstay of a politics 
of persistence that transgresses and disrupts the settler-colonial desire for territorial 
control. These practices of persistence, or steadfastness (sumud), not only keep the land 
question of settler-colonialism alive but also betoken possibilities for alternative political 
horizons.  
To re-state my argument, a vernacular theory of shadow spaces shows how the 
zill-shadow haunts precisely in its capacity to shelter other forms of being. Cultivation 
can be understood as fugitive practices of refusal and contestation that interrupt the 
scientific object of cultivation.  
 One of the most penetrating thinkers on the relationship between history and land 
in the Arab world has been the Palestinian poet Mahmud Darwish. Through the last 
works of his long oeuvre, Darwish explored the figure of the defeated and the absentee. 
This figure allowed him to consider the relationship of history and geography for those 
thrust into the matrix of colonization. However, his remarkable contribution was that his 
persona was not a unitary figure. Rather, as Sinan Antoon has argued, Darwish often 
deployed the “You” (huwa) and “I” (ana) forms to brilliant effect, enabling the poetic 
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persona to converse with its internal other.36 This allowed him to put the fractured 
persona of the defeated into productive tension by re-imagining the relationship of place 
and history. In other words, the fractured self explored the terrains of excluded histories 
without essentializing them. Darwish referred to these exclusions as the aṭlal or ruins of 
dominant historical accounts and defeats.37 
 The concept of ẓill (which I have translated in the double sense of shadow and 
shelter) is also Darwish’s topos for the living historical trace. The ẓill-shadow enabled 
Darwish to imagine the convergence of past and present, presence and absence. Thus, as I 
have argued, the ẓill-shadow stands in simultaneously for ruin or exclusion but also 
potentiality. A conversation from Darwish’s work of poetic prose, Fī Ḥaḍrat al-Ghiyāb 
(In the Presence of Absence), illustrates this: 
 
In this field open to armed archeologists who do not stop questioning you:  
Them: Who are you?  
You check your limbs and said: I am I.  
Them: We need the proof.  
You: I am the proof. 
Them: This is not enough. We need a nothing. 
You: I am both a perfection and a nothing. 
Them: Say you are stone so we may finish the excavation. 
                                                
36 (Antoon, 2009) 
37 My thinking on Darwish has benefitted greatly from lively conversations with Ibrahim Muhawi and the exceptional 
scholarship of Sinan Antoon, both of whom who are translators of Darwish. See especially (Antoon, 2009) and Sinan 
Antoon’s translator’s preface in (Darwish, 2011). 
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You: If only the young man were a stone. And they did not understand you. 
 
They removed you from the field. But your shadow did not follow you and did not 
deceive you. It was fixed there and turned to stone, then it turned green like the 
sesame plant, green in the day and blue in the night.  Then it grew tall like the 
willow, in the day green, and in night, blue / 
 
However far you are, you will be near / however much you are killed, you will live / 
so do not think that you are dead there / you are alive here / nothing establishes this 
and that but metaphor / the metaphor that makes of the shadow a geography / the 
metaphor that trained the creatures in the game of the words / the metaphor that will 
reunite you and your name / so rise with your people / higher and farther than the 
tradition of legends tells you and me / you, yourself write the history of your heart / 
since Adam fell in love / until the rise of your nation (qawmak) / and you, yourself 
write the history of your people (jinsak) / from when you gained from the sea her 
rhythm and breathing pattern / until your return to me, alive / 38 
(My translation) 
 
Many rich concepts are at work in this excerpt. The ẓill-shadow is a living entity. But 
nothing proves whether you are dead or alive but metaphor. Green by day, purple by 
night. This is fairly ambiguous. Nothing establishes your proximity despite being far, and 
                                                
38 Translation by the author from the Arabic. From (Darwīsh, 2009) 
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your life despite your killing, but metaphor. Metaphor thus is the act of imagination, the 
giving-form or activation of potential. Thus, the ẓill-shadow can be regarded as the trace 
left in the wake of official history or the space of potentiality that is the only presence 
possible. Because the fractured self (self-other or you-I) is unable to effect a full return to 
the memory of a place both physically and conceptually, the ẓill-shadow stands in as the 
living space of presence and potential.39 As Antoon has argued, Darwish’s illustration 
that return to the land or an essentialized past is only possible through the concept of ẓill-
shadow, has become one of his most perceptive contributions.40  
While scholarship on Darwish recognizes the sense of ẓill-shadow as that which 
haunts the other, the victor, in his dreams, the second sense of ẓill-shadow is frequently 
overlooked. My understanding of this second valence of ẓill-shadow comes from Arabic 
word itself. Roughly translated as shadow or shade, the word ẓill in Arabic does not 
possess the negative charge “shadow” often carries in English. The Arabic word can 
mean shadow or trace but also, shelter or protection. Thus, ẓill-shadow is that which 
shields one from the harsh sunlight and the elements but, equally, from danger and 
observation. In the latter formulation, ẓill-shadow becomes a powerful way to 
conceptualize forms of haunting that can shelter life or potential. 
In this dissertation I employ Darwish’s ẓill-shadow metaphor as a provocation to 
thought. Darwish calls for making of the shadow a geography through an active project 
of interpretation. His invocation of ẓill-shadow is both material and virtual: the physical 
ruins of villages decimated by settler-colonialism but also the ruins of lives and 
                                                
39 I am indebted to (Antoon, 2009) for clarifying this point.  
40 (Antoon, 2009) 
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communities disrupted that continue to exist in memory and history. For Darwish, the 
ẓill-shadow shelters the traces of Palestinian life in this double manner. More profoundly, 
Darwish says that it is only by unleashing metaphor, or activation of zill-shadow, that 
establishes whether one is alive. In so doing, Darwish gestures to the potential embodied 
in ẓill – a potential that is dormant until activated the work of memory, writing, or (as I 
suggest) cultivation.  
 To summarize, I argue that the ẓill-shadow offers an evocative vernacular theory 
of the colonized in two central ways. First, ẓill-shadow is the figurative and material 
space of exclusion and ruin, whose spectral existence haunts the colonizer’s history of 
autochthonous achievement. These excluded spaces constantly disrupt the claim of 
triumphalist history by illustrating the constitutive violence and dispossession that are its 
conditions of possibility. The constitution of center via colonization and management of 
the margin is consistent with the argument of the Latin American philosopher Enrique 
Dussel, who has contended that “Europe” as geographic center of the world and self-
proclaimed site of universal epistemology is itself an effect that would not have been 
possible in the absence of a relationship of coloniality to the margins or peripheries.41 In 
other words, that which claims for itself the position of center is always enabled by the 
(effaced labors and resources of the) margin. It is precisely the striving to exclude the 
other that produces the self.  This first sense of ẓill-shadow as trace informs my 
discussion of Part 1 of the dissertation. 
                                                
41 (Dussel, 1994) 
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Second, as I have repeatedly noted, ẓill-shadow is the space of potentiality that is 
given form through a series of labored practices, including memory, writing, and 
cultivation.42 Potential, of course, can be actualized in many ways. It may assume a 
reactionary form, as in the case of hyper-nationalist projects that seek to establish 
essentialist and exclusionary links between certain people and certain places. Darwish 
understood the pitfalls of this and guarded against it by rigorously maintaining that he 
“belonged to the question of the victim” (rather than, say, the nation).43 For Darwish, zill-
shadow shelters potential geographies that do not have to fall into established orders of 
the state; in my reading, Darwish left open the possibility for unforeseen forms of 
political community to emerge from within the fissures of colonial control. This second 
sense of ẓill-shadow as shelter informs Part 2 of my dissertation. 
How does this vernacular theory of shadow spaces map onto individual 
dissertation chapters? As noted, my dissertation explores two senses of ẓill-shadow in 
relation to the question of cultivation. In Part 1, I explore the first sense of cultivation as 
an abstract political concept, examining the ruins and shadow spaces of its narrative of 
agricultural self-achievement. This gives expression to the first sense of ẓill-shadow as 
something that haunts and follows. Chapter One considers the production of Palestinian 
cultivation as a discrete object of knowledge, and Chapter Two explores how this object 
is taken up in juridical processes. In Part 2, I investigate the second sense of ẓill-shadow 
as shelter, a space of potentiality. Chapter Three considers the durability of rainfed 
                                                
42 This may be considered in relation to dwelling for Heidegger, for whom form emerges through a process of poesis or 
giving form. Thus being for Heidegger is given form through a working-with and not the external grounding of an 
order. (Heidegger, 2001) 
43 (Darwi ̄sh, 2008) 
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production as a practice of persistence, and Chapter Four explores how the cultivation 
practices of Palestinian farmers, far from being fully determined by a settler-colonial 
juridical logic, instead forms an “infrastructure of recalcitrance” for contesting 
domination.  
These chapters do not seek to write a comprehensive history of Palestinian 
cultivation. Rather they aim to re-solder connections and relationships that have been 
rendered separate by colonial technologies of rule. In so doing, I hope to contribute to 
studies of comparative settler-colonialism by reconsidering the effects of a purported 
clean break between “traditional” and “modern” agriculture that pervades colonial 
histories and showing, furthermore, how such a break was enabled by geographic 
circulation of legal practices, materials, and ideas amongst settler colonies. In the latter 
half of the dissertation I focus on practices of cultivation mobilized by Palestinian 
farmers in spatially and temporally uneven, even discontinuous ways: far from being 
innocuous these practices, I suggest, constitute a ‘politics of persistence’ in their refusal 
to abdicate connection to the land in spite of ongoing Israeli attempts to sever such 
connection. In anchoring dignity and freedom to the cultivation of land, Palestinian 
farmers demonstrate a mode of political steadfastness that cannot be contained within the 
standard telos of freedom as establishment of an independent nation-state. 
 
Summary 
Settler-colonialism is characterized by the lasting control over land. Dispossession of 
prior land users in self-professedly liberal settler-colonialist formations requires legal 
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justification for expropriation. Such justification emerges, I show, through the assessment 
and classification of cultivation practices through the operations of agronomic science. 
Concepts and metrics used to build an ostensibly scientific hierarchy of cultivation 
practices are not pre-given, but emerge in process itself.  
However, as a variable, ongoing and embodied practice, cultivation also becomes 
a site of political action and being-in-common that challenges dispossession. These forms 
of political being are emergent rather than pre-determined by national identity; if there is 
a core it is their basis in an attachment to land, repeated efforts to affirm collective claims 
to it, and the refusal of prescribed subjectivities as subjects of state power.  Such 
practices of cultivation thus emerge as a flashpoint to consider anew the question of 
territory and sovereignty or, in short, the land question.  
 
Methodological Approach 
The dissertation considers the history of cultivation in Israel-Palestine and develops a 
theoretical understanding of cultivation as constituted by both colonialism and the 
oppositional politics arrayed around it. It draws on two primary sets of sources. First, I 
use materials from and about the Late Ottoman, British Mandate, and Israeli 
administrations to understand the constitution of the juridical category of cultivation. In 
categorizing land as either cultivated or uncultivated and subsequently reclassifying land, 
colonial powers have opened fields of action, intervention, and settlement. 44 A vast 
infrastructure of measurement and calculation was brought to bear on Palestinian 
                                                
44 (Braverman, 2008; Fakher Eldin, 2008; Forman, 2009; Mundy, 2007) 
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cultivators: field surveys, test plots, experiment stations, surveys, aerial photography, and 
new crop trials. The relation of these processes to legal shifts must be considered 
historically to understand the process of state territorialization.  
Second, the dissertation relies on Arabic-language personal papers, locally 
published books, court testimonies from the British Mandate period, and fieldwork to 
understand how Palestinian farmers and intellectuals understood and practiced 
cultivation. Fieldwork in the sense means that I spoke with dozens of agronomists, 
farmers, Ministry of Agriculture officials, and others to gain a sense of their situations but 
not with the intention of quoting them in this work. 
 I employ the concept of cultivation to open discussion of the historical 
relationship of land-use practices and legal classifications. Cultivation is indeed a human 
effort of tilling and planting but also of interpretation and re-imagination of political life. 
It is a kind of practice that works with the land but leaves a certain vegetative imprint that 
often ends up exceeding human intervention.45  These overlooked cultivation practices 
and processes strike at the heart of the land regime in the West Bank, deploying the 
categorization of land as a wedge in the gap between the cultivated and uncultivated. The 
interplay between categories opens important questions about politics as constituted 
through concrete practice rather than abstract rights. This builds from a burgeoning field 
of environmental politics within geography and Middle East studies that explore relations 
of more-than-human life.46 My hope is that the dissertation offers both fresh empirical 
insights into the relationship of cultivation practices to control over land, as well as a 
                                                
45 (Mikhail, 2011; Mitchell, 2002) 
46 (Alatout, 2006; B. Braun, 2005; D. K. Davis & Burke, 2011; D. Davis, 2007; Mikhail, 2011; Mitchell, 2011a; 
Wainwright, 2005) 
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novel conceptual framework to consider the histories and geographies of settler-
colonialism through what I gloss as a vernacular theory of shadow spaces. Key to my 
approach is the effort to understand the history of cultivation in Israel-Palestine not as a 
chain of chronological events but as a series of historical moments that are constantly 
summoned and reinvented in and for the present. This genealogical (as contrasted to a 
conventional historical) account yields not only a particular methodological approach of 
reading texts, practices, and landscapes but also a conceptual framework to explore the 
ways that traces of the past inhabit the present, relentlessly interrupting established 
historical narratives and sheltering alternatives.  
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PART 1: CULTIVATION AS ABSTRACT CONCEPT 
Chapter 1: The Question of Cultivation as Index  
 
 
Part One explores the first movement of the question of cultivation. Over the next two 
chapters, I will explore the politics of representation that produced cultivation as a 
scientific and legal object. I will take up this problem as part of a wider exploration of 
how cultivation of land is related to the appropriation of land within settler colonialism. 
Chapter One considers how modes of agricultural knowledge and coercion participate in 
the consolidation of control over land. Chapter two examines how legal processes call 
into being those modes of knowledge and coercion to justify the appropriation of land.  
 
Modern scientific studies of Palestinian cultivation open with a consistent theme. As late 
as 1989, one prominent Israeli agronomist stated, “The Arab farmers, in common with all 
the farmers in the neighboring countries, practiced the typical Mediterranean agriculture, 
which, to all intents and purposes, had remained practically unchanged since biblical 
days.”47 The idea persists, then, that local cultivation practices remained stagnant for 
millennia. In contrast, it is claimed, the intervention of the Zionist agricultural initiatives 
in the late nineteenth century brought about a radical change. Accordingly, the same 
author elsewhere stated, “The author has been active in agricultural research for over four 
                                                
47 (I. Arnon, 1989, p. 79) 
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decades in a country that, during this period, has passed through all the stages of 
development from biblical agriculture to that of the twentieth century.”48  
Pioneering scholarship on the history of scientific endeavors in the Zionist 
movement and their effect on Arab agriculture has effectively illustrated the fractured and 
contested course of the Zionist movement.49 Studies such as those of Penslar reserve 
space for a detached Zionist technical intervention. More specifically, Penslar implies 
that the strategic interest in control over land came to prominence with the rise of what he 
calls “militant Zionism” in the 1930s.50 However, more recent work from Sufian and Abu 
El-Haj on health and archeology, respectively, has broken new ground, asking whether 
regimes of knowledge writ large can be considered apart from the processes of 
dispossession.51 The notion that Zionist agricultural interventions effected an absolute 
break with the past and local cultivation practices is often explained as the self-evident 
unfolding of natural logic. 52 However, this new strain of academic work within the 
emerging literature on comparative settler colonialism shows how scientific endeavors 
were the result of interaction across modern European settler colonies, whose defining 
characteristic is an attempt to consolidate control over land.53 As we see below, it 
becomes difficult to sustain a separation between the early scientific endeavors that 
predate the forms of Zionism that Penslar discusses, and ongoing processes of 
dispossession. Oversights such as these highlight the necessity of a comparative settler 
                                                
48 (I. Arnon, 1981, p. xvi) 
49 (Kamen, 1991; Penslar, 1991) 
50 (Penslar, 2000, pp. 217–218) 
51 (Abu El-Haj, 2001; Sufian, 2007) 
52 (Lockman, 2012, pp. 13–14) 
53 (Jabary Salamanca et al., 2012; David Lloyd, 2012; Lockman, 2012; Veracini, 2010; Wolfe, 2006) 
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colonial approach. Yet the arguments found below also extend the discussion on settler 
colonialism by exploring the way that legal practices participate in the logic of territorial 
control. In this critique, I rely on important recent scholarship on the production of 
juridical categories, especially that of the human, within colonial contexts.54 This work 
however, does not address how the production of those subjects differs when the priority 
is placed upon state territorialization in settler colonial contexts. 
From this basis, this chapter explores the twentieth-century genealogy of the 
concept of Palestinian cultivation. The chapter asks: What are the modes of reporting and 
exclusion that gave rise to Palestinian cultivation as a political abstraction? Exploration 
of the connections between colonial encounters and material forces illustrates the 
conjunctural nature of a concept like Palestinian cultivation. From the perspective of 
modern government, Palestinian cultivation is seen generally both as (a) external and 
deficient and (b) in need of intervention. More importantly, however these modes of 
reporting produce a concept of cultivation that is marked by its shadow: dispossession 
through the law. In contrast to a causal relationship, this chapter asks how staging the 
newly-formed concept of Palestinian cultivation participates in the consolidation of 
control over land. 
The chapter is divided into two principal sections. Each section follows a 
particular operation of agronomic knowledge. I argue that these operations constitute—
that is, do not predate—the emergence of intensive agricultural production in Palestine. 
First, I explore the circulation of ideas and materials among colonial scientific institutions 
                                                
54 (Samera Esmeir, 2012) 
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through the modern history of standardized agricultural experimentation in Palestine. 
Second, I consider the concentration of agricultural knowledge in a particular site, an 
experimental farm where a series of experiments was designed to codify and evaluate a 
new abstraction: the Arab fallaḥ (peasant) farm. The effaced stories, materials, and forces 
that have enabled the production of Palestinian cultivation are marked by traces left in the 
“shadow spaces” of conventional accounts. These overlooked spaces constitute the 
subject of this study. 
  
SECTION I. THE BIRTH OF PALESTINIAN CULTIVATION AT THE AMERICAN STATION IN 
HAIFA 
 
The booming railroad town of Billings, Montana, in 1909 is an unlikely place to begin a 
story about Palestinian cultivation. But it was in October of that year that Aaron 
Aaronsohn, a prominent Zionist agronomist, addressed the Fourth Dry Farming Congress 
and its audience of concerned agricultural officials from the United States, Canada, 
Germany, Mexico, Brazil, and other countries. Billings, established in 1882 in the 
Montana Territory on the Northern Pacific rail line, had just mushroomed from 3,000 
inhabitants in 1900 to 10,000 in 1910. Just thirty years before the congress in 1909, the 
area witnessed one of the last large-scale campaigns by Native American tribes in the 
American West. In 1876, Northern Cheyenne and Lakota Sioux bands staged a final 
insurrection, which ended in their defeat, dispossession, and confinement on reservations 
in the not-yet formed states of Montana and South Dakota. The history of the American 
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West, Ned Blackhawk has recently argued, cannot be seen apart from the regimes of 
violence that underpinned European settlement. 55  Frequent interaction with residents of 
the Northern Cheyenne and Crow reservations ten miles to the south of Billings would 
have served as a reminder of the living history of Native American life in the area. Thirty 
years later, Billings posed an attractive and convenient location to showcase the U.S. 
government’s work in settlement of the semi-arid West through dryland agriculture. 
Indeed, hundreds of agricultural officials from these countries came together to discuss 
research into the intensive agricultural production in arid and semi-arid areas. 
 Aaronsohn, an agronomist and resident of a Jewish colony in Ottoman Palestine, 
arrived by train to address the assembly. He was on a tour of the United States at the 
invitation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture and was seeking funding to establish an 
agricultural research station in Palestine. Despite the town’s bigger size and more rugged 
atmosphere, Aaronsohn must have felt a certain affinity in Billings among the pioneers of 
the American West. After all, he was working to establish Zionist settlements in 
Palestine. The two settler-colonial enterprises also shared a concern for the productive 
capacity of semi-arid farmland. His lecture on botanical explorations of Palestine found 
an eager audience, so eager, in fact, that he was urged to continue speaking beyond his 
allotted time.56 Duly impressed with what he had seen in several Western states, 
Aaronsohn noted that “the successes are so numerous that they seem unbelievable.”57 
However, Aaronsohn’s address to the assembled agriculturalists was to highlight the long 
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history of dry agriculture. He stated, “The lessons drawn from the past will show us the 
road to follow in the future and will prove, I hope, that the future of agriculture in the arid 
and semi-arid regions is most assured.”58 In doing so, he linked the fate of the dry-
farming efforts of those assembled under a single project tied ineluctably to the process 
of colonization. For with his visit to the United States, which he called a “study”, 
Aaronsohn sought to understand how insights from the dry farming experience of settlers 
in both Ottoman Palestine and the American West could mutually benefit newly 
established settlements.  
Born in what is now Romania, he had traveled as a child to Palestine, where his 
parents helped establish the early Zionist settlement of Zichron Ya’akov.59 Growing up in 
Ottoman Palestine in a one of the earliest Jewish settlements, he explored the countryside 
extensively and, like his generation of the earliest Jewish pioneers, learned Arabic and 
interacted daily with the Palestinian Arab community. His prominence grew as he 
returned from agronomy studies in France to work in the Rothschild-supported 
plantations in Palestine.60 He soon began his own agricultural and geological explorations 
of Palestine with the help of prominent German scientists who were also conducting 
surveys in Palestine. He rose suddenly to international fame in 1906 when he announced 
to his German colleagues that he had finally identified the elusive wild relative of wheat, 
the wild emmer.61 
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 Aaronsohn traveled to United States at the behest of the USDA’s David Fairchild, 
a noted botanist who had established its Office of Foreign Seed and Plant Introduction 
and is credited with helping to introduce 80,000 species to the United States.62 
Aaronsohn’s purpose was twofold: to secure funding for the planned Jewish agricultural 
experiment station near Haifa and to explore the economic potential of crops native to 
Palestine in the dry areas of the United States, especially California. His U.S. trip 
culminated in a 1910 USDA Bulletin, Agricultural and Botanical Explorations in 
Palestine, which identified major native crops in Palestine that could be of economic 
value to the United States. His U.S. travels helped secure funding from philanthropists on 
the East Coast, and his charisma and confident knowledge of the Palestinian landscape 
endeared him to leading agronomists at the University of California and elsewhere.63 In 
1911, with private funds that he secured on his U.S. tour, he established the first 
agricultural experiment station in Palestine near Haifa. 
How does this series of events relate to our opening question about the 
relationship of the question of cultivation to the consolidation of control over land? I 
would like to suggest that a series of four interlocking connections—evident in the work 
of Aaronsohn—forces us to reconsider the narrative of autochthonous achievement 
claimed by accounts of modern agriculture in Palestine.  
First, Aaronsohn was the first to recognize local agricultural practices as such and 
study them systematically. This recognition is the first step. His mission for the station 
was the following: 
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It has to make an exhaustive investigation into the local forms of agriculture, 
however backward they may be from the modern standpoint, and to obtain a 
thorough knowledge of all the local practices and methods, as well as of their 
causes, before one is justified in giving them up in favor of methods which have 
been simply copied from other countries. To some of those in search of the latest 
methods, this will, no doubt, appear a thankless task. But those who possess real 
agricultural knowledge will not be ashamed to confess that they have too much 
respect for existing agricultural methods simply to pass them over.64 
Aaronsohn’s statement reflects a position expressed by scientists and activists of his early 
generation that sought to recognize the value of local agricultural practices in order to 
improve “modern” methods of the Jewish colonies. At first glance, such statements may 
seem at odds with the common denigration of local agricultural practices. However, this 
move to recognize constitutes the first step in producing a representational space that 
circumscribes and documents local agriculture. Aaronsohn’s careful practices of 
gathering soil and rock samples, local seeds, and landraces, as well as conducting field 
trials and publishing articles, constituted indespensible technologies of reporting for that 
process.  
Second, Aaronsohn benefitted from his extensive contacts with German and 
French scientists, including the renowned botanist at the University of Berlin, Otto 
Warburg, whom Aaronson assisted in early botanical explorations and who introduced 
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him to the idea of agricultural experimentation in 1901.65 As Penslar’s impressive 
research has shown, Warburg’s extensive agricultural work in the German colonies in 
West Africa provided him invaluable experience for the practical matters of “settlement 
engineering” in Palestine as a Zionist.66 Together with Selig Soskin, another German 
agronomist, fellow Zionist, and former employee of the German colonial agricultural 
service, Aaronsohn was put in contact with elite circles of German botanical and 
agricultural researchers. His contacts in the German academy—in addition to their 
financial and moral support—were instrumental to publishing his findings in the top 
academic journals of his day and securing his reputation as a prominent agricultural 
researcher. Furthermore, Warburg and Soskin’s support of Aaronsohn was material in 
securing funding and credibility for his agricultural research station, both in the Zionist 
leadership and foreign backers, based in no small part on their reputations built over 
years in the German colonial service. Warburg’s long editorship of a tropical botany 
journal based on his explorations of Asia and private business ventures in cocoa, coffee, 
and rubber trade with German West Africa framed his ambitions in Palestine within a 
distinctly European colonial sensibility.67 Moreover, Aaronsohn’s training in France 
yielded extensive early contacts with French colonies in North Africa, where he 
conducted study visits, and he frequently cited their interventions, especially in new 
methods of olive production in arid environments.68 
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Third, Aaronsohn’s contacts with David Fairchild of the USDA made two things 
possible. He was given access to benefactors to fund his research center in Palestine with 
private donations from the United States, which enabled him to carry out the project with 
much greater freedom than official Zionist institutions enjoyed at the time. Also, 
Fairchild introduced Aaronsohn to the agricultural colonization efforts in the Western 
United States, including the land-grant system of agricultural colleges, advanced methods 
of dryland cultivation, leadership roles in the Dry Farming Congress, at least two 
extensive study tours of the United States, and contacts in U.S. government. So strong 
was the bond with Aaronson that Fairchild, a noted researcher, wrote an adulatory article 
in Science in 1910 announcing the establishment of what he described as an “American 
institution in the Levant and carrying the American experiment station idea abroad.”69 
Furthermore, he announced that the USDA had outfitted the station with “the most 
complete set of American experiment station reports and bulletins to be found anywhere 
in the Old World.”70 And, according to Fairchild, Aaronsohn was given the opportunity 
to buy “as a nucleus of pathological work the collection of the late Professor W. A. 
Kellerman of about 24,000 specimens of fungi, and the Department of Agriculture has 
offered to supplement this with about a thousand other numbers.”71 Kellerman’s rare 
collection of cereal rusts, for which he was known in the United States, would have been 
a precious acquisition for any fledgling research station, especially outside of the West. 
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In exchange, Aaronsohn sent the USDA samples of landraces for their own breeding 
programs. This complex interaction made research at the station possible. 
Fourth, Aaronsohn’s relationship with local Arab cultivators was complex. He 
belonged to a generation raised in a tiny settler community that depended heavily on the 
assistance and friendship of the overwhelming majority of local Palestinian Arab 
communities. On the other hand, Aaronsohn harbored a deeply suspicious and 
antagonistic relationship with the many Palestinians he employed at the research station. 
He believed strongly in the dominant role of scientifically trained specialists. However, 
his extensive employment of Arabs at the research station earned him the ire of newer 
generation of Zionists committed to Labor Zionism’s virulently exclusionary labor 
politics. In fact, the early benefactors of his research station boycotted him over the 
extensive use of Arab laborers, believing that he should only employ Jewish laborers.72 
As Penslar argued, “Aaronsohn valued Arab labor for allowing the Jews to develop into 
an elite group of agricultural experts, not a brutish peasantry. Like other products of the 
First ‘Aliyah, Aaronsohn was proud of his knowledge of Arabic and Arab ways, and he 
saw no reason why Jews and Arabs should not work together, so long as the former 
dominated the latter.”73 Fascinatingly, his 1910 bulletin used the local Arabic names for 
local crops (e.g. “Bint-el-Bascha”) in addition to their Latin names. 
However, Aaronsohn’s clearly disparaging view of Arab agricultural practices 
was evidenced in his writings. Although he occasionally expressed respect for local 
knowledge, he believed local practices should be documented and placed in the service of 
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settlement activities. A story recounted by Aaronsohn on the search for wild wheat 
illustrates this. Also note his use of Arabic: 
The habits of these two plants are so similar that the Arabs fail to distinguish 
them, although they are given to more or less close observation of natural 
phenomena. Several times I have asked the Arabs to gather for me some stools of 
wild Triticum like the sample which I gave them. They always brought me back 
Hordeum spontaneous. Nor have I been able to find any special word in their 
language for wild wheat. They always called it “scha’ir barri” or “scha’ir iblisse” 
(wild barley or devil’s barley). But, when I asked if it was not wild wheat, they 
admitted that it was “kamh barri” (wild wheat), being eager, as the Arab always 
is, to agree with the opinion of a guest.74  
The quote confirms his dependence on Arab assistants, no doubt also guiding him in the 
search leading to his discovery of the wild wheat and its announcement in German 
botanical journals. More crucially, these writings produce the effect of a sharp distinction 
between local knowledge produced under “centuries of stagnation” and the modern 
knowledge systems, based on Linnaean taxonomies.75 Aaronsohn’s chief concern was 
“danger of the destruction of these races of plants in consequence of the general leveling 
which is a necessary accompaniment of national awakening and progress.”76 He believed 
that the only way to ensure the future use of this unique genetic pool was through 
“exhaustive research” into existing peasant practices and seed stocks. Most importantly, 
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the results of this research would illustrate the “success of our colonization in Palestine” 
and connect it to the wider projects of European colonialism that he was deeply entangled 
with in the United States and Germany: “The results can be well compared with those to 
be obtained in other lands of colonization.”77 
Despite his longstanding educational and scientific connections to European 
institutions, Aaronsohn made it clear that that American models of agricultural research 
offered the best way forward. Speaking to his audience in Montana about the need for 
more research in Palestine he stated, “Europeans, being afraid of new ideas, will never 
furnish these means and will never carry on these researches”.78 Aaronsohn believed that 
the settlement project within the United States afforded its scientists a more useful vision 
than his European counterparts who explored distant lands for colonial extractive 
economies. It is as though for the first time, while on his tour of the United States, 
Aaronsohn saw a project of scientific inquiry that could work in the service of settlement, 
something that resonated deeply with his own vision for Zionist settlement of Palestine. 
He stated that the United States had “a geographical situation which enables the people of 
this country to understand and make use of all that is best in the East and West”.79 Thus, 
it is the ‘geographical situation’ of the United States (understood here as the spatial 
patterns of settlement and control over land) that helps Americans to understand the 
importance of practical research, unlike European institutions that support exploration. 
For Aaronsohn, European colonial scientific institutions apparently did not fully 
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understand the stakes of his scientific research in Palestine, whereas scientific endeavors 
in settler-colonial contexts like the United States aimed for new understanding of the 
land that would be the basis of a new society. Echoing language from the U.S. land grant 
research system that he would have witnessed on his tour, Aaronsohn told his American 
audience that research should have a “practical, economic importance, an importance 
which I dare to call social”.80 Here the land question at the heart of settler-colonialism is 
revealed through Aaronsohn’s contrast of American and European interest in his efforts 
to establish a research station in Palestine. 
Although the research station lasted only five years until the First World War and 
a lack of support caused it to close, its effect was felt in a generation of technically 
trained agricultural researchers in Palestine. Aaronsohn’s later exploits in espionage 
against the Germans have earned him a recent surge in interest and several general-
audience books on the topic.81  However, it is clear from the series of connections 
outlined above that, like Orientalist painters, Aaronsohn’s surveys, writings, and research 
programs staged, for the first time, an abstract representational space to gather the myriad 
local cultivation practices of Arab peasants under the sign of ‘Palestinian cultivation’. 
This representational space does not stand apart from the connections, some of which are 
described above. Rather, the abstract concept of cultivation emerges precisely from the 
encounter of settler-colonialism and its attendant scientific research arms. In calling for 
the preservation of local knowledge, Aaronsohn also effectively gathered the diversity of 
local practice under one category in the service of Zionist “national awareness and 
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progress.” This had the important effect of making his scientific endeavors appear 
separate from the wider circulation of seeds, know-how, and capital through the settler-
colonial processes of domination that made it possible. As we see next, another 
prominent agricultural scientist, Elazari-Volcani, took this representational apparatus to 
new heights in the next decade. 
 
Interlude: terrains of settler-colonialism 
Before moving to the second section of this chapter, I would like to pause to consider the 
promise of a comparative settler-colonial approach. While all modern colonial projects 
develop representational spaces for the study and classification of the vernacular 
geography, settler-colonial projects, whether in the United States, South Africa, Canada, 
or Australia, must relentlessly territorialize themselves for the purpose of settlement.82 
Though dwarfed by the devastation visited upon native and enslaved peoples in the 
Americas, Palestine’s Manichean spheres of human habitation offer a prism to consider 
the conceptual underpinnings of what might be called the land question of settler-
colonialism. As settler-colonialism’s distinguishing feature, the control over land resides 
at the heart of its efforts to understand and in doing so, represent the spaces it settles. The 
texts by scientists, intellectuals, and writers showcased in this chapter guide us through a 
complex and often contradictory effort to codify Palestinian Arab knowledge, reshaping 
the terms of modern knowledge itself in the process. 
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What binds Palestine to other colonial spaces is the division of the world into 
compartmentalized oppositions. Following Timothy Mitchell, colonial power is derived 
from the bifurcation of the world into binary oppositions.83 It is argued here that another 
understanding of knowledge production, one that shows its mixed and fragmentary 
nature, better apprehends how knowledge is produced and what effects it has. More 
importantly, however, it also troubles the exclusive legitimacy claimed by colonial 
expertise. What emerges is a species of history informed by the political-ecology 
tradition in geography that has taught us to understand the distinction between nature and 
culture, or politics and science, not only as enacted but also as a basis for the exercise of 
colonial expertise and power. This spatial history, as I call it, lays bare the previously 
unexplored connections between European settler enterprises as the Zionist project 
sought information and guidance from other colonial projects with experience in the Arab 
world and beyond.84 
 Examination of the technical texts and documents produced by Palestinians over 
the same period illustrates a vigorous debate regarding the complex transformations 
taking place. This gave rise to a contested field of knowledge, not a knowledge transfer 
as it is conventionally known. Building on pioneering work by scholars from India, I 
follow El Shakry’s suggestion that other colonial spaces might hold clues about the 
relationship between knowledge and political life.85 As such, in “tracing the development 
of a mode” of agricultural and environmental inquiry, it is hoped that we will also better 
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grasp the role of structures of knowledge in the historical process of dispossession.  For it 
is in the production of objects of inquiry, wittingly or unwittingly, that regimes of 
intervention are made possible. The interventionist impulse that has transformed the 
Palestinian countryside has been largely divorced from the modes of scientific inquiry 
that have enabled and undergirded it from the beginning. While Israeli policies of land 
confiscation, water restriction, dispossession, and limitations on movement have been 
rightly cited for these transformations, the more subtle shifts taking place in the register 
of human reason and logic are left unnoticed.  
Why is the settler-colonial context important? Because Palestinians were facing a 
project to take control of land for settlement of other people, their interest in modern 
knowledge historically centered on the need to remain, to persevere, and to retain their 
livelihood from working the land. Zionism clearly sought the reform of Palestinian life 
through various modes of governmental practices; the modes worked ultimately in the 
service of dispossession.86  
The “clean break” between traditional and modern agriculture, thus, was the 
effect of a politics of representation that resulted in the emergence of abstract scientific-
legal object. The emergence of this object catalyzed a governmental field of intervention 
that could both retain Palestinian cultivators as cultivators but also act upon their 
practices to reform them. The scholarly efforts to understand the emergence of the modes 
of government in colonial contexts has been well-documented87 within postcolonial 
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studies and subaltern studies, but the articulation of modern systems of knowledge across 
a settler-colonial space of difference has not. This is distinct from other colonial contexts 
because the settlement enterprise staged modes of knowledge to bring more land under its 
control. Settler colonialism distinguishes itself as both the control over land and 
settlement of Europeans in non-European spaces but also for its paradoxical reliance on 
local people for the survival and prosperity of the settlements.88 This latter component of 
the settler-colonial “double bind” must be persistently suppressed to uphold the story of 
autochthonous accomplishment of the settlers. The land question, as a central feature of 
settler-colonialism, informs my exploration of the politics of representation used to 
produce cultivation as a scientific object. 
 
A WORD ON METHOD 
The material that explored here evokes a particular relationship of history and geography 
that I have called a vernacular theory of shadow spaces. Harnessing the double valence of 
the term ẓill-shadow as both trace and shelter, I argue traces haunt conventional histories 
of cultivation precisely in their capacity to shelter alternative accounts. In this way, the 
shadow space both marks a trace or ruin in a narrative or a landscape, but also shelters 
other forms of political and social community that await activation. More generally, such 
an understanding of history and geography enables me to explore not only the paths that 
were not taken at a given conjuncture, but also better understand the path that was taken. 
This approach is indebted to the genealogical method.  
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What is meant by a genealogy? Here I work from the tradition elaborated 
famously by Michel Foucault in which he contrasted conventional linear, event-based 
history with a genealogical mode that asks how something operates and comes to be 
naturalized. This means that Foucault didn't seek to explicate 'institutions' or 'theories' but 
rather 'regimes of practices' in order to understand the logics undergirding that practice89. 
Importantly, Foucault notes that the resulting narratives challenge dominant histories. He 
argued, "It's a matter of shaking this self-evidence, of demonstrating its precariousness, of 
making visible not its arbitrariness, but its complex interconnection with a multiplicity of 
historical processes many of them of recent date".90  
 How does one conduct genealogy? A crucial component of such an intellectual 
labor for Foucault is the role of  "subjugated knowledges".91 He believed these 
knowledges are best understood in two senses. First, ‘buried knowledges’ in which, 
"historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence or 
formal systemization" and second as ‘disqualified knowledges’ that have been 
"disqualified from the hierarchy of knowledges and sciences".92 These two senses offer a 
way of understanding both the buried and the disqualified classes of knowledge that 
underpin genealogical inquiry. 
 Antonio Gramsci, however, gives the subject of counter-history a more forceful 
valence by showing how critical consciousness emerges from the "certain specific 
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problems posed by reality".93 In this way, Gramsci saw consciousness as inexorably 
linked to the surrounding circumstances of the philosopher and therefore not capable of 
being abstracted for the purpose of creating a general theory. Edward Said took up this 
political valence by showing how Gramsci was “programmatically opposed” to the 
“tendency to homogenize, equalize, mediatize everything, what we can call the 
temporalizing and homological function by which the whole problem of specificity, 
locality, and/or identity is reformulated so as to make equivalence.”94  This reading of 
Gramsci’s intellectual practice extends Foucault’s insights on genealogical method: the 
outcome is an intellectual endeavor that unsettles established historical narratives. 
Moreover, this notion of counter-history dovetails with my notion of shadow space, in 
which the historical traces activate and enable unconventional histories and de-activate 
others. 
 Partha Chatterjee has recently commented on the status of a related intellectual 
project–Subaltern Studies–that sought to challenge dominant histories. Chatterjee noted a 
recent turn in the humanities and social sciences to the study of practices that “highlights 
the autonomous status of embodied or institutional practices whose significance cannot 
simply be read off texts describing the underlying concepts.”  This does not mean, 
however, that specificity does not present its own problems. The price paid, Chatterjee 
says, for “the shift to the ethnographic, the practical, the everyday, the local”95 is that 
they do not travel well.  However, for Chatterjee, “The challenge is to devise appropriate 
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forms of writing that will preserve the integrity of the study, as well as make it accessible 
outside the region.”96  This dissertation addresses this question of specificity by stating: 
theoretically rich insights emerge precisely from close attention to the specificity of a 
given situation. The tempting appeal to universality in theory is not always desirable and 
also negates the powerful theory-making potential of specific cases. In this way, shadow 
spaces offer opportunities for the actualization, both metaphorical and material, of their 
embedded traces. More importantly however, the insights from Foucault, Gramsci and 
Subaltern Studies illustrate how in the shift from ‘history’ to ‘genealogy’, the stability of 
categories like ‘Fellah’s Farm’ is called into question. In other words, by focusing 
attention on the historical traces that stitch together the present, I am better able to 
explore the moments when alternative trajectories and narratives were foreclosed. 
Moreover, as the double valence of the ẓill-shadow illustrates, I am better able to 
recognize that texts, landscape and memory shelter a variety of political possibilities that 
the colonized can activate.  
The dissertation now continues with the exploration of the representational 
politics, in this case through agricultural experimental design, which produced cultivation 
as a scientific and legal object. 
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SECTION II. PALESTINIAN CULTIVATION UNDER EXPERIMENT 
The Marj ibn ͑Amir plain of northern Palestine, between Haifa and Nazareth, is well-
known to Israelis and Palestinians. Also known as the Jezreel Valley or Plain of 
Esdraleon, the area was known as the breadbasket of Historic Palestine; its bountiful 
grain production was said to feed both Palestine and its environs. If you were to visit the 
area today, you would see a carpet of patchwork fields that elicits for Israelis the bygone 
utopian-agrarian era of early Zionism. However, for Palestinians, the Marj ibn ͑Amir 
evokes one of the most painful chapters in the long struggle over land rights with the 
Zionist movement. The Marj ibn ͑Amir became a primary foothold of the Zionist 
settlement project in the 1920s through a series of secret land purchases with absentee 
land investors in Beirut. The subsequent displacement of local peasants, the 
establishment of Zionist settlements, and the eventual expulsion of Palestinians from the 
area in April and July 1948 dispossessed Palestinians of the plain. As such, the area has 
long been a flashpoint for considering the cultivation rights of tenant Arab farmers.  
Over a period of about ten years after 1900, the Jewish National Fund succeeded in 
purchasing massive tracts of farmland in the Marj ibn ͑Amir. The land deals exploited the 
fact that business families in Beirut owned much of the land and had little regard for the 
political implications or the fate of tenant farmers scattered in villages throughout the 
plain. The displacement of cultivators from their ancestral lands by the new owners and 
establishment of Jewish colonies on those lands caused massive upheavals of both 
peasant and urban Arab resistance, helping to cement Palestinian national consciousness 
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around the effects of land dispossession.97 This section explores the lingering effects of a 
more subtle strain of the Marj ibn ͑Amir’s history: an agricultural experimentation project 
conducted by Zionist agronomists in the 1920s. 
It was in this context of upheaval and colonization that a leading agronomist 
working for the Jewish Agency embarked on radically new kind of experiment in 
Palestine. We saw in the previous section that the experimentation enterprise of 
Aaronsohn employed Arab cultivators and sought to understand their practices. However, 
this experiment sought to do what Aaronsohn had neither the resources nor interest to 
complete: a “scientific” comparison of peasant and modern agricultural systems. In doing 
so, the author of the study, Yitzhak Elazari-Volcani (Wilkansky), powerfully reproduced 
the effect of an absolute distinction between the two abstract concepts. Penslar has argued 
that Volcani (Wilkansky) played an instrumental role in the research arm of the Zionist 
agricultural efforts, calling him its “most eloquent spokesman” despite his writings being 
“steeped in an odd brew of anti-industrialism and technophilia.”98 This was due to 
Volcani’s advocacy of the modernization of extensive, non-irrigated grain production 
built on careful and lengthy experimentation. This position eventually came to be 
considered retrograde by the Zionist movement, but Volcani’s role as director of the 
research organization for twenty years, through its absorption into the new Israeli state’s 
Ministry of Agriculture, was enshrined when the center was renamed the Volcani 
Institute. 
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 In his role as study director, beginning in 1914 Volcani began to carefully collect 
data from at least four sources. First, with Palestinian cultivators still living on part of 
their lands in the valley (probably unaware of their pending displacement), Volcani began 
to take careful notes on the lifestyle, household economy, and planting practices in 1914 
of the 50-60 tenant farmers on 1,000 hectares living on land now owned by the Jewish 
National Fund (JNF). These observations collected by farm supervisors were carried out 
for ten years. Second, he collected records from his previous work at two experimental 
farms over ten years, 1909-1919. Third, Volcani and his assistants collected records from 
the farmers of villages adjacent to the experiment station. Fourth, and most importantly, 
Volcani hired a local peasant to farm a plot within an experimental block design for the 
purpose of comparing it to “modern production systems.”  
Let us return to Tel al- ͑Adas the village described in the introduction as the site of 
Volcani’s study.  Volcani from the outset assumed the future dispossession of his 
research subjects, describing the land as “worked by tenant farmers until transferred to 
the new colonists.”99 Thus, the about-to-be-displaced farmers constituted a precious 
opportunity for study of local practices; “the threshing floor and fields were supervised 
by watchmen in the employ of the company, and an exact record of crops was kept from 
year to year.”100 The names of Tel- ͑Adas, Jinjar, Jebata, and Tel Al-Fir, all villages whose 
inhabitants were displaced by the purchase of their land by the Palestine Land 
Development Corporation (PLDC) from external landlords, haunt Volcani’s text.101 More 
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importantly, however, photographs of the soon-to-be-dispossessed people while 
winnowing, plowing, and harvesting haunt the text. The minutely detailed records, 
Volcani stressed, were collected while managing the land temporarily “before its 
transference for colonization purposes.”102 The remarks column (see below in Figure 1) 
illustrates the displacement of a village by marking the end of a particular experiment. 
For example Volcani carefully notes that his data sources from the village of “Tel- ͑Adas” 
ends in 1923– the year that corresponds to the establishment of the colony of Tel 
Adashim in its stead.  
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1915 62 15 7 3 2 2 4370-8'5 778-6'5 290-5 24-1 58-9 - 286 - - 150dunams=15ha. 
1916 46 11 7 4 1 1 2907-7 901-3 361-4 44-1 50-7 310 - 1217-3 951-1 Tenure-Tel-Adas 
1917 51'5 12 5 7 2 - 3779-5 781-3'5 - 5-7'5 19-3 872-10 3744-9 -
1918 54 19 6 5 2 - 2694-11'5 924-8 - 3-7'5 - 1132-2 2770-10'5 -
1919 57 19 9 5 - 1 3688-9-5 1221-6 - 56-10 251-8 1622-9 238 - 108-4'5 
1920 57 20 8 4 1 1 3503-5'2 1088-3'5 - 138-2'5 204-1 1600-6'5 1315-3 322-2'8 
1921 61 17 11 1 1 - 1835-3,5 1031-7 - 85-8 120-9'2 767-4-8 239-10 -
1922 55 13 9 5 1 1 2306-7,5 570-6'5 - 52 - 94-7'5 818-9 712-8'5 225-5'8 
1923 37 10 7 3 1 - 1956-6 535 - - 19-10'5 43-7 170-2'5 336 - 130-7'5 
1921 39,5 - - - - - 910-6'2 671-11 - 12-0,8 74':"4'5 399-11 256-7'5 9-11'8 Djendjure 
1922 33 - - - - - 1400-10'5 523-4 - 10-7 30-2 209-11 348-11 105-0'5 
1923 16,5 - - - - - 906-5 150-11 - - - - - -
1921 46'5 - - - - - 1063-1 513-3 129-9 28-6-8 12-6'8 102-2'5 402-7 30-4 Nahalal 
1922 - - - - - - 534-6 66 - - 12-3'5 - - I 92-6 31-8 Tel-Alfire 
Sources of data: Material arranged and condensed by the author from yearly accounts between the Palestine La.nd Develope 
ment Company and tenants on an area of about 10,000 dunams, before its transference for colonisation purposes. 
 
Figure 1: page 33 from Elazari-Volcani, “The Fallaḥ’s Farm” (1930) 
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C hap t e r Two. 
SEASONS OF AGRICULTURAL WORK. 
The festivals of Israel are fixed for the most part accord-
ing to the seasons of agricultural labour: the counting of the-
Orner from the feast of Passover, the feast of first fruits, and 
the feast of in-gathering. Now as of old the work of the thresh-
ing floor finishes in the farm of the Fellah at the end of Tishri 
(October). From harvest time to in-gathering man and beast 
pass from the confinement of the clay hut to the unconfined 
threshing-floor under the open sky. That is then where life 
throbs both by day and night. The harvest passes, the summer 
ends, the threshing finishes, and the threshing floor is emptied 
of living creatures and the last remnants of produce. Then 
commences the great work of household renovation, the women 
taking command. It is they who gather dry grass in the fields 
and bring it home on their shoulders, who mix mud for mortar 
and crush to powder the animal dung when it has been dried. 
A mixture of these materials with stubble serves for plastering 
the roofs and the walls. Under the diligent hands of the women 
the walls are clothed with new coats of plaster. The low cone-
shaped straw-stacks are renovated with a flew coat of moist 
plaster. The men after the hard work of the threshing-floor 
now sit with their hands folded and chat idly, raising the while 
their eyes to heaven appealingly; for without the early rain the 
husbandman cannot go out to his work in the field. 
The first rain. - The first early rain which deserves the 
name moistens the soil to a depth of about 20 mms. It is only 
16 
]\Iending the plough 
First ploughing  
Figure 2: page 17 from Elazari-Volcani, “The Fallaḥ’s Farm” (1930) 
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Founded on the displaced Jebata village, the new Zionist settlement of Gevat was set up 
in 1926.103 In the same year of its establishment, Volcani reserved 340 acres for grain 
experiments, making it an official branch station founded by his new research institute 
five years before. This was part of a larger effort of the Jewish Agency to build a research 
infrastructure “based in principle on the land-grant college model” of the United 
States.104 Established in 1921 near Rehovot by the Keren Hayesod and then handed over 
to the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the institute sought to provide a rigorous, evidence-
based approach to agricultural colonization. Writing in 1932, Volcani said that the station 
would host one of the agricultural divisions focused on grain. 
The Institute has a Central Station at Rehoboth and a branch at Gevath, Valley of 
Esdraelon. The offices, the laboratories, and the Citrus, Feeding, and Extension 
Divisions are in Rehoboth; the agricultural divisions at Gevath. At the Central 
Experimental Station, there are about 325 acres devoted to experiments in 
plantations, field crops, and vegetable. At the Station Jebata in the Emek, there 
are 340 acres devoted primarily to grain experiments.105 
One of the most striking features of this quote is that Volcani interchangeably uses both 
the original Arabic name and the newly imposed Hebrew place-name: “Gevath” first and 
“Jebata” later. This interchangeable use of both the displaced Palestinian village’s name 
and the name of the new settlement marks the lingering legacy of the recent 
dispossession. How exactly was Palestinian cultivation isolated and produced as an 
                                                
103 (Huneidi, 2001, pp. 224–225; Khalidi, 2010, p. 113); Moshe Dayan’s famous quote about no part of Palestine 
without Arab inhabitants included Gevath/Jabata in the list. (E. W. Said, 1979, p. 8) 
104 (I. Arnon, 1989, p. 652) 
105 (J. Elazari-Volcani, 1932, p. 92) 
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abstract object? In other words, if we are exploring the politics of representation in this 
chapter, how did the experimental design of Elazari-Volcani in Jebata begin to build a 
frame of representation for Palestinian cultivation? 
 
 
Shadow Spaces of the “Arab Fallaḥ” Experiment 
The Jebata/Gevath agricultural research farm and settlement in the Galilee hosted a 
seemingly unremarkable encounter in 1926. An Arab man from the Palestinian farming 
village of al-Mujaydil was brought by a Jewish agricultural scientist to cultivate a patch 
of land at the experiment station. The farmer, his wife, and their four children, among 
others, were asked to work the plot in a traditional manner:  
The area set aside for the primitive system is cultivated strictly with the prevailing 
system. To ensure greater certainty, this portion has been handed over to an Arab 
fallaḥ, who cultivates it as his own expense, according to his own methods 
without any influence on our part, the Division simply taking exact notes on his 
methods of cultivation, hours of work, the cost of maintaining his working teams 
and of providing essential food requirements.106 
We would have very little information were it not that Volcani mentioned in a side note 
that the fallaḥ’s family hailed from al-Mujaydil. It was a relatively large town of 2,000 
Arab inhabitants. Perched on the south face of an escarpment 250 meters in height, it 
looked over the Marj ibn ͑Amir, the famed Galilean plain of about 380 square kilometers 
                                                
106 (I Elazari-Volcani, 1930)  
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that was known as the breadbasket of Palestine. It had a mixed Muslim-Christian Arab 
populace that mostly depended on agriculture. The two churches, Eastern Orthodox and 
Roman Catholic, each had schools. A religious elementary school accompanied the 
village mosque. The town also hosted a health clinic and state school. Comparatively 
prosperous, al-Mujaydil boasted two cereal mills and two olive presses, making it an 
important processing center for local farmers and, as it were, Jewish settlers in the early 
years of the Yishuv. The international connections and intensity of agricultural production 
in the Marj ibn ͑Amir plain is illustrated by longstanding exports of wheat to Italy for 
pasta and barley to Germany for alcohol production.107 The village classified its holding 
into two land types common to Palestine, wa’ar (rugged, hilly) and marj (plain). Jaber 
Nassar, whose self-published memory book describes the social and agricultural history 
of the town, declared, “Al-Mujaydil, if compared with other Palestinian villages, would 
be called ‘blessed’ because of its location about 300 meters above sea level, its large 
expanse of lands, and its abundant water and natural springs.”108  
 
                                                
107 (Shafir, 1989, p. 29) 
108 (J. Nassar, 1991, p. 14) 
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nations to map (Continued). 
-="" 
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Figure 3: page 83 of Elazari-Volcani, “The Fallaḥ's Farm” (1930) 
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Al-Mujaydil was known to be politically innovative, establishing a pioneering form of 
village council to lead internal affairs. The three schools meant that its upwardly mobile 
villagers played an active role in the growing agitation against British officials for 
collusion with the Zionist settlement projects in the Galilee. Together with other nearby 
towns such as Saffuriyya, it provided numerous volunteers for the peasant backbone and 
higher leadership of the Arab rebellion of 1936-1939 against British Mandate authorities. 
According to some accounts, dozens of people from the al-Mujaydil village participated. 
Mujaydilis were particularly known for sabotaging the recently built British-sponsored 
pipeline that stretched from the oilfields of northern Iraq more than 600 miles to the 
Mediterranean through the refinery and port in Haifa. The pipeline passed at the foot of 
the village, weaving through Marj ibn ͑Amir just before reaching Haifa.  
An event in January 1938 illustrates the village’s daring. On this day, as they had 
done numerous other times, local rebels severed the pipeline. The increasingly frustrated 
and repressive British Mandate authorities arrested all of the men of the village in one 
raid on January 21, 1938. The women in the village protested, eventually going to 
Nazareth, where they were joined by other women’s groups, and demonstrated outside 
the military and government headquarters. In response, at least one source states that 
most of the men were released and two men who had been sentenced to death had their 
sentences commuted to life in prison.109 
                                                
109 Yāsīn, Ṣubḥī M. (1961). al-Thawrah al-ʻArabīyah al-kubrá fī Filasṭīn, 1936-1939. Damascus. pp. 91-92. 
(Swedenburg, 1995, p. 237) 
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Ten years before the protest, from 1926 to 1929, this village provided the peasant 
subject for the research farm’s elaborate experiment to scientifically establish the 
primacy of modern agriculture in Palestine.110 This apparently ordinary encounter 
between an agricultural scientist and a peasant, however, staged what was to become one 
of the most pervasive narratives in modern Palestinian history. For this particular 
experiment became a chief scientific warrant for the mythology that the Zionist 
movement, through its deployment of modern science, redeemed the Holy Land from the 
dilapidated situation produced by Arab habitation.111 The experiment results, published in 
1930, claimed to form the scientific basis for the superiority of modern agricultural 
methods in opposition to the traditional farming of Palestinian peasants.112 Scholars note 
that modern scientific knowledge was situated at the heart of the Zionist colonization 
project in Palestine through numerous fields, such as agronomy, hydrology, geology, 
archeology, medicine, and epidemiology. Paradoxically, this knowledge production 
enterprise hinged on collecting local knowledge about Palestinians. In July 1930, upon 
publishing the results of his study, the scientist directing the project stated, “Good 
relations with the Arab neighbors at the places mentioned facilitated the gathering of 
data. The fallaḥs understood that the questioners had no motive but to study conditions 
and to devise methods of increasing yield.”113 The systematic process of dispossession of 
                                                
110 Ostensibly an experiment, which assumes that a hypothesis is being tested, Elazari-Volcani made it known that only 
one farm system could serve as a model: “The mixed farm is the only one which can serve as an example in respect 
of the standard of life which is assures its owner, and it is this which is the chief point of departure for all the reforms 
which it is proposed to introduce in the other types of farms,” (I Elazari-Volcani, 1930, p. 68) 
111 (Kamen, 1991, p. 211) 
112 Elazari-Volcani explained his presuppositions on several occasions. He gave a clear chronology and teleology: “At 
opposite poles are the entirely primitive farm of the fellah and the consolidated mixed farm, while between them, the 
remaining types constitute gradual steps in development.” (I Elazari-Volcani, 1930, p. 67) 
113 (I Elazari-Volcani, 1930, p. iv) 
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the Marj ibn ͑Amir only inhabits the text as a specter. But, following Darwish, the ẓill-
shadow harbors the potential for the activation of future histories and imaginaries.  
 
… 
 
The Galilee convulsed with colonial violence within eighteen years of the agricultural 
experiment. For ten days in July 1948, Israeli forces implementing Operation Dekel 
moved methodically through at least fifteen villages, “cleansing” thousands of 
Palestinians. On July 15, 1948, the Golani Brigade of the Haganah militia took control of 
al-Mujaydil and expelled its population. Al-Mujaydil and the neighboring village of 
Saffuriyya were subject to a new tactic designed to terrorize the local inhabitants: 
bombing from the air.114 On that day in July, Jewish soldiers must have encountered a 
largely deserted town, its inhabitants taking refuge in the nearby city of Nazareth, 
believing that city would be spared for fear of European backlash. Nassar recounts that 
the town was deserted “except for a number of elderly and women who were dragged to 
the threshing floor area which was used as assembly point, where trucks appeared and 
they were forced to get on without any belongings and transferred them to Nazareth and 
where they were left to find the other members of their town.”115  
Jettisoned in Nazareth, the newly displaced and dispossessed farmers of al-
Mujaydil tried to reach their abandoned fields to harvest crops they had planted that 
                                                
114 “In fact, what developed in July was ethnic cleansing from the air, as air attacks became a major tool for sowing 
panic and wreaking destruction in Palestine’s larger villages in order to force people to flee before the actual 
occupation of the village” (Pappé, 2006, p. 172). 
115 (J. Nassar, 1991, p. 76) 
  61 
spring. They were met with a fierce response. Morris describes the scene based on Zionist 
archival sources: 
In August 1948, a Jezreel Battalion Golani patrol encountered “groups of Arab 
women working fields” near Al-Mujaydil, and they reported that: “I [squad OC 
Shalom Lipman] ordered the machine-gun to fire three bursts over their heads, to 
drive them off. They fled in the direction of the olive grove ... .” But after the 
patrol left, the villagers returned. The patrol came back and encountered “a group 
of Arab men and women ... . I opened fire at them and as a result one Arab man 
died and one Arab man and one woman were injured. In the two incidents, I 
expended 31 bullets.” The following day, 6 August, the same patrol encountered 
two Arab funeral processions. The commander remarked dryly that, “one can 
only assume that one of yesterday’s wounded died.” A day or two after, the 
patrol again encountered “a large group of Arab women in the fields of Mujeidil. 
When we approached them to drive them off, an Arab male [was found] hiding 
near them, [and] he was executed by us. The women were warned not to return 
to this area of Mujeidil.” The company commander commented: “Arab women 
repeatedly attempt to return to Mujeidil, and they are usually accompanied by 
men. I gave firm orders to stymie every attempt [lehasel kol nisayon] to return to 
the village of Mujeidil.”116  
  
                                                
116 Quoted in (Morris, 2004, pp. 445–446). According to (Morris, 2004, p. 460), “Battalion HQ to Golani\Intelligence, 8 
August 1948, IDFA 128\51\\32 The report says that the executions occurred on ‘3.8.48’, but this would seem to be an 
error; it should probably read ‘7.8.48.’ The use of the word lehasel, literally, ‘to liquidate,’ is indicative. Also typical is 
the shift to passive mode when reporting the executions.” 
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The complication internal to the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians in 
1948 was that those who were able to stay near their homes kept trying to reach their 
fields. Lt. Gen. John B. Glubb of the British Army illustrated the “infiltration” problem of 
farmers seeking to tend their crops in late 1948: 
Some deep psychological urge which impels a peasant to cling to and die on his 
land. A great many of these wretched people are killed now [by the Israeli army], 
picking their own oranges and olives just beyond the [frontier] line. The value of 
the fruit is often negligible. If the Jewish patrols see him he is shot dead on the 
spot, without any questions. But they will persist in returning to their farms and 
gardens.117 
The violence exacted on farmers trying to salvage their crops was meant to set an 
example for the rest.  For the Zionist project, at least in this part of the storied Marj 
ibn ͑Amir plain, the Palestinian peasant had transmuted from research subject to menace in 
less than twenty years.  
Within a few years, the nascent Israeli state had bulldozed the village (along with 
hundreds of others) and carried its valuable stone away for construction elsewhere. Fast-
growing evergreen saplings were planted over the remains. In 1950, under strong 
pressure from the Vatican, the town’s Christians were offered the chance to return to the 
village but refused, in part, because their Muslim neighbors were not included.118 The 
entire village, save for the town’s two churches and mosque, was bulldozed. By 1952, the 
Israeli government had founded a new settlement for Iranian Jewish immigrants, known 
                                                
117 Quoted in (Fischbach, 2003, p. 76) 
118 (Pappé, 2006, p. 153) 
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as Migdal ha-Emek, upon the ruins. Six kilometers away in Nazareth, the people of al-
Mujaydil had jammed into the houses of relatives and friends, sleeping on monastery 
grounds and in other impromptu locations, now severed from their land.119 
Nassar said that he wrote his village history book lest future generations forget 
that al-Mujaydil was in fact an Arab village whose inhabitants were forced out, unlike the 
description given by tour guides today of “remains of Roman villages that were destroyed 
over time by earthquakes and other natural disasters.”120 The author of this particular 
memory book was one of the few who was able to remain in historic Palestine as an 
“internal” refugee and was able to describe the destruction, aftermath, and effacement 
(tams as he calls it in Arabic) of the village where he was born in 1919. Because of the 
density of the trees that were planted, Nassar was not able to locate his family’s home in 
the village. He said that he was able to locate the homes of others from their wells, 
noting, “The occupier has tried to disguise the remains of the occupied villages by a 
variety of methods”.121 
According to Nassar, some olive groves remained intact after the occupation. 
Faced with a lack of knowledge about olive production and a labor shortage, the new 
Israeli occupants accorded some village families the indignity of picking their own olive 
groves for a harvest-share, an arrangement traditionally reserved for day-laborers.122 This 
situation was repeated in other parts of Palestine, most notably in the vast citrus groves of 
the Jaffa area, where Palestinian refugees who had remained within Israel were brought 
                                                
119 (J. Nassar, 1991, p. 76) 
120 (R. Davis, 2011) 
121 (J. Nassar, 1991, p. 5) 
122 (J. Nassar, 1991, pp. 82–83) 
  64 
back to work their own family’s former orange groves, transforming them from 
proprietors to contracted manual labor.123 We see in the next chapter how legal categories 
like the ‘cultivated land’ and ‘absentee property’ were produced in the wake of this 
dispossession. These categories, especially following the creation of the Custodian of 
Absentee Property, link the question of cultivation with the legal processes required to 
consolidate control over land after 1948.124  
 
Palestine-as-Experiment 
Samera Esmeir’s recent work has brilliantly described a central temporal function of 
modern law: “In its quest to homogenize the world, the colonizing power of modern law 
was directed not only at the present but also at the bond between the present and past.”125 
Similarly, Mitchell has recently called for exploration of processes by which technical 
projects “produce the forms of distance, separation, concentration, and difference that 
could be organized into the distinction between modern environments and modern 
environmental imaginaries.”126 In this section we explore two central operations that 
enable Volcani to posit an absolute break between present modern agricultural production 
as essentially apart from past local practices in his study of the “Fallaḥ’s Farm.” 
First, Volcani sought to establish the unchanging, deficient character of the 
peasant agricultural system. This is most explicitly stated at the opening of his chapter on 
the experiment itself: 
                                                
123 For example, see interviews with Hassouneh family in (Sivan, 2010) 
124 (Fischbach, 2003) 
125 (Samera Esmeir, 2012, p. 22) 
126 (Mitchell, 2011a, p. 270) 
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In general the plan follows two main lines: that adopted in existing farms in 
accordance with their essential characteristics, and the new line marked out by the 
division of Agronomy and the Division of Plant-Breeding. In regard to the first, 
the system of farming is carried out on set lines without any alternation; while in 
the second, the farm is worked according to those positive results which have 
been obtained by the various divisions of the Experimental Station.127 
At the level of experimental design, Volcani reveals his understanding of the ontological 
divide between systems. Here the fixed, unchanging, “essential characteristics” of 
existing farms are compared with the “new line” based on experimentation, change, and 
progress. At the level of description, Volcani states this position frequently: “From the 
time of Ruth up to this day there has scarcely been any change, neither in the methods of 
its operation nor in its notions.”128 And, with regard to the appearance of Arab villages, 
“The whole village both in its external appearance and in its structure seems to have risen 
out of the soil on which it stands.”129 Here local practices have fossilized unchanging 
essence through both the experimental design itself and in descriptions of Arab 
Palestinian cultivators. This narrative of the unchanging character of agriculture clearly 
demarcated a space within which metrics of evaluation on the status of cultivation could 
be brought to bear. 
Second, the execution of the experiment began from the premise of two 
hermetically sealed groups of experiments: “Results of Experiments in Modern Farming” 
                                                
127 (I Elazari-Volcani, 1930, pp. 65–66) 
128 (I Elazari-Volcani, 1930, p. 28) 
129 (I Elazari-Volcani, 1930, p. 40) 
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and “Results in Experiments in Fields of the Fallaḥ.”130 Thus, the experiment starts from 
an inherent, essential divide between the two. The experiment was set up in the following 
manner. An area of 250 dunams (61 acres) was divided into seven units to test various 
cropping systems. One unit of 60 dunams (14.8 acres) was left to the “the fallaḥ of the 
neighboring village of Medjdel,” who worked it at his own expense. The peasant plot was 
further divided into six plots of 10 dunams (2.46 acres) each. Elazari-Volcani organized 
these plots into various two-year crop rotations: (a) wheat (Triticum durum) and a legume 
(like Cicer arietinum), (b) wheat and sorghum (Sorghum bicolor), and (c) wheat and 
sesame (Sesamum indicum). The experiments included one experimental treatment with 
fertilizer in the ‘Arab’ cropping pattern and one without. The peasant plots were adjacent 
to the other plots run by the experiment station. The peasant’s tillage practices, his crops, 
and minute details of his life were carefully recorded, including what he ate, including the 
timing and cost, as well as the cost of his clothing and descriptions of his daily schedule. 
As with many experiments, the number of variables was reduced to one or two. 
Specifically, the experiment aimed to determine the best way to improve soil fertility 
through three different conservation strategies: (a) fallow, (b) green manure, or (b) row 
planting. The various rotations in the predetermined “modern” and “fallaḥ” group were 
compared against those treatments. Notably, Volcani described the results of the “fallaḥ” 
experiments in detail, drawing extensive conclusions about their viability and future 
recommendations, but he spared this extrapolation in the analysis of the “modern” 
systems. This was because “all of the factors of production in modern farms have been 
                                                
130 (I Elazari-Volcani, 1930, p. 83;90) 
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specially studied on hundreds of actual farms (not experimental ones), the results of 
which have been published in separate treatise.”131 According to Volcani, it follows, 
leniency was not accorded the “fallaḥ” system because its essential characteristics were 
known in advance. Therefore, unlike the modern farm, for Volcani the “fallaḥ farm” 
stands alone as an “organic unity” in which the farmer is “not dependent on external 
economic factors and he is not affected by the changes and vicissitudes of the outer 
world.”132  
The timeless, unchanging character of the Fallaḥ’s Farm then is made possible 
through a series of occlusions within the experimental design, such as the grouping of 
treatments. Myriad factors are shared, and the separation between the two categories is 
constantly undermined by the eruption of natural forces (such as mice and drought in this 
case) and by the mixed way in which the modern is always already enabled by the 
effaced labor of the local. Only close attention to the details of the experiment itself and 
the circumstances of its execution offers this vantage point. While the results of the 
experiment provide an intriguing view of the mechanics of colonial science, it is the 
experiment’s unintended byproduct that offers the most important contribution: the 
staging of Palestinian agriculture and society as discrete objects of inquiry and 
intervention. 
 
 
 
                                                
131 (I Elazari-Volcani, 1930, pp. 90–91) 
132 (I Elazari-Volcani, 1930, p. 39) 
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SECTION THREE. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored a series of connections between agricultural practice, 
knowledge, and politics. It argues that this situation gave rise to the abstract conception 
of Palestinian cultivation, creating the effect of its autonomy from the processes that 
brought it into being. This politics of representation relied on what I have called an index 
used to evaluate cultivation, something that was produced through the regimes of 
scientific experimentation explored above. Unlike most scholarship on the history of 
Historic Palestine, this cultivation index is not considered in isolation to systems of 
representation in other colonial spaces–as something apart from the colonial encounter. 
Indeed, I have sought to understand how the enterprise of modern scientific knowledge-
making articulates within the colonial encounter of violence, domination, racial orders, 
and ethnic hierarchies. Until now, the kinds of knowledge produced by the nameless 
fallaḥ in Elazari-Volani’s studies have been considered on their own terms as facts, 
divorced not only from the production of those objects of knowledge as such but also 
from the devastation that convulsed Palestine within a few short years. By contrast, this 
dissertation investigates knowledge production through that which stands in its shadow. 
In concrete terms, this would mean that the agricultural knowledge and its connections to 
other settler-colonial encounters cannot be understood but in relation to its shadow 
spaces: the erasure of Jebata, the displacement of Tel- ͑Adas, as well as al-Mujaydil’s 
bombing, ethnic cleansing, and demolition within twenty years.133 These events do not 
elaborate a causal relationship as conventionally understood between agronomic 
                                                
133 Think about this more because topographically the experiment station also literally stood in the shadow of Al-
Mujaydil. 
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experimentation and dispossession; rather they mark the question of cultivation in 
Palestine and illustrate the development of an analytic basis for future legal actions to 
consolidate control over land. Thus, my contention is not that agronomic research directly 
causes dispossession, but rather that the representations of local agriculture generated by 
this research enable dispossession by providing scientific warrant for settler colonialism 
at various moments in time. Hence, agronomic representations become a vital element in 
the repeating re-invention of the past for the present. This is what I have called the 
politics of representation that produces Palestinian cultivation as an abstract object. I 
explore this claim in the next chapter. 
 This genealogical method of study also gives rise to new perspectives on the 
spatial history of knowledge in Palestine.134 Namely, it is not possible to understand those 
spatial histories without shining light into the shadows, the margins of the narrative of 
modern progress. There, obscured from view, are the living remnants, what Mahmoud 
Darwish has called the “shadow geography,” that relentlessly surface to trouble the easy 
assumptions of colonial orders of knowledge and self-evidence. This chapter has 
explored the relationship of agricultural research and control over land as well as its 
structural connections to similar projects of territorial control in the United States. The 
shadow spaces, both material and narrative, haunt the conventional account of 
agricultural achievement. It is precisely in their capacity to shelter other accounts, that 
other stories haunt dominant histories. 
                                                
134 Spatial history is a method popularized by Paul Carter and others but has more recently re-emerged, e.g. Craib, R. 
B. (2004). Cartographic Mexico: a history of state fixations and fugitive landscapes. Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
Press.  
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 Let us return to the village of al-Mujaydil. The only structures spared when al-
Mujaydil was bulldozed, two churches and a mosque, survived for decades. The Catholic 
church, Dayr al Malāk Jibrā͗il or the Convent of the Archangel Gabriel, was protected by 
Vatican intervention and has stood intact as the new Israeli town engulfed its tiny 
structure. It remains in use by former residents of the town.135 The dilapidated mosque 
building was demolished in 2003 to make room for a shopping center. The Orthodox 
church lay in disrepair for many years. In the mid-1990s, former residents of al-Mujaydil 
founded an organization to work for the renovation of the church and registered it 
officially with the Israeli government.136 They fought legal battles but found assistance 
from an unlikely source: Russian immigrants. Many immigrants to Israel from Russia 
remained practicing Christians, and they assisted in the fundraising, protection, and 
renovation of the church and cemetery. Finally in 2004, the church reopened and now 
holds services in both Arabic and Russian.  
As the celebrated Palestinian filmmaker Michel Khleifi has shown in his 1985 
film, Ma͑lūl Taḥtafil Bi-damārha (Ma’loul Celebrates its Destruction), the former 
residents of many towns who remained in what is now Israel use this living record to 
reimagine both the past and the future.137 Ma’loul, a neighboring town to al-Mujaydil, 
suffered a similar fate. In the film, Khleifi follows former residents as they picnic in the 
ruins of the village on Israeli Independence Day, a tradition they practice each year.138 
                                                
135 The Arabic language website created by parishioners of this church can be found at: http://www.dmgm.org/ 
136 For more on this project, see Humphries, I. (2006, Summer-Autumn). Al-Mujaydil Church: the Possibilities of 
Community Action. Al-Majdal Quarterly Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.badil.org/en/al-majdal/item/1021-al-
mujaydil-churchthe-possibilities-of-community-action 
137 (Khleifi, 1985) 
138 For a literary reading, see (Abu-Manneh, 2006). 
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The town’s church grounds and cemetery were part of a pasture for the new Israeli town, 
and the church building itself was overrun with cattle. In a powerful sequence, the film 
follows an older man as he tries to locate the site of his demolished family home and is 
disoriented by the evergreen trees planted over sixty years ago. He first identifies a 
nearby small grove of olive trees, then a sabr cactus and carob tree, and finally an almond 
tree next to an olive tree. “There!” he exclaims, pointing at some stones. “The house was 
here.” Noting that the sabr cactus is still there but has moved over the decades, he carries 
on to look for a mulberry tree near his former neighbor’s home. 
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 Chapter 2: Cultivation and the Juridical Order 
 
A host of recent scholarship has produced novel and illuminating analysis of the Israeli 
control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These analyses, critical of occupation policies 
and their deleterious effects on Palestinians, have provided insightful insights on the 
mechanisms of territorial, economic, political, and social control exercised by various 
Israeli government agencies across time and space since 1967.139 The authors, in different 
ways, argue for consideration of the more subtle aspects of the occupation, the ways in 
which it has produced Palestinians as vulnerable and deficient subjects. While the debate 
covers both the Gaza Strip and West Bank, this chapter will focus solely on the West 
Bank given the better availability of research material and sources in that area. 
With regard to the question at issue in this dissertation, the question of cultivation, 
this academic body of work tells us that Palestinians in the West Bank rapidly 
“developed” their agricultural practices with the influx of Israeli funding, know-how, 
technology, and access to export markets. Analysis identifies a shift after the first ten 
years of the occupation, when a more conservative government came into power in 1977 
and cut funding for the programs. Authors do acknowledge that Israeli agronomic 
programs after 1967 sought to transform Palestinian agriculture in ways that made it 
more dependent on Israel for inputs, supplies, seeds, and know-how, but the thrust of 
their argument is that the “1979 transition” was meant to rectify a politically untenable 
policy that supported Palestinian agricultural livelihoods though the modernization 
                                                
139 (Azoulay & Ophir, 2012; Gordon, 2008; Hever, 2010; Makdisi, 2010; Weizman, 2007) 
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process. 140 In other words, the development programs of the early occupation, 
inadvertently or not, made Palestinian rural life more profitable and tenable. Therefore, 
the rise of the conservative Likud government in the late 1970s, combined with economic 
crisis in Israel, caused them to abandon the munificent agricultural programs. While these 
extensive development programs are striking, they are not novel to Palestine but rather 
are better understood as part of a longer process of governmentalized intervention in the 
sphere of cultivation. Cultivation thus is correctly understood as a site of politics in the 
1979 West Bank. However, I will argue next that this fact is part of longer story of the 
production of an abstract political concept of cultivation. More specifically, I argue that 
understanding the agricultural programs in the West Bank allows us to understand how 
readings of representations from earlier interventions were called into the present to 
provide the warrant for the transformations in the 1970s and 1980s. In other words, this 
chapter will explore how these programs activated an index of cultivation and legal 
precedent from an earlier moment. Understanding the relation of those earlier moments in 
the 1930s to programs decades later help us to ask questions about both periods and more 
fundamentally, about the way that scholars have been narrating the story of Palestinian-
Israeli interaction in the West Bank. 
 What is the nature of these agricultural programs implemented after 1967? 
Beginning during the Six Day War in 1967, the Israeli government provided agricultural 
extension and veterinary services to Palestinian farmers to prevent crop failure and 
                                                
140 Weizman accepts this shift when he claims, “By 1979, when the government realized that the expansion of the 
Palestinian agrarian economy was counterproductive to its aim of annexing uncultivated lands, it stopped the policy 
that actively encouraged cultivation altogether.”(Weizman, 2007, p. 120)  Also, Gordon makes a similar statement 
on (Gordon, 2008, p. 75). 
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disease.141 This curious moment alone illustrates a deep and enduring scientific interest in 
the farming and conservation practices of Palestinians over decades. Intense scrutiny of 
local cropping systems and conservation methods by experts in the Israeli government’s 
agronomic training programs is one of the most active yet understudied dimensions of 
Israeli administration of the West Bank. The implementation of this knowledge regime 
resulted in: reduced farm biodiversity; the widespread use of hybrid seeds with their 
accompanying suite of external inputs, including pesticides and herbicides; the increased 
reliance on irrigation technology and its assorted piping, pumps, joints and nozzles; and 
finally, a 300-percent increase in the use of synthetic fertilizers in the first ten years of 
occupation. The raw materials of the knowledge regime were produced and sold 
exclusively by the new occupying power. According to a government report from May 
1969, after less than two years of occupation, “several hundreds of tons” of seeds were 
sold at discounted prices to farmers, 400 model plots were started to introduce new 
methods, and 80 field days were held to showcase new technologies.142 The government 
contended that 12,000 farmers attended the field days the first year and 18,000 farmers 
attended in the second year.143 The new authorities were also concerned about the spread 
of plant and animal disease. According to their official reports, the Israeli military culled 
rodents on a large scale, sprayed hundreds of acres of olive trees with a Mediterranean 
fruit-fly pesticide, vaccinated 30,000 cattle against foot and mouth disease, and 
                                                
141 (Migdal, 1980, p. 61) 
142 (Ministry of Defence, 1969, p. 10) 
143 (Ministry of Defence, 1969, p. 10) 
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vaccinated 500,000 chickens against New Castle disease.144 These immediate efforts 
were followed by wider agricultural extension and training programs within a few years. 
A large training center in Ramallah was opened, and more Palestinian agronomists were 
hired to steer programs as varied as plant protection and animal science.145 According to 
official reports, major field days were held each spring and fall, and “hundreds” of 
smaller field days were held around the West Bank “devoted to cultivation methods, 
irrigation systems, fertilization, disease, and pest control, etc.”146 Tours of Israeli farms 
and training programs were also instituted at local technical schools. As the series of 
reports released by the Israeli government would have it, the Palestinian areas now 
administered by the Israeli military in the West Bank enjoyed tremendous growth, 
prosperity, and modernization of agricultural production thanks in large part to its 
programs.147  
Yet for all of their important insights, critical analyses of these programs and 
documents tend to overlook the workings of cultivation, subtle and overt, itself as a 
political mode of being. Generally, cultivation and agricultural practice are considered 
external to the process of governing, mere objects in the implementation of development 
intervention. For example, Weizman states, “Prior to this system of land grab coming into 
general practice, the Israeli military government had focused on the improvement and 
                                                
144 (Gordon, 2008; Ministry of Defence, 1969, pp. 10–11) 
145 (Coordinator of Government Operations in the Administered Territories, 1972, pp. 40–41) 
146 (Coordinator of Government Operations in the Administered Territories, 1972, p. 41) 
147 Reports include: (Coordinator of Government Operations in the Administered Territories, 1972; Israel. Misrad ha-
bitahon, 1982; Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, 1967-1987, 1987, Ministry of Agriculture, State of Israel, 1970, 
Ministry of Defence, 1969)  
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expansion of Palestinian agricultural production.”148 Hever, whose analysis gives fresh 
critical analysis of the economic aspects of occupation, said, “Israeli professionals were 
sent to the occupied territories to ‘modernize’ the Palestinian economy—implementing 
innovations on irrigation, vaccination of livestock, and land reclamation.”149 Moreover, 
Gordon, in a careful exploration of the “bio modes of power,” also notes, “The dire 
effects of Israel’s controlling apparatus in the economic field were not felt during the first 
years of occupation because the integration of the labor force into the Israeli economy, as 
well as several other interventions like planting thousands of trees and introducing 
improved seeds and new agricultural technologies, managed to compensate for the 
structural ramifications of the integration and externalization process.”150 These authors 
do go on to show that the developmentalist policies of the early occupation were meant 
not only to create dependency of Palestinians on Israeli government and companies for 
technology and technical assistance, but also to increase the effectiveness of modes of 
sovereign power such as tree uprootings, limitations on exports and trade, control of 
crops and planning, and draconian water restrictions. This is best expressed in Azoulay 
and Ophir, who argue, “The economic integration that had actually improved living 
standards in Palestinian society during the first decade of Occupation now enhanced its 
vulnerability.”151 These important reflections on shifts in occupation policies, however, 
belie much older debates that put the question of cultivation as a site of politics into 
sharper relief. 
                                                
148 (Weizman, 2007, p. 120) 
149 (Hever, 2010, p. 8) 
150 (Gordon, 2008, p. 75) 
151 (Azoulay & Ophir, 2012, p. 65) 
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The relationship between isolated debates offers two central questions for 
deliberation. First, what insights does the question of development and self-sufficiency, 
current in the 1980s, offer to our understanding of the current debate regarding the “1979 
turn”? Second, what are the historical antecedents that have produced cultivation as a site 
of politics for the state? 
To explore these questions, let us consider the central point of contention. While 
this debate covers both the West Bank and Gaza Strip, I will address only the West Bank 
in this chapter. Gordon argued that, after 1979, Israel began to restrict “an independent 
Palestinian economy based on industry and sophisticated agriculture” and that “the 
different forms of control that were utilized in the economic field produced excesses and 
contradictions that ultimately spurred Palestinian resistance and helped shaped Israel’s 
policy choices.”152 Gordon correctly argues that the “prosperity” policies of the early 
occupation were not only aimed at fostering the “economic utility” of the Palestinians 
under its control. They were, as he stated, also aimed at “managing the population” (p. 
76). However, he leaves the agricultural forms of management underdeveloped. In 
particular, this formulation gives rise to two central issues. First, cultivation and 
agriculture are left as self-evident, externalized technologies of the state to be deployed 
through policy, rather than technologies of measurement (around yields, income, input 
use and so on) made in the process of encounter itself. Second, the formulation denies the 
political practice of Palestinian cultivators themselves, a topic discussed in the following 
chapter. Rather than an external process that was simply deployed as a  “disciplinary or 
                                                
152 (Gordon, 2008, p. 75) 
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bio modes of power,” I suggest that cultivation itself emerged as an object through this 
encounter of forces. The shift in emphasis that Gordon and others describe provides a 
useful launching pad precisely to explore the conjuncture of forces both human and 
otherwise that reveal cultivation not as a tool deployed by state power, but a political 
concept that emerges out of that encounter. 
 To explore the political life of cultivation from the perspective of the state, this 
chapter is divided accordingly along two eras of state sovereign power: (a) the British 
Mandate (1920-1948) and (b) the State of Israel (1948-today). These two periods share 
certain commonalities, as well as profound differences. The British Mandate period 
produced cultivation as a kind of metric for the exercise of all kinds of state power: land 
reform, rule of law, trade, and coercion. After the establishment of the State of Israel, the 
state has employed various metrics to understand and validate particular forms of 
cultivation for its own purposes. Especially in the West Bank, these technologies of 
measurement became increasingly complex. Namely, as a colonial mandate of the British 
Empire, governmental modes of power operated differently than in the State of Israel, 
which was the outcome of decades of disparate Zionist agencies working on the 
settlement of people, land purchase, and capital investment. The division necessarily 
organizes the chapter into distinct periods; however, this approach is not without its 
drawbacks. Primarily, it does not fully account for the “hybrid” period of rule, 
particularly the fascinating First World War period in Palestine between Ottoman rule 
and British rule.153 This is a period I hope to explore in further research. More 
                                                
153 (Tamari, 2006) 
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substantively to our question of cultivation here, a profound contrast is found in the 
motivations and effects of technologies of measurement around cultivation. In the case of 
the British Mandate, these modes of measurement instituted various forms of rule that 
served their stated aim of assimilation of Jews and Arabs. In the case of the Israeli state, 
however, consolidation of territorial control undergirded all political work, including the 
abstract concept of cultivation, which gave warrant to state policies toward that aim.154 
Both of these eras share certain characteristics. As we have been exploring in the 
last chapter, in state-based modes of power, cultivation emerges as an index used to 
justify state territorialization. It is political in the sense that it has always served as a kind 
of justification for the enactment of technologies of rule on the part of the state, yet 
abstract because it must be made to appear separate from the processes that produce it. If 
we accept cultivation as a direct technology of rule, then we accept that it stands apart 
from and is simply deployed as a tool of state power. However, this chapter argues the 
opposite: that cultivation emerges from the interactions and processes only partly under 
its control. The next part of this dissertation deals with cultivation as it emerges as a 
concrete political practice. However, this chapter aims to show the historical connections 
and genealogy of cultivation. This is not meant as a complete history written in a linear 
manner. Rather, a genealogy seeks to uncover the ways that past events are summoned 
and are folded into the present, to renew an abstract concept of cultivation.  I show below 
that the British Mandate and Israeli state periods constantly drew upon legal and 
scientific precedents from the past in order to justify interventions in the present. This 
                                                
154 (Kimmerling, 1983; Weizman, 2007) 
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topological approach to the temporality of history underscores the continuous 
entanglement of the past in (the production of) the present. To be clear: I do not argue 
that what happened in the 1930s for example, caused what happened after 1967, rather 
that the policies of 1967 summoned those earlier moments in order to shape the present in 
a particular way. By attending to that folding of past into a contingent present, I am able 
to argue in this chapter that cultivation for the state is an abstraction that is constantly 
remade through interactions of ideas, materials, environmental processes, and politics.  
 
Interlude: Jordan Valley Agroecology 
As we will see in Chapters 3 and 4, agroecological practices and processes are in excess 
of both efforts to measure and control them and to reproduce them as deficient. Efforts by 
the British to produce Jordan and Palestine as places in need of intervention obscured a 
long and complex history of human engagement with the physical features of the land 
that binds the two places, namely the Jordan Rift Valley. I would like to pause briefly to 
discuss the valley, which has consistently been the most frequent object of British and 
Israeli agricultural development interventions. The valley is the northern extension of the 
Great Rift Valley, which stretches from East Africa under the Red Sea and Dead Sea and 
provides the basin for the Jordan River. The biophysical circumstances of the valley, with 
its location below sea level, fertile soil, heat, water, and sun, earn it a comparison to a 
giant greenhouse. This greenhouse has been produced over time through powerful 
geomorphologic processes, but also through painstaking human intervention over 
centuries.  
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If one were to dig into the earth with a spade, one would find a clayey, alluvial 
soil structure with a relatively young profile or AC horizon (Horowitz 2001). The shallow 
soil profiles, which lack organic matter, are caused by the arid climate and the rapid 
erosion from seasonal flooding (ibid.). The annual rainfall varies widely, from 59 inches 
in the north to 15 inches in the south. The Rift Valley presents one of the world’s most 
unique topographical formations, with dramatic elevation changes down to the lowest 
point on the Earth’s surface at approximately 400 meters below sea level.  
Moreover, the Jordan River provides sustenance for diverse flora and fauna, and it 
supported some of the world’s first settled human communities. In addition, natural 
springs that are fed by rainfall from the highlands are located against the rift wall, and 
many show signs of ancient human use (ibid.). These remains indicate that the valley has 
been transformed into an agroecological landscape over the many years of human 
settlement and agricultural practices. People have shaped its waterways, irrigation 
systems, micro-ecologies, and nutrient cycling systems.155 The deliberate human 
management of these relationships has allowed the valley to support crop agriculture, 
animal husbandry, and habitation over a long span of history and has set the stage for 
contemporary projects. Yet this long tenure of human management could not be 
acknowledged by colonial scientists because it would undermine the narrative of modern 
scientific achievement. It was precisely this lack that mandated the series of interventions 
planned for the coming years.    
                                                
155 Humans and nonhumans are enrolled or recruited into the constitution of various processes and technical bodies. 
Following Mitchell (2002), a technical body is “an alloy that must emerge from a process of manufacture whose 
ingredients are both human and nonhuman, both intentional and not, and in which the intentional or the human is 
always overrun by the unintended” (p. 43). As Mitchell shows, the mixed nature of processes is necessarily written out 
of conventional narratives to provide the warrant for “modern” / “rational” intervention. 
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Scientific research itself (such as disease and pest resistance, irrigation methods, 
etc.) was forged at the site of encounter with other priorities and circulating knowledge 
and experts from former British colonies. In contrast to programs implemented upon a 
given populace, British and American interventions sought quick-impact effects to 
solidify political influence over a shifting terrain of nationalist sentiment. An intense 
debate arose from the matter, but it remained confined within a modernist frame.156 Key 
national figures sought local control over foreign development schemes rather than 
fundamental changes in the understanding or need for change itself. In doing so, it is 
precisely the articulation of difference enacted through practices of agricultural and 
environmental development projects that makes the science available as we know them 
today.  
Many of these projects rely on a process of delay. For European colonial 
authorities, it was Arab farmers who had to be taught to “appreciate” the benefits of 
modern science. The presupposition was small-scale technical projects (departing from 
ostensibly earlier “political” interventions) until local capacity was properly prepared. 
Today international patronage is premised on a notion of stopgap measures, which are 
necessary until a political solution can be found. Moreover, through technologies of 
measurement and reporting, new spatial relationships are instituted that attempt to 
transform the relationship between land and people. For example, through the institution 
of intensive production and irrigation, the state is able to regulate the amount and 
duration of water flow. Or, as we saw above, through the recognition of problems such as 
                                                
156 (El Shakry, 2007; Samera Esmeir, 2012) 
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disease outbreaks, objects emerge as being in need of intervention as the warrant for a 
host of state strategies of rule.  
 
SECTION I: ISRAELI STATE  
We come now to one of the most important ways that cultivation is linked to the 
mechanisms of control over land, namely, the law. The 1948 war caused the expulsion of 
about 750,000 Palestinian Arabs from Historic Palestine to neighboring countries and 
produced a major crisis for the Zionist settlement project as to the legal status of the lands 
owned by displaced Palestinians. This conundrum was expressed by Josef Weitz of the 
Jewish National Fund, and key settlement leader in the Zionist movement: 
“As for the property they have left behind, we are prepared to pay for it, after 
deducting proper compensation for the damage caused by the Arabs. This money 
will help the Arab refugees to re-establish them- selves wherever they may be, 
whether in Transjordan, Iraq, Syria or Nablus…Israel has no legal way of 
appropriating these lands, unless it wishes to follow totalitarian methods, and I do 
not believe that is possible.”157 
 Here we can clearly see how the law was mobilized to annex land rather than simply 
absorbing the land. In this way, consolidation of control over land comes to depend on 
the relationship of the law with cultivation. Fischbach shows how the debate over 
whether or not to compensate and how to compensate refugees for the lost land produced 
a host of ancillary problems, namely how to classify the land now under Israeli control. 
                                                
157 Quoted in (Fischbach, 2003, p. 60) 
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Fischbach argues, "Thus the Israeli attitude toward refugee property quickly was 
becoming clear: Israel would not return the land (restitution); the refugees’ legal title to it 
was now null and void; and Israel would pay compensation, but only for land actually 
cultivated and only on a collective basis".158 Here we can see the development of the 
state’s reliance on the need to legally define land as either cultivated or uncultivated. 
Fischbach shows that ideas central to the creation of the “Custodian of Absentee 
Property”, the body charged with managing and selling the recently acquired land, was in 
part inspired from the example of refugee property exchanges between India and 
Pakistan.159 Thus we can see that ideas, materials, and funding about cultivation 
circulated between settler-colonies. However, legal practices also circulated through 
these interconnections. Cultivation emerged as an index and was codified by law in the 
form of a new body, the Custodian for Absentee Property, where decisions were made 
around evaluation of the value of land, whether houses and buildings left behind should 
be retained or destroyed, and whether a parcel was to be considered abandoned or not. 
This decision making power for the refugees’ agricultural land fell on the newly-formed 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
  
 
Agricultural aftermath of the Nakba 
The fruit hanging from the trees left behind by Palestinian refugees displaced from 
Palestine in 1948 posed a major problem for the nascent Israeli state. As Fischbach’s 
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extensive research into property of Palestinian refugees has shown, the various 
agricultural agencies and the forming Ministry of Agriculture took the lead to harvest the 
grain and fruit, restart irrigation pumps, and ultimately claim and resettle Palestinian rural 
areas.160 The “Emergency Regulations for the Cultivation of Fallow Land and the Use of 
Unexploited Water Sources of 5709/1948,” passed in October 1948, allowed the Minister 
of Agriculture to claim “uncultivated” land, even retroactively. The justification for such 
measures in the text of the law are quoted here from Fischbach: 
The War conditions have resulted in lands being abandoned by their owners and 
cultivators and left untilled plantations being neglected and water resources 
remaining unexploited. On the other hand, the interest of the State demands that, 
without prejudice to the right of ownership of land or other property, agricultural 
production be maintained and expanded as much as possible and the deterioration 
of plantations and farm installations prevented. For the attainment of these 
objects, it is necessary that the Minister of Agriculture should have certain 
emergency powers, which are conferred upon him by these Regulations.161 
Through those regulations, Palestinian farmland, now emptied, was brought under the 
sovereignty of the state and various para-state agencies such as the Jewish National Fund. 
According to at least one estimate in 1949, this included about 3.9 million acres of 
“abandoned property,” of which 338,000 acres was deemed “cultivable.”162 Benefitting 
tremendously from the influx of cash from the massive annual income of the ensuing 
                                                
160 “Given its central role in the creation of centralized Zionist plans for settlement and agriculture, it was the 
Agricultural Center and its regional councils that began entertaining applications for permission to cultivate 
abandoned farms from individual settlements and signing lease agreements with them.”(Fischbach, 2003, p. 13) 
161 (Fischbach, 2003, p. 20) 
162 (Fischbach, 2003, p. 52) 
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lease of urban properties, agricultural plantations, and other assets, the government 
poured support into the settlement enterprise. This constituted the first enabling factor for 
settlement of the land directly from the dispossession of Palestinian farmers. 
A second important effect emerged from this windfall of Palestinian farmland. An 
economic and agricultural crisis had to be averted by stepping in to maintain Palestinian 
villages and farms. Recognizing and maintaining the well-being of the land opened the 
door for a host of other interventions, namely using new laws to permanently expropriate 
refugee land. The cereal and grain areas were quickly leased, under the Israeli state’s new 
nationalized land-tenure laws, to neighboring agricultural colonies, which began 
converting them to industrialized production. However, in areas such as the abandoned, 
export-oriented citrus groves or vast olive groves, the “Custodian of Absentee Property” 
found it difficult to find Jewish immigrants willing to cultivate groves that they viewed as 
unproductive.163 In 1948, the Custodian created a committee called the Villages Section 
to manage the farms left by Palestinians. Owing to a lack of interest in cultivating the 
massive olive groves now in its possession and the fall harvest bearing down on them, the 
Villages Section hired 3,000 workers to pick the 1948 harvest. In a cruel twist of fate, the 
workers hired were mostly Palestinians who were internally displaced within the new 
state of Israel.164 This harvest of 6,000 tons of olives was sold for 250,000 pounds 
sterling, and, during the following harvest of 1949, 5,000 tons was harvested.165 In 1950, 
however, a cold year and poor harvest, combined with a lack of interest, caused the 
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Custodian to turn more toward the planting of new, more productive groves by the new 
Jewish immigrants. By 1952, according to Fischbach’s impressive research, only a third 
of evacuated Palestinian olive groves were being cultivated. In the case of the citrus 
industry, a loan from the U.S. Export-Import Bank provided $8 million for rehabilitation 
of citrus groves, and the resulting exports provided a crucial influx of foreign currency 
into Israel in 1951.166A similar fate awaited citrus groves, as well, as the government 
determined it too costly to rehabilitate them and either abandoned or replanted the former 
Palestinian groves. Granott, quoted in Fischbach, gives a succinct assessment of the 
relationship of this regime of agricultural production and knowledge with the process of 
dispossession of Palestinians: 
Settlement operations in the years 1950–52 strengthened the conviction that there 
could be no return to the old status: The lands vacated by the Arabs during the 
War of Independence were by this time settled, for the most part cultivated, and 
governed by a progressive agrarian regime, in harmony with the aspirations of 
Zionism and the rules of the Jewish National Fund. ... Thus, as a result of a 
combination of unanticipated factors, it has been possible to implement the great 
principle of land nationalization proclaimed at the inception of the Zionist 
Movement, which in the State of Israel is now a reality with every day bringing 
nearer its complete fulfillment.167 
In this way, the very methods of making the land productive give warrant to the complex 
legal maneuvering required to reclassify lands, evacuated of Palestinians, as the exclusive 
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property of Jewish immigrants without allowing the inhabitants to return after the end of 
the war. It is precisely this “progressive agrarian regime” of capital- and input-intensive 
production that became the justification for dispossession. This process echoes the British 
Mandate views of neglect of the land necessitating its rehabilitation and parceling for 
sale. However, another important point is also documented here. The circumstances of 
the military defeat, poor harvests and cold weather, ideological stances, and lack of 
knowledge about olive cultivation, among other things, combined to enable the 
reorganization of land law to allow expropriation of refugee assets. Rather than an 
entirely external logic, the politics of cultivation emerged out of this cocktail of processes 
and events. Next we will see how this regime of analyzing land use was brought to bear 
on cultivation as the Israeli state was established. I use English-language sources that 
illustrate the representational space produced in English for outside audiences. 
 
 
Producing a Palestinian Green Revolution 
As the Israeli state established sovereignty over the land and settled it, the Galilee, where 
the bulk of the minority of Palestinians who remained within Israel lived, was put under 
martial law from 1948 until 1966. In fact, now for the first time, the Zionist movement 
attempted to improve Palestinian agriculture directly through development intervention. 
The first agricultural extension projects aimed directly at Palestinian farmers who had 
become citizens of Israel came under the auspices of the military government in the 
Galilee region in 1960. The first agricultural extension was taken up in 1954, and the first 
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extension office168, purposed to serve Palestinian Arabs in the new state of Israel, opened 
in Nazareth in 1961.169 Its work in the early days was “devoted to the liaison between 
farmers and the Military Government.”170 The Israeli ministry created a Section for the 
Arab Village within the Ministry of Agriculture, which was staffed by Jewish agricultural 
specialists with “earlier contacts with Arab villages” and two Arab assistants. This 
department soon grew with extension agents as some Palestinians graduated with 
technical degrees from Israeli universities. Intensive agricultural extension was thought to 
be the most effective means of bringing about changes in Palestinian agricultural 
practices, where British policies had failed to produce extensive changes.171  According 
to Blum, “The evidence published so far indicates that agricultural extension was 
probably the single most important factor in explaining the quick and intensive 
development of agriculture in the Arab sector of Israel.”172  
It is important to note that although these extension policies are almost always 
analyzed in isolation of Israel proper, the process of intervention echoes that of the 
Palestinian agricultural areas before and after the establishment of Israel. Massive 
investment in mechanization, irrigation, chemical inputs, and farm credit resulted in 
major shifts for “1948 Palestinian” farmers beginning in the 1950s with the establishment 
of Israel. As an example of this ostensible progress, the land area of irrigated production 
increased fivefold in the first eleven years of the new state. The attitude of researchers 
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toward the changes was clear. In describing the area of Taibe and Tira in the Eastern 
coastal plain, they stated, “Formerly this was one of the most desolate and backward 
places in Palestine.”173 After Israeli government investment and intervention, they put it 
like this, “At present the Little Triangle is one of the most advanced agricultural areas in 
Israel.”174 These statements illustrate the emergence of an explicit agricultural 
development discourse – in not just in Israel-Palestine, but in many parts of the world – 
that dramatically reconfigured relations with Palestinian cultivators. 
In what concrete ways did cultivation emerge as an index to enable interventions? 
Let me offer two examples. First, studies were carried out at the new Nazareth 
agricultural extension office for “identification of problems and professional issues in the 
region and to set priorities.”175 These studies immediately set about following the 
example of British administrators from only twenty years before, prioritizing water 
distribution for use in intensively irrigated production of horticultural crops. Second, they 
implemented a number of research plots to complement existing breeding programs. 
More specifically, research plots gathered data on resistance to pests, disease, and 
drought, as well as on responses of particular research varieties to microclimatic 
conditions. With this data, the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture and, by extension, agro-
industry was able to extend valuable research data into new areas of rain-fed production 
and new genetic pools in plant and animal breeding. 
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However, the Israeli government specialists in Arab agriculture needed an 
extensive study to illustrate how the “green revolution” in Arab agriculture was made 
possible. The results of extensive studies of changes in Arab agriculture were then 
published and offered in both academic and practitioner arenas of agricultural 
development work. 
After a preliminary study in 1971, agronomists and rural sociologists working for 
the Settlement Ministry and Ministry of Agriculture surveyed “the 94 Arab villages of 
Israel” in order to conduct an in-depth study in the following years. Published in Hebrew 
in 1976 by Itzhak Arnon, Michael Raviv, and Sara Molho, the study was abridged and 
published in English as “Fallaḥ to Farmer” in 1980.176 To conduct the study, the authors 
used questionnaires and interviews given by “educated Arabs” with 388 farmers and 273 
nonfarmers in nine villages in both Israel proper and the West Bank beginning in 1973. 
The impetus for the study stemmed from what they deemed to be dramatic changes in the 
West Bank and Israel in Arab villages under Israeli rule. The authors asked: 
What has triggered this sudden and dramatic change after such a prolonged period 
of stability, with stagnation, especially in view of the lack of change in agriculture 
in most of the Mediterranean region in general, and, recently, of the neighboring 
West Bank of the Jordan, in particular?  
The researchers aimed to understand what Israeli interventions enabled Palestinian 
agriculture to finally ‘improve’ after centuries of stagnation “since biblical times”.”? One 
of the most common themes, repeated in the introductions of numerous studies, described 
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the “unchanging” character of Palestinian cultivation practices.177 Establishing, through 
studies, reports, and surveys, the “unchanging” character of Palestinian cultivation 
practices allowed Israeli interventions to be set in sharp relief. In the preface to one of his 
popular textbooks, Itzhak Arnon stated, “The Author has been active in agricultural 
research for over four decades in a country that, during this period, has passed through all 
the stages of development from biblical agriculture to that of the twentieth century.”178 
Arnon’s claim, common among Western scientists studying local cultivation, was that 
this stagnation, neglect, and stasis meant that changes brought in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries marked a period of change for the first time in more than 2,000 
years.179 Thus, these changes had to be precisely documented. They were partly 
motivated in these studies to share these results of the “green revolution” in Arab 
agriculture as a model for other developing countries.  
Yitzhak Arnon was active on this front. Born in 1909 and raised in Belgium, 
Arnon studied agronomy at the renowned Faculté Universitaire des Sciences 
Agronomiques de Gembloux, a center of agronomic science at the apex of Belgian 
colonialism in central Africa. The institute in the late 1920s and early 1930s was heavily 
involved in establishing agronomic studies to support the notoriously exploitative rubber 
plantations of the Belgian Congo and the establishment and staffing of the massive 
research center, the Institut National pour l’Etude Agronomique du Congo Belge 
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(INEAC), in 1933.180 In his writings, Arnon gave the INEAC as an example of colonial 
agricultural institutions, calling it “an enormous research complex in Yangambe—
probably the biggest in the World—with experiment stations in all parts of the 
country.”181 Though it is not known whether he traveled to Belgian colonies, his 
extensive training in agricultural science, derived from Belgium’s colonial experience, 
probably traveled with him to Palestine. Arnon arrived in 1932 and began work with the 
Department of Agriculture of the British Mandate, eventually becoming Superintendent 
of Research at the largest station near Acre (‘Akka).182  A doctorate from the Hebrew 
University took Arnon to the directorship of the newly formed Volcani Insitute for 
Agricultural Research in Rehovot, which brought together academic, Jewish Agency, and 
British Mandate agricultural research and experimentation agencies under one umbrella. 
Arnon served as director from 1958 to 1968 and continued as professor of agronomy at 
the Hebrew University. 
The emergence of something of an “agricultrual development” industry from 
Israeli experts bears discussion. Abraham Blum, a leading authority on agricultural 
extension theory and an Israeli scholar, declared emphatically that, lacking other options, 
“Professionally, they [the Nazareth office] continued in the line started by the British.” 
An early leading Israeli agronomist, director of the national agricultural research center, 
and agricultural development consultant worldwide, Arnon made a similar observation: 
“After independence, the State of Israel inherited the dual frameworks of agricultural 
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research and experimentation of the Jewish Agency and of the Mandatory 
Government.”183  
Blum and, to a greater extent, Arnon were passionate advocates for the 
implementation of modern agricultural extension services in developing countries. 
Arnon’s 800-page opus, “Agricultural Research and Technology Transfer,” in 1989 was 
an important intervention into this field of agricultural development in Third World 
countries.184 Even more important were the two editions of his textbook and guide, titled 
the “Modernization of Agriculture in Developing Countries.”185 After his tenure as 
director of the Volcani Institute for Agricultural Research, he continued as a prominent 
academic and sought-after agricultural consultant in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. He 
described trips to Mexico and Kenya, among many other locations, with his work with 
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. 
Yet, in his extensive textbooks and writings, Arnon drew from the well of 
experience gained as we saw above ushering Palestine through “all the stages of 
development from biblical agriculture to that of the twentieth century.” He frequently 
drew examples from Arab cultivation methods to support his claims. His study of 
Palestinian cultivation, “Fallaḥ to Farmer,” delineated the change that was possible in 
Palestinian villages brought into modernity by Israeli agricultural intervention.   
Let us return now to the ways by which forms of measurement of production—
soil fertility, economic status, yield, and so on—were brought to bear upon Palestinian 
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cultivation practices. How were these studies able to distance themselves from wider 
political-ecological processes? One example from the work of Blum will suffice. The 
fastidious attention to forms of Palestinian agricultural deficiency allowed these academic 
authors to stand apart from the processes of occupation, dispossession, legal orders, and 
biology that made their agronomic work possible. In an article comparing strategies and 
effects of Israeli government extension services in the Gaza Strip and Nazareth in 1989, 
Blum makes no mention of either dispossession of land or the extension of agricultural 
services via special military government either in Nazareth or the Gaza Strip. In fact, 
after describing the ineffectiveness of British Mandate agricultural programs, he states, 
“The major breakthrough came to the Nazareth region after the establishment of the State 
of Israel, and after the establishment of a regional extension bureau in Nazareth, soon 
after Extension Service was set up in the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture, in 1960.”186 This 
ahistorical scholarly stance, in which a number of interactions are marginalized, began to 
frame discussion about the agricultural policies of the Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank beginning in 1967. 
 
 
Extending the Arab Green Revolution after 1967 
In a striking echo of Israeli government reports, produced in English for an outside 
audience, describing the imperative to maintain and prevent the deterioration of 
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agricultural production of Palestinian refugee lands in 1948, government reports again in 
1967 made a strikingly similar appeal.  
On June 11, Eytan Israeli, at that time still on Army duty, was appointed 
Agricultural Officer for the Nablus district. He also realized that speedy action was 
essential. The cattle herds of Kalkiliya, dying slowly from lack of care, were his 
first concern. His second was to look after the wells and prevent their blockage or 
fouling. The citrus groves, turning yellow for want of irrigation, had to be tended. 
Swift and far-reaching measures were needed if grave, possibly irreparable, 
damage was to be avoided. 187 
The first task of military commanders during the war itself was to “contact the staff of the 
local offices of the Jordanian Ministry of Agriculture” to restart the process, encourage 
staff to remain in their positions, and prevent an economic collapse.188 So as to leave no 
doubt in the reader’s mind as to who was in charge, the first report on the programs of the 
Israeli occupation in 1969 noted that all branch ministry staff (agriculture, health, etc.) 
were “completely subordinated to their commanders as Army officers.”189 As we saw in 
the Galilee in 1948, this organization continued for decades of military rule. When the 
Israeli government occupied the West Bank in 1967, it followed in a long tradition of 
modern agricultural development programming first implemented in the British Mandate 
period. The British government established agricultural experiment stations, extension 
services, school curricula, and synthetic fertilizer regimes. Many of these programs were 
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continued under Jordanian government control until 1967, when the newly occupying 
Israeli government expanded agricultural development projects. However, Israeli aims 
for the land were focused on building settlements. As we have seen above, it directly 
deployed its experience in agricultural development work in Palestinian villages inside 
Israel in working on its new subjects in the West Bank and Gaza.  
One of the most revealing discourses emerged in the publicity material published 
by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1970 and 1983.190 Two related themes can be 
identified. First, agricultural development will foster “peaceful cooperation” between 
Palestinians and Israelis. Second, that development is contingent on the modernization of 
agriculture with “contemporary farming methods.” Thus, we can see in the report from 
1970 that: 
Speedy action by the Ministry of Agriculture has thus prevented crisis and 
upheaval in the most important branch of the economy of Judaea and Samaria. It 
may be assumed that, from the agricultural point of view, conditions will never go 
back to what they were and, moreover, the great forward stride in farming will, it 
is hoped, be a stepping-stone to mutual understanding and blaze the welcome trail 
to peaceful cooperation.191 
This view is also reflected in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefing from 1983 titled, The 
Green Revolution in Judea-Samaria: 15 Years of Israeli-Arab Cooperation. The authors 
argue that it is precisely the technology that has enabled the hope of cooperation: 
One of the first objectives of Israel’s administration was to introduce 
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contemporary farming methods through agricultural extension services, including 
the improvement of crops under irrigation with more modern methods, and the 
replacement of low-yield with high-yield strains, and low-income with high-
income crops. No less important, however, has been the introduction of Israeli 
agricultural know-how via Arabs of Judea-Samaria who have been working in the 
agricultural sector in Israel, whose experience has spurred them to innovation on 
their own farms, through adaptation of new technologies to local conditions, 
resulting in significant yield increases.192 
What logic was at work here? Was Israel simply acting to consolidate its economic 
interests, or were other forces at work? In addition to the debate discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter, an intense debate amongst Palestinian scholars from the 1980s 
on the economic effects of the Israeli occupation has largely been absent from the current 
debate on the Israeli occupation.193 The debate began formally with a conference in 
Jerusalem in 1981 titled Development For Steadfastness [At-Tanmia Min Ajl As-Ṣumud] 
and continued into the early 1990s with debates around strategies of resistance and the 
First Intifada, or uprising, from 1987 to 1991.194 Leading figures in debates particularly 
related to agriculture included Ibrahim Dakkak, Hisham Awartani, Salim Tamari, and 
Raja Khalidi. This prolific political economic literature offers important insights into the 
very recent analysis of the Israeli occupation, especially with regard to agriculture. These 
works do acknowledge what Dakkak called the “dominance of the occupation 
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agricultural policies” that “caused everyone to change local agricultural practices”195 and 
also recognized improvements in the standard of living of Palestinian rural families.196 
However, one branch of this debate was much more cautious about effects of the 
agricultural policies of the early occupation, citing the massive dependence on Israeli 
technology and inputs and calling for policies of “resistance sumud” that included greater 
agricultural self-sufficiency.197 This form of sumud or steadfastness, as Tamari points 
out, was sharply contrasted to the way it had become “a term of cynical self-denigration” 
in reference to those Palestinians who benefitted from the “sumud” funds flowing in from 
Arab countries during the 1970s.198 While the home economy and agricultural self-
sufficiency movements were criticized as being inattentive to local economic changes, 
many of those concepts were taken up in favorable ways into the popular committees that 
formed a power base for the uprising that began in 1987.199   
 Yet the story is more complex than in the telling of critical Palestinian scholars. 
At first many farmers refused to use the hybrid seeds or fertilizers and actively organized 
against them. Already by August 1967, the first field demonstration day was held in 
Hebron, and an Israeli report noted that, “Two days before opening, extremist circles 
warned the farmers not to attend, but the intimidation was ignored and thousands of Arab 
agriculturalists visited the grounds and watched demonstrations of the use of farm 
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machinery, ploughing methods and effective spraying against pests.”200 This was not the 
first time that the Zionist movement had attempted to create local organizations amenable 
to their agricultural interests. The Zionist Executive created the Hizb Az-Zurra’ (Farmer’s 
Party) in 1924 to assist in the modernization of Palestinian agriculture. It collapsed by 
1927 after nationalist groups revealed its relationship in working with the Zionist 
movement201.  Again in the 1978, the Israeli government established the so-called Village 
Leagues in rural areas to counter the growing discontent, attempting to pit rural groups 
against urban political leaders.202 This effort also had largely failed by 1983 and was 
disbanded by the outbreak of the first uprising in 1987.  
 As we saw above during the British Mandate period, the Israeli interventions 
changed as they were constantly beset by disease outbreaks and droughts. For example, 
the government blamed sheep imported from Jordan for the spread of animal disease and 
halted all imports, which inflated the cost of meat. The government attempted to solve the 
problem by importing “tens of thousands” of heads of sheep through Israeli ports from 
Romania to fill the void.203 In retaliation, the Jordanian government stopped all 
agricultural imports from the West Bank, and a bumper crop of Hebron grapes in 
particular was nearly doomed until the Israeli government itself arranged to purchase the 
grapes to avoid a market crash. The wheat crop in those years also suffered from a 
drought, and the farmers were made more vulnerable by the their recent intensification of 
production and concentration on cash crops. In response, the Israeli authorities introduced 
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new strains of wheat developed by Israeli companies, ending their reliance on the 
“production of their own seeds, which are often poor in quality.” 204 In this way, the 
subtle shifts in production methods, chemical inputs, climatic fluctuations, economic 
interests, and seed production began to transform the landscape of cultivation in 
Palestine. We have seen now the situation of cultivation in the West Bank and Gaza in a 
new light. Next, I will explore the British Mandate period and the way that those 
agricultural policies enableenabled the changes discussed in the previous section. More 
specifically, I show how the index of cultivation codified during the Mandate period 
came to supply warrant for the appropriation of land. 
 
SECTION II: BRITISH MANDATE 
This section charts the connections between people and environments that colonial 
scientific authorities sought to reorder in the 1930s and 1940s. Efforts to “improve” 
Palestinian cultivation derive their warrant from the conceptual foundations laid during 
the colonial period. This does not discount, however, the role of the Ottoman Empire, 
especially in the work of land reform during the Tanzimat period and the series of 
reforms that culminated with the Land Code of 1858.205 However, this period currently 
lies outside the scope of my study for practical considerations. The transition years and 
traces of the Ottoman period in Mandate policies are important to better understand the 
import of colonial policies. This period’s centrality is also evidenced by the growth of 
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recent work in this regard.206 I focus here on the ways that cultivation came to be 
measured under British Mandate authorities, with particular attention to how those 
metrics gave warrant to interventions that followed.  
First, agricultural scientists and other experts have long sought through modern 
science to establish links between the status of the land and a corresponding social order 
of the people inhabiting it. The categorization in the service of state power was made 
possible through mechanisms such as the implementation of agricultural science by 
Western powers. In their relatively short tenure from 1920 to 1948, British colonial 
authorities conducted agricultural surveys and studies in Jordan and Palestine. Scientists 
commented widely on soil fertility and structure, erosion patterns, livestock breeds, 
common pests, water resources, and plant diseases, and they planned interventions 
accordingly.207  
However, contingencies such as disease constantly changed the course of policies. 
For example, schemes for the development of poultry in the country meant that breeding 
for new hybrid races of poultry was concentrated in one location, at the Acre (‘Akka) 
research station of the British Mandate. As El-Eini shows, agriculture officials claimed 
that 99 percent of the “modern” poultry production in the country originated with 
chickens from the research station.208 However, the intensified production of eggs and 
layers of new breeds of chickens in close quarters caused a massive outbreak of avian 
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influenza that then infected the local village stock in 1945.209 Both of the main hatcheries 
and the program overall were abandoned as a result, and more decentralized models of 
production were explored. Another instance occurred with the ‘Al-Dudeh’ wheat leaf 
miner (Syringopais temperatella (L.)) outbreaks in 1931, 1933, 1935, and 1937 and led to 
widespread damage to cereal crops such as wheat.210 British agricultural authorities 
wanted to impose harsh legislative actions but, fearing local reaction, instead set up forty-
six demonstration plots to encourage farmers to introduce a third crop into the rotation. 
As El-Eini carefully shows, when these efforts failed due both to widespread resistance to 
a third crop rotation (because of livestock grazing on crops) and spread of the pest, they 
passed harsh restrictions on the planting of a winter rotation in 1945 and asked local 
village leaders to guarantee the change in rotations.211 Next, I want to discuss three of the 
most important interactions we can credit with producing an abstract notion of cultivation 
under the British Mandate. 
First, the British Mandate used cultivation as a kind of index to pioneer various 
forms of intervention. This “intervention impulse” emerged through the processes of 
research, documentation, and experimentation on Arab agriculture. Sir Robert Peel 
presided over the Palestine Royal Commission, whose full report was published in 1937. 
The report’s authors grappled with measuring and counting cultivable land and mediating 
between Arabs and Jews to ensure the stability of the British Mandate. An important 
theme emerges in the Peel Commission Report: British authorities were intensely 
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interested in reforming Palestinian agriculture to pacify the area, a responsibility they 
acknowledged would take a long time because of the “separation of centuries” between 
Zionist and Palestinian knowledge and resources.212 This impulse could be read today as 
a part of a larger British colonial impulse in its desire to recognize and subsequently also 
re-organize Palestinian agricultural life. This recognition is a crucial element of the 
subsequent interventions as it stabilizes and circumscribes an object to be acted upon. 
However formidable the task, colonial authorities felt compelled to undertake 
reform. British colonial texts express a deep concern for what they saw as the sorry state 
of the Palestinian fallaḥ, . More importantly, they express a commitment to help. This is 
popularly known as the civilizing mission of colonialism. The report of John Hope 
Simpson in 1930 on the state of the land is exemplary: “The fallaḥ is neither lazy or 
unintelligent. He is a competent and capable agriculturalist, and there is little doubt that 
were he to be given the chance of learning better methods, and the capital, he would 
rapidly improve his position.”213 In this narrative, Arab peasants are in fact the obstacle to 
their own development and progress. If the peasant were taught to value modern ways, 
then herhis development would enable peace between Zionists and Palestinians. This is 
stated explicitly in the Agriculture section of the Peel Commission report: 
We have referred in paragraph 7 of Chapter III to the “the separation, almost, it 
might seem, by centuries,” of the Arab and the Jew. These two visits to the Arab 
village and the Jewish laboratory illustrate its meaning. Yet, when the villager is 
sufficiently educated to appreciate the value of the discoveries of the laboratory, 
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the hoped-for assimilation of the races may begin. The idea still prevails in some 
quarters that Palestine is a fertile country, “a land of milk and honey,” whereas, 
for ten months out of the twelve it is in fact for the most part dry and barren. 
Crops can only be obtained by hard toil. Modern science may promote fertility. 
Whether in relieving the Arab peasant of his indebtedness by Co-operative 
Societies and Agricultural Banks, or in persuading him to irrigate his lands or to 
plant fruit trees, several decades must pass before any marked change will be 
apparent. [Emphasis added]214 
For Peel and his fellow committee members, Palestinian farmers had to be taught to 
appreciate modern reason. By this logic, the more advanced party must undertake this 
task on behalf of the less advanced. Moreover, this long-term effort is the overwhelming 
responsibility of the colonial power. British colonial authorities believed that education of 
Arabs would lead to agricultural development and help them to have a “fair chance to 
improve their lives.”215 Education of Palestinians in modern agriculture enables them to 
overcome their own obstacles to development.  
 This was also a very common theme of Zionist agencies: that modern agricultural 
methods that they introduced to the area would benefit Palestinians as well. But they also 
made clear, as El-Eini argued, that, “the Jews wanted Government development policy to 
support the intensification of Arab agriculture, thereby releasing land for their settlement. 
They also argued that Jewish settlement influenced Arab agricultural development.”216 A 
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similar sentiment was found in the British reports, though they did also express 
frustration with the Zionist narrative of “progress by transfer” of modern technology to 
the neighboring Arab farmers: “Unless he can be provided with the same resources, in the 
shape of capital, continuous help and advice, he cannot possibly compete with the 
Jew.”217 In this way, British and Zionist interests found common cause in the 
documentation of deficiencies and potential interventions on Palestinian cultivation 
practices. 
 
 Second, the establishment of particular notions about the hostility inherent to the 
primitive nature of both people and environments was established through regimes of 
measurement, especially the geomorphological status of the land. Mandate and 
collaborating Zionist and American scientific experts measured the mismanagement of 
the land and the attendant need for reform of the landscape itself. In contrast to modern 
agriculture, the “uncontrolled” and “unruly” nature of Arab people is evident in the 
rampant erosion, desertification, and lack of vegetation, all of which can be measured 
scientifically. Such markers serve to index the “backwardness” of the fallaḥ. The 
preoccupation with internal and external “nature” as threat is clear in contemporary texts. 
By their framing, both nonhuman nature (e.g. biophysical circumstances, desertification, 
and poor nutrient cycling), as well as human nature (e.g. Palestinian immaturity and 
unreason), encode a constant threat of violence. This deficiency in Palestinian human 
nature is reflected in “nature” on the ground. Thus, when Jewish and British colonial 
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authorities deployed modern science to categorize and evaluate soil fertility and structure, 
hydrological resources, and productivity, these experiments served to naturalize a social 
order built on a hierarchy of peoples.  
Few expressed these ideas more widely and energetically than W. C. Lowdermilk, 
an American soil scientist who conducted a survey of Palestine in 1938-9 at the request 
of the U.S. Soil Conservation Service. Lowdermilk’s argument was straightforward but 
carried numerous assumptions: The biophysical state of the land is related to the abilities 
and status of its associated inhabitants. Lowdermilk (1944) saw hope for the land of 
Palestine in the modern European agricultural settlements. In the “neglect” of the land, he 
diagnosed a problem with the Palestinian inhabitants: “Backward native populations and 
political and social decay are the usual result when land is impoverished by erosion and 
neglect. Palestine is a classic example of such transformation” (p. 21). In this telling, the 
deficiency of human nature is reflected in the barrenness of the land, a mark of the 
backwardness requiring colonial tutelage. The conflation of these natures immediately 
sets those people endowed with reason apart from those who remain connected to 
“nature.” Accounts such as Lowdermilk’s allowed Israel to ally itself on the side of 
reason and progress: 
The country is emerging from a backward low-yield agricultural economy, 
dependent chiefly on grains and olives, and is evolving towards a modern, 
scientifically directed and richly diversified economy where fruits, 
vegetables, poultry, and dairy products play an ever greater role. The 
wooden plow is yielding to the tractor, the flail to the threshing machine. 
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Rural Palestine is becoming less and less like Trans-Jordan, Syria, and 
Iraq and more like Denmark, Holland, and parts of the United States. 
(Lowdermilk 1944, p. 6) 
For Lowdermilk, it is precisely in the study of agricultural practices and conservation 
efforts that a racial order is laid bare. This binds the territorial to the social and uniquely 
enables the scientist to enjoin changes.  
 
 Third, the British Mandate agricultural officials and Zionist scientists shared an 
antipathy for the musha͑ system of commonly held land, which was rooted in the Ottoman 
agricultural policies of the Tanzimat period. The Peel Commission report regarded the 
two-year cultivation cycle of land held in common to be “an obvious bar to any 
agricultural development.”218 This was because, according to the experts commissioned 
in 1923 to study the musha͑ system and possibilities for dismantling it, it offered no 
economic incentive for farmers to improve the land, much less even maintain it. The 
studies and intensive efforts of the Mandate authorities focused on measuring the 
economic viability of small-scale agricultural holdings. They considered abolishing the 
system outright by law, but found that “in certain areas, the Arabs regard this system of 
tenancy, destructive as it is of all development, as a safeguard against alienation.”219 
However, in more subtle ways, through the operations of agricultural extension, they 
began to dismantle the system. The report explicitly notes: “Government have a number 
of officers who are constantly touring the villages, placing expert assistance and guidance 
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at the disposal of the cultivators as to the best method of breaking up musha͑.”220 British 
officials used geomorphological measurements of soil erosion and soil tests to illustrate 
that development of agriculture required the parceling of land. It was a consistent position 
across all of the major British studies of Palestine, according to El-Eini: “Criticisms of its 
being an obstacle to agricultural development and calls for its abolishment were repeated 
in the Hope-Simpson, Johnson-Crosbie, Strickland, and French Reports (as discussed 
above); all the arguments of which were repeated in the Colonial Office by H.F. Downie, 
who saw land partition as a means to improve Arab agriculture.”221 This was an 
economistic argument that played into both the economic goals of the British authorities 
and also the wider goal of facilitating privatization of land, ostensibly in the interest of 
the welfare of Palestinian farmers. However, as noted in the report above, the parceling 
of land enabled its enrollment into the system of trade and sale that was an aide to the 
Zionist movement’s land-acquisition plans.222 It was sometimes expressed explicitly but 
often again highlighted the musha͑ system’s restriction of development for the Palestinian 
farmers as measured in the soil fertility and economic well-being.223 
Similarly, the interventionist impulse of agricultural science is revealed in the 
justifications brought for British irrigation projects in Jordan. This was premised on the 
notion that current production would not be able to sustain population growth or the 
influx of Palestinian refugees from across the river. To rearrange those agricultural 
methods was to assume the humanization process of Jordanian farmers through 
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mechanization and juridical measures. It was during the British Mandate period in Jordan 
(known then as Transjordan) that authorities first sought to improve the situation of rural 
peasants and herders by bringing high-tech irrigation technology to the country and, in 
doing so, constitute science itself as the intervening force.  
 
SECTION III. CONCLUSION  
Until now, the scholarly literature has explained the situation of Palestinian agriculture in 
the West Bank in the following terms: Israel improved Palestinian agriculture by 
modernizing it, subsidizing it, and allowing export, and then it cut this generous aid when 
it realized it was working against its goals of dispossession. As we saw, another debate 
prevalent among Palestinians in the late 1980s sought to understand whether the Israeli 
occupation was creating “dependence” or “integration” through its policies, attempting to 
understand the underlying motivations for its policies. One is left with the impression that 
the West Bank experienced a natural unfolding of agricultural modernization, though it 
may have been affected by factors out of its control such as politics or diseases.  
 However, both of these positions assume an actor-peasant who is the passive 
object of development intervention simply calculating his options within a suite of 
options provided by the occupier’s policies.  An understanding, in contrast, that explores 
how a particular situation emerges through a serious of arrangements and practices over 
which humans only retain partial control gives another account. This addresses Tamari’s 
consistent critique of traditionalist positions because, in contrast to nativist stabilization 
of a static, idealized peasant past, attention to the dynamic process of political practice 
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through the practices of cultivation reveals how those positions are not necessarily 
preordained or understood through conventional economistic and political logics from the 
perspective of the state.224 They do not seek to stabilize an idealized past through regimes 
of representation, but constantly emerge through a complex of practices and situations 
that remake the political horizon.  
 At base, I have argued that the situation of Palestinian agriculture is contingent and 
situated.225 It is not the product of a predetermined rollout of policies that had accordant 
effects on the ground. Israeli policies do not occur on a flat, receptive surface. Rather, the 
policies themselves emerge through the encounter of ideas, practices, and ecological 
circumstances, among other things. To grant that Israeli policy simply “transformed” and 
“modernized” Palestinian agriculture through a process of incentives leaves unquestioned 
the host of connections, ruptures, and violence that were its conditions of possibility. The 
traces of the British and post-1948 Israeli period discussed above come to have meaning 
in new ways in 1967 and 1979 and beyond as they are invoked to produce the 
understanding of the present. 
 What then explains the shift in Israeli policies in the West Bank after 1979? To 
explore that question, we must consider a number of factors and processes at work during 
that time. At its core, the goal of enrolling tracts of land into state projects of various 
kinds (settlements, roads, etc.) remained largely the same before and after 1979. The shift 
emerged because the emphasis for ruling the West Bank shifted from encouragement to 
coercion and law, although those processes had always been interrelated. However, our 
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thinking about that shift has remained static. Analysis of this shift in emphasis has not 
been able to explore this process because it has been unwilling to explore the technics of 
cultivation in the West Bank. Why? Because considering those processes, interactions, 
and arrangements that make cultivation possible as we know it would unsettle 
professionalized knowledge about agricultural and environmental processes as the sole 
locus of authority. By leaving it unattended, it constantly reproduces the regimes of 
difference instituted through Zionist and British scientific exploration that we explored in 
the previous chapter. Such oversights obscure the connections and coercion that make 
possible the dominant understanding of cultivation as sector of the economy or subject of 
scientific inquiry.  
 Over the last two chapters, we have seen that the various technologies of 
measurement have produced an absolute separation between “traditional” and “modern” 
agriculture. This is what I have termed a politics of representation. The traditionalist 
view participates by policing the boundary between the “traditional” and “modern” forms 
of agriculture and thus constantly reproducing its effect rather than unsettling the 
boundary. Thinking of cultivation as practice, in contrast, allows us to understand how 
the distinction is remade through its interaction with a host of forces human, political, and 
otherwise. Thus, neither standard political-economic nor traditionalist accounts of 
cultivation in Palestine can help us explain the shifts that took place as Israel assumed 
military and political control of the West Bank. This is important because such 
separations facilitate the evaluation of land so that it can be made legible to the legal 
order. These legal processes in turn participate in the larger processes of dispossession.
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 We also have learned over the last two chapters that, in this way, cultivation has 
always been an index used by state power to justify its various technologies of rule, 
whether through the law, through acts of coercion and violence, or through processes of 
encouragement such as economic prosperity and agricultural development. 
 However, cultivation is also a political practice that produces political being quite 
distinct from predetermined political subjectivities of the state. It is an embodied practice 
that is enmeshed in a host of ecological processes such as rainfall and drought, as well as 
the social and political forces that we generally think of. Cultivation, then, is part of a 
process only partly under human control, and cultivation does not pre-figure, but emerges 
from that interaction.  
 The question should then become: What practices and processes make agriculture 
possible in the West Bank as we see it today? Is it the simple equation of policy initiative 
equals corresponding change? Only by understanding this combination of forces do we 
begin to grasp the shifts occurring in cultivation in the West Bank. As Timothy Mitchell 
has shown, an oppositional politics that leaves unexamined the host of effaced forces 
grants logics of reason, capital, and the state the power they depend on.226 In contrast to 
the politics of representation considered here, the next two chapters explore a politics of 
persistence. 
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PART 2: CULTIVATION AS CONCRETE PRACTICE 
Chapter 3: On the Durability of Rainfed Farming 
 
Part Two (Chapters 3 and 4) explores the second aspect of the question of cultivation: not 
as an index or instrument of the law, but rather as a site of politics. Cultivation here 
resides in the second sense of ẓill-shadow: not as trace but as a shelter that harbors 
potential alternative forms of political being. Chapter 3 explores how rainfed farming 
practices enable a kind of durable attachment to the land and explores this theme as 
conceptualized in Arabic language sources that deal with the land question, cultivation, 
and belonging more generally. Chapter 4 in contrast, considers the way that certain legal 
classifications of land such as ‘Nature Reserve’ in fact enable farmers to render 
annexation of their land more difficult. Together, these texts and practices offer 
fragments of overlooked and obscured histories of cultivation that, as I show, offer 
powerful understandings of political being as an open question. Exploring the work of 
these traces in the present that affords us a view of novel forms of political community 
that are otherwise rendered invisible in linear accounts of the history of cultivation. 
 What has enabled the remarkable durability of rainfed practices in the face of 
great economic and political restrictions? Also known as dryland agriculture, rainfed 
production is a suite of planting, tillage, and plant protection strategies that exploits soil 
moisture for growing crops without irrigation. It also uses water catchment strategies like 
cisterns to collect water during the rainy season for watering crops in dry months. 
Rainfed production has been the basis of agriculture in Palestine for generations owing to 
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the dearth of freshwater, and as such developed through highly sophisticated and 
localized practices of cultivation. Rainfed or dry farming has been the subject of great 
interest in Palestinian scientific institutes, as well as a scientific interest in many arid and 
semi-arid regions of the Americas, Australia, and Africa; the critical study of which 
would be a worthwhile academic enterprise. I acknowledge that the category of ‘rainfed 
farming’ obscures the diversity of practices described under its sign; however, here I use 
‘rainfed farming’ as a hermeneutic concept to open discussion between certain practices 
on the land and the political relationship to that land. 
The durability of rainfed farming enjoys resonances with work emerging on the 
history of settler-colonialism. In his important study of land and political community in 
the Creek Nation of Oklahoma in the mid-nineteenth century, David A. Chang has shown 
that it was small-scale farming practices that made certain kinds of national self-
fashioning possible. While freed slaves were denied land tenure rights throughout 
Southern United States, Creeks of African descent were given land rights within the 
Creek nation. This radically open understanding of national belonging afforded Native 
people of mixed African and/or European descent a place in the Creek Nation. Chang 
argues persuasively that it was the small-scale farming practices that nurtured this notion 
that all "had an equal interest in the soil".227 The emphasis on small-scale production also 
fostered independence, because, "like other Creeks, black Creeks largely followed a 
small-farm strategy that emphasized home production, allowed for limited trade, and 
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provided for a level of autonomy".228 Ultimately, according to Chang, the land tenure 
system produced a uniquely inclusive sense of "composite nationhood" so that "being 
Creek meant belonging to a polity, not a race, and that the lands were to be defended as 
national property available to all who were part of the nation".229 My analysis below 
extends the important argument put forward by Chang: I pay greater attention to precisely 
how cultivation practices are productive of orders not only within the realm of private 
property, but also of political being itself. In other words, this section of the dissertation 
explores the itinerary of political ontology through cultivation practice without assuming 
it to be driven by an underlying logic. 
 For my purposes in this chapter, rainfed agricultural practices will serve as a locus 
of inquiry to explore the genealogy and politics of Palestinian cultivation practices. 
Although early Zionist scientists not only studied but also advocated rainfed agriculture, 
it was clear by the mid-1920s that the emerging generation of scientists in the yishuv 
became more interested in intensive irrigated production of fodder crops especially to 
support dairy farming.230 Yet what is striking in the case of Palestine is that beginning 
from the early writings through current day, rainfed agriculture has maintained the 
interest both through the practices of Palestinian cultivators but also in the study of 
Palestinian agriculture by Palestinians. Today, as it has for generations, rainfed farming 
dominates the landscape of the West Bank. In 2005 for example, rainfed production made 
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up about 85 percent of total agricultural land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.231 Aside 
from parts of the northern West Bank and the heavily industrialized production in the 
Jordan Valley, the vast majority of production in the West Bank is non-irrigated. If 
production in the West Bank was so ‘successfully’ modernized after 1967 as we saw in 
the last chapter, then what accounts for the persistence of rainfed production? 
 Scholars give two main explanations. First, lack of freshwater resources and 
perhaps more importantly, appropriation of groundwater resources by Israel made rainfed 
production the only viable option for Palestinian agriculturalists.232 Second, the fall in 
agricultural production, the decline in agricultural livelihoods, and the urbanization of the 
West Bank meant that rainfed farming of trees and nuts better suited the time constraints 
of part-time farmers.233  Both of these explanations offer helpful and accurate 
frameworks to consider the constraints, both ecological and political, which affect 
Palestinian farmers. Rainfed farming may well be a survival strategy or last resort, but 
here I suggest that there are other reasons for its vitality. Could it be that rainfed farming 
offers certain purchase against processes of land alienation and dispossession that 
Palestinian farmers have faced? This chapter will explore this question through tracing 
the historical trajectory of thinking on and practice of rainfed farming by Palestinians. 
The range of technical studies dedicated exclusively to rainfed cultivation produced by 
Palestinians spans 1927 to 2005.234  This span indicates the depth of academic interest in 
the topic. Moreover, this figure does not exclude the plethora of studies on Palestinian 
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agriculture by Palestinians generally or studies made by the formidable local ‘folkloric’ 
tradition that saw surges in the 1920s and 1980s.235 This ethnographic tradition centered 
on Tawfiq Canaan and his colleagues in their Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society, 
which ran from 1922-1948.236 A host of other technical studies have been produced on 
the related topics of sustainable agriculture and local seeds, especially in more recent 
years.237 In a conceptual register, these texts point to a deep understanding of how certain 
practices such as rainfed farming wards off state territorialization and consolidation of 
control over land, issues that are central to settler colonialism. The written record of such 
thinking illustrates the longstanding interest in the relationship of dispossession of land 
and the cultivation of land. 
At stake is neither the peasant ‘everyday resistance’ of James C. Scott that enacts 
a distinction between practice and abstractions like the law or state 238, nor the fetishized 
peasant resistance figure of Palestinian nationalism239; rather, at issue here is an 
embodied practice of leveraging agroecological and political orders in the service of 
collective persistence on the land. As Timothy Mitchell has argued, in Scott as well as 
most social science scholarship, power “appears through” ostensibly free standing 
political orders or geographical arrangements, whereas it should be considered to be 
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something made through practice that gives form to any concepts.240 Today across the 
West Bank one is not likely to hear Palestinians discuss the political situation in the worn 
terms of state politics. This situation has rendered tired terms like ‘independence’ and 
‘statehood’ that are less able of giving expression to the aspirations of West Bank 
Palestinians. Moreover, as many have noted, the process of distanciation has removed the 
physical presence of various structures of Israeli occupation from the everyday 
interactions of Palestinians.241  
 One of the primary ways that Palestinians do interact with Israeli soldiers and 
settlers in the West Bank is in the farmlands where they work in the fields, harvest olives, 
graze animals, or travel. This is important because cultivation is a practice that produces 
its own effects that articulate uneasily with established political orders like law and 
economy. In this way, cultivation has become a flashpoint for the question of sovereignty 
and territory in the West Bank as the Oslo-process designated ‘Area C’ is 
overwhelmingly constituted by farmland and grazing land. In tracts like Area C where 
Palestinians have little political sovereignty, irrigation would be impossible, but rainfed 
production may afford a certain measure of what might be called traction. What processes 
enable this? 
The complex array of microclimates, seed, local cultivars, landraces, 
topographies, climatic fluctuations, adaptations of plants that rainfed production depends 
on constantly generates new forms of attachment to land by exploiting the volatility and 
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recalcitrant qualities of plants that enable a dynamic attachment to a place and a refusal to 
perform to the script of state power. These practices enable a collective politics that is not 
necessarily state-based.242 In fact, it frustrates projects of state territorialization and 
enrollment, especially in hilly, rugged areas where rainfed cultivation predominates. In 
contrast to a mere political-economic calculation, cultivation emerges as a novel political 
practice that does not necessarily adhere to the telos of the state form.  
Let me be clear: cultivation is a complex concept and practice. My emphasis on 
political practice in this exploration of the ‘durability’ of rainfed cultivation does not aim 
to discount the material constraints of farmers facing both crushing Israeli restrictions on 
agriculture, nor the material fact of water shortage in a semi-arid climate. Little 
persistence is possible in the face of state violence, a brute force which is invoked all too 
often in the West Bank. I do not intend to detract from the pervasive nature of the current 
colonial order that seeks to dispossess Palestinians. However, my study examines rainfed 
production practices in order to unpack how a combination of forces contributes to 
persistence on the land. It is my contention that through the embodied practice and 
accumulated experience of cultivation, in this case rainfed cultivation, farmers constantly 
produce a remarkably ‘durable’ persistence and attachment to the land that is not visible 
when limiting our frame of analysis to the political economy of Palestinian agriculture. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. First, I explore a text published in 1927 
that aimed to introduce a modern concept of dry agriculture to Palestine. Second, I survey 
efforts by scholars to understand the persistence of rainfed farming in Palestine. Third, I 
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delve into the specific biophysical qualities of rainfed farming practices and ecological 
arrangements to illustrate their role in producing a kind of durable attachment to the land. 
Finally, I explore the writings of a particularly insightful text on the question of land and 
identity to demonstrate early thinking on cultivation as political practice. One of the 
central arguments of this chapter is that Palestinians, through writing and through 
cultivation practices, have confirmed the importance of rainfed agricultural production 
for continued persistence in rural areas.  
 
 
SECTION I: DISCOVERING RAINFED FARMING 
In the Mediterranean city of Haifa, things were not going well for Najib Nassar. A 
Palestinian from Haifa, he was born in 1865 to a middle class family of urban 
professionals. Unlike his siblings, he was not an adept businessman or professional. He 
instead became involved in fervent political debate swirling in the Ottoman Empire, 
especially in the Syria province of which Palestine was a part. He considered himself an 
Ottoman subject and, unlike some of the other nationalists of the time, sought Arab 
autonomy within and not outside of that structure. There are many reasons for this 
position which are not germane to the discussion here; suffice it to say that his role in 
fomenting Palestinian national consciousness was positioned in relation to his belief that 
the Ottoman system, despite its many faults, provided the best hope for a pluralistic 
society. Raja Shehadeh believed that Nassar opposed European colonial control, the 
prospect of which distressed him more than quasi-autonomy for Arabs under Ottoman 
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rule.243 This point is also made, though less emphatically, by Rashid Khalidi.244 
 Disillusioned by his failed attempts as a businessman, Nassar turned to writing 
and journalism, where his positions for Arab autonomy earned him the ire of Ottoman 
authorities. In 1908 he founded the Al-Karmil newspaper, which was published in Arabic 
and named for the storied mountain overlooking Haifa on the northern Mediterranean 
coast of Palestine. His newspaper was part of a group of others including al-Quds in 
Jerusalem and Falastin in Jaffa, which alerted the Palestinian newspaper-reading classes 
to the dangers of Zionism and Arab feudalism in the increasing pressure on lands brought 
by the settlement enterprise. He and other middle class products of Western educational 
institutions in Palestine and beyond, helped to cement Palestinian national awareness in 
response to the Zionist claim to Palestine.245 Filastin in particular carried a weekly 
column called “Rasā͗il Fallāḥ” or “Letters of a Peasant” beginning in 1911 in which the 
viability of the farm economy and the issue of land sales were discussed.246 In his seminal 
work on Palestinian identity, Rashid Khalidi asks how Palestinian Arabic-language 
newspapers played a role in cementing a link between urban intellectuals and peasants in 
their opposition to Zionism. He said that of the early Arabic newspapers, al-Karmil “was 
by far the most outspoken in its opposition to Zionism.”247 Nassar went into hiding in 
1915 in order to escape arrest and trial for his public positions. This three-year period of 
underground life living with peasants and Bedouin (far outside his prescribed social 
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world of urban Haifa) gave him an intimate view of Zionist land acquisitions and its 
relationship to both local and absentee landowning classes. Although he had been writing 
about the process for at least five years, he also became acquainted firsthand with its 
harsh effects on Palestinian peasants who found themselves increasingly beholden to new 
landlords who aimed to dispossess them. With the fall of Ottoman rule and the 
establishment of the British Mandate in Palestine, Nassar’s writings focused on the plight 
of Palestinian cultivators and stemming the tide of the Zionist movement’s land 
acquisition and settlement in Palestine. In views he shared with several prominent 
Palestinian intellectuals including Shukri al- ͑Asali, Ruhi al-Khalidi, and ͑Isa al- ̨̨͑Isa, Nassar 
believed that the collusion of the British authorities, the feudal land system, and the 
increasing desperation of the peasants were making Zionist control possible.248 Through 
his writings in Al-Karmil he advocated the support and encouragement of Palestinian 
agricultural life as a means of asserting Palestinian claims to the land. To ground his 
analysis in the lived reality of those he wrote about, Nassar embarked on two treks 
around Palestine. Nassar then wrote dispatches from the field and published them in his 
newspaper. The first trip in 1922 stretched over three months and resulted in twenty-three 
letters covering a range of topics including economic, political, environmental, and 
agricultural matters. The second trip, over ten months, resulted in sixty-three letters from 
the field. Walid Khleif, editor of the compiled volume in Arabic, compared Nassar’s 
letters to a kind of Palestinian “encyclopedia or dictionary”.249 He was most concerned 
with the loss of Palestinian land through sales to the Zionist movement, and with two 
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related domains of Palestinian life: education and agriculture. Nassar believed that 
improvements in these arenas would enable Palestinians to better meet the challenges to 
livelihood that colonialism posed. He strongly believed the wellbeing of the land was 
related to the wellbeing of the national enterprise. In a dispatch from the famed Marj 
Ibn ͑Amir plain he counseled local people who were at the frontlines of land dispossession 
in the Galilee: 
We met with local people and spoke with them about their narrow attitude and we 
said there is no way out of the danger except the unceasing work of building the 
soil, its skillful cultivation and the planting of trees; that they should establish a 
treasury of 500 olive seedlings for each son of the village; that they do not sell 
any of their land to urban land brokers, some of whom have in turn sold the land; 
that they guard against embroilment in religion; that they should educate their 
children both scientifically and practically. We saw the despair seeping into their 
being because of the lack of rain and the danger encircling them. So we 
encouraged them by telling of the large cultivation efforts of their brothers in the 
villages of Jenin, Tulkarem, and Nablus.250 (My translation) 
 
Nassar weaves together the impending danger of dispossession through land sales with 
the nuturing of the land through natural fertilizers and planting of olive groves. In another 
dispatch, he sharply attacked local Arab landlords for selling their land, shaming each 
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known seller in the Jenin area by name.251 Nassar also criticized government policies that 
taxed olive tree seedlings, saying that, “the [Mandate] government does not profit from 
these monies yet it hurts the people and blocks rehabilitation of the land”.252 He 
commented on the situation of these areas across Palestinian villages and cities alike, 
traveling to Haifa, Nazareth, Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarem, Qalqilia among others. Nassar 
believed in the power of his dispatches, read in the seemingly distant cities, to embarrass 
transgressors and inspire Palestinians to oppose land sales and reassert themselves 
through concrete actions on their land.253 This imperative to retain and improve 
Palestinian agriculture is illustrated in a single intriguing Arabic technical text, where 
Nassar combined articles he had published with translations from a scientific book, Dry 
Farming, published in 1911 by American scientist John Widtsoe. 
 
Connecting studies 
Nassar was one of the first Palestinians to articulate in writing the problems of land, food, 
and water in relation to the national cause. His 1927 Arabic volume, Azzira͑a al-Jaffa 
(Dry Agriculture), is a little-known book, based on a collection of articles published in 
Nassar’s newspaper, whose stated aim was to improve Palestinian methods in dry 
agriculture by learning from U.S. experiences. These farming techniques, refined by 
native cultivators in arid regions for generations, became subject of great scientific 
interest in the late nineteenth century when Europeans settled drier regions of the 
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Western United States. Codified by agricultural scientists as ‘dry farming’ or ‘dry-land 
farming,’ the volume advocated methods to improve agriculture in four registers: the 
retention of soil moisture, availability of moisture by plants, plant breeding for drought 
tolerance, and finally, erosion control techniques.  
In a interesting move, Nassar uses different phrases in Arabic for the same idea, 
sometimes using direct translation from the English zira͑a jaffa (dry farming). Yet in the 
first full sentence of the text, and other places, he uses the deeply colloquial term for 
nonirrigated agriculture, ba͑͑li. Palestinians use the term ba͑͑li or ba͑al as an adjective to 
describe fields, crops, or fruits that rely only on rain and dew for water. It is believed to 
be a reference to the Canaanite title for master god Baal, who was associated with Hadad, 
the Canaanite god of rain and agriculture. The word remains in common usage today. 
Ba͑͑li vegetables elicit higher prices and are prized for their superior taste, believed to be a 
result of slower growth. Through the subtle use of both the technical and vernacular 
terms in the Arabic Nassar validated both local knowledge and exposed a local traffic in 
concepts.  
For a leading nationalist intellectual, Nassar’s agricultural concerns appear to be 
disarmingly pragmatic. We learn that the published volume is a collection of articles that 
were also published in Nassar’s Al-Karmil newspaper. He matter-of-factly points out the 
impetus for the study in the introduction to his translation:  
 
Most of the land in Palestine and Jordan and Syria does not receive more than 25 
qatran and our sun is Eastern and our wind is dry, these lands cannot be made 
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agricultural to give a sufficient harvest except with irrigation or following the 
ways of dry agriculture. Since irrigation is impossible but in a few small areas of 
these lands, it is necessary to learn ways and principles of dry farming, and since 
this method has remained neglected until the modern age– it is our opinion to 
collect the findings of scientists, writers, and technical research departments and 
print them in an abridged form in Arabic in al-Karmil newspaper and then collect 
them into a special volume for the Arab farmer.254 (My translation) 
 
Here Nassar claims that given the limited capacity for irrigation, modern dry farming 
must be adopted by updating the traditional practices. This is not a mere question of 
pragmatism. Rather, it strikes at the heart of one of the most important debates that gave 
rise to nature-as-national-problem in Palestine: the so-called carrying capacity of the 
land. The fact of Nassar’s translation of this text on rainfed or nonirrigated agriculture 
and not for irrigated production illustrates his direct assertion that it is only dry 
agriculture that can succeed in the long term. This stood in direct opposition to Zionist 
efforts, which were exclusively focused on implementing and improving irrigated 
agriculture255.   
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create endemic water shortages in the country.”(Shehadeh, 2010, p. 25). For more on irrigation: (K. W. Stein, 1987, p. 
101); (Kamen, 1991, p. 28) 
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Water conservation, irrigation and agricultural production developed as an 
important theme for Palestinians during the late nineteenth century as the export-oriented 
citrus industry expanded. While irrigation was a near obsession of the Zionist settlement 
engineers, for Palestinians the question of rain and water for crops was more complex 
and did not square with the metrics of calculation employed by the Zionist researchers.256 
For Nassar rain itself opened the question of the land’s potential to support Palestinian 
life. This life, as farmers who work in ba͑͑li production recognize, is only partly under 
human control. This question transcended his intellectual and political aims. Nassar had a 
farm in the Beisan area where the highest percentage of irrigated land by district (11.7 
percent) 257 was located, almost all of it Jewish agriculture. He saw the utmost value in 
dry-agriculture or ba͑͑li production as it offered a way to maintain and even expand 
Palestinian agricultural land under production. There was a major jump in the amount of 
irrigated Arab agricultural land, from 3000 dunams in 1927 to 36,500 dunams in 1939 
with similar jumps in Jewish agriculture as well. However, this is dwarfed by the vast 
bulk of agricultural land that was farmed extensively without irrigation. His was a 
pragmatic approach but one that was intertwined inextricably with the displacement of 
Palestinian farmers and the decline in rainfed agriculture. 
In contrast, Zionist activists, Ruppin in particular, were wont to argue that Jewish 
land purchases helped indebted Palestinian peasants because the capital from the sale 
could be used to maintain or even improve their living standards by intensifying 
production. This benefitted Zionists because they could then use the purchased land to 
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build settlements. Kamen discusses this debate between Jewish settlement leaders and 
British authorities at length258, arguing that the land purchases had little effect on the 
farming practices in surrounding Arab villages. He does however note that the data 
available from the Mandate authorities make it difficult to get a clear picture or 
landholdings and agricultural output over time. These texts can be read to link a lingering 
subtext that particular kinds of practices like dry agriculture enable persistence on the 
land.  
Thus, as we saw in the first chapter, the modern object-in-the-making, 
‘Palestinian agriculture’, needed to be set in sharp contrast to practices emerging from the 
Zionist movement259. In the case of Palestinian intellectuals and likely for most Arab 
cultivators, the distinction between modern and traditional appears to have been 
immaterial. One might argue that this was simply due to their lack of expertise. Rather, I 
propose that it stemmed from ‘active indifference’ to the study of agriculture in 
preference for the practice of cultivation itself. In hindsight we can see clearly that this 
active indifference regarded Zionist academic and scientific translation of Arab practices 
trivial and even dangerous. Palestinian aversion to the kinds of academic study of their 
own world might be understood to result from ignorance or inability or lack of academic 
culture; but they are more profitably understood as wrought from a political practice, 
which aimed to both disrupt and render inadequate the scientific knowing of the land that 
was being propagated by Zionist scientists. Throughout the texts like those of Nassar 
there is a tracking between two poles of recognizing and even celebrating the 
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259   
 
  130 
‘accomplishments’ of countries like the United States in dry agriculture, and yet 
simultaneously insisting on the particularity and history of traditional Palestinian 
methods. In one of his many digressions from the English text, Nassar illustrates this 
entangled position that is characteristic of the Nahḍa period: 
 
Our mighty ancestors established ancient cities and were models of effort and 
vigor. They practiced all kinds of agriculture whether in their great dams or 
amazing irrigation canals in Iraq and Yemen. There are historical reports in the 
Torah, Gospels, and Eusebius and all other modern and ancient histories about 
olives, figs, grapes, and field crops in Palestine and Syria. The great Arab cities 
like Baghdad and Damascus and others whose inhabitants were in the millions 
were witness to the Arab renaissance and their advancement in the days that 
Europe was languishing in darkness and America was unknown.  Why do we 
delay and not follow the example of ancestors and of contemporaneous Europeans 
and Americans and walk in their path, instead of leaving our lands to go waste 
and our cities to go to ruin and poverty to seize us? May the Arabs open their eyes 
to what modern nations are building. Let us learn and benefit from the experience 
of the amazing American nation in dry agriculture. If we invest our land with 
modern technical principles we will restore the wealth of our ancestors and the 
prosperity of our land.260 (My translation) 
 
                                                
260 (N. Nassar, 1927, pp. 235–236) 
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Nassar invokes a common theme of his era in calling for redemption of the land to a past 
glory.261 In calling upon the ‘amazing’ American system, he reshaped knowledge 
connections and asserted Palestinian national claims, drawing from the resources of that 
dominant narrative itself. Nassar’s position is best understood in relation to his decades of 
work bringing to light the dispossession of peasants by the Zionist land purchases and 
collusion of Arab landowners. In fact Nassar may have also personally involved himself 
in assisting fallaḥin in land disputes as early as 1909 with one of the earliest violent 
confrontations surrounding the village of al-Shajara in the Marj ibn ͑Amir .262 This 
intersection of agricultural practice with the national imperative to stem the takeover of 
land by settlers produced a novel problem that is explored next.  
 
Appropriating ‘Dry Agriculture’ 
For Nassar the economic, ecological and political realms were inseparable. Agricultural 
practice could not be seen in isolation of the dispossession of peasants he had spent ten 
years writing about in his newspaper. He cites the ‘economic distress’ of Palestinians in 
the British Mandate period in which he wrote:  
 
We relied heavily on a book collected by the respected agricultural scientist, Mr. 
John Widtsoe, from the most reliable sources and scientific experiments. We 
believe that through this work of ours we serve the country a glorious service and 
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facilitate for the fallaḥ knowledge of how to increase production to survive the 
economic distress we are in. 
 
In responding to this perceived imperative, Nassar believed that modern insights were 
needed if dry agriculture were to enable Palestinian peasants to survive economic 
hardship. In doing so he located livelihood and persistence on the land in water and soil 
conservation with few external inputs, which were the hallmark benefits of dryland 
production. The most important insight from Nassar was his insistence on the centrality 
of the Palestinian peasant livelihood. For Nassar, if farmers could make a reasonable 
living they would be less likely to leave the land or sell their land to eager prospectors. 
Ironically, he claims to have directed the volume at farmers, most of whom at that time 
would not have had access to written materials. It marks the beginning of a tradition of 
Arabic language how-to guides written by Palestinians. Azzira͑a Al-Jaffa, however was a 
translated text from an American scientist, John Widtsoe. How did it travel to Palestine?  
What is made abundantly clear by Widtsoe’s text, Nassar’s translation, and the 
other works that we have seen in chapter one, is that these texts cannot be reduced to 
expressions of Western knowledge applied to the non-West. Rather, they are more 
profitably understood precisely through the encounter of forces (historical, human, or 
otherwise) at the site of knowledge production. In particular, I would like to explore next 
how Widtsoe’s texts cannot be separated from the colonial history of the American Great 
Basin, in the same way that Nassar’s translations and Zionist studies are best understood 
within their deep entanglement in local agricultural knowledge and colonial violence. 
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It is unlikely that the American scientist John Widtsoe would have envisioned how his 
1911 book on dryland farming would travel to the Middle East. Born in Norway, the loss 
of Widtsoe’s father at an early age and his family’s conversion to Mormonism, 
precipitated their emigration to the then Utah Territory in 1883. Widtsoe later completed 
a doctorate in Germany while a missionary, and returned to Utah in 1900, where he grew 
in prominence and responsibility, eventually becoming a noted agricultural scientist who 
specialized in dry agriculture and an Elder in the Mormon Church. He served as the 
president of the Agricultural College of Utah and published widely on matters of 
agriculture and Mormonism. He also served a Mormon representative in Europe and 
likely visited Palestine several times to foster Church work there263. 
 Widtsoe shared the zeal of other settlers arriving in the semi-arid rangelands of 
the Great Basin region in the American West. He believed that the settlement of Utah 
brought many benefits to an otherwise barren area. Writing in 1910, Widtsoe stated: 
 
We need harbor no such envyings, for in the conquest of the nonirrigated and 
nonirrigable desert are offered as fine opportunities as the world has known to 
the makers and shakers of empires. We stand before an undiscovered land 
through the restless, ascending currents of heated desert air the vision comes and 
goes. With striving eyes the desert is seen covered with blossoming fields, with 
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churches and homes and schools, and, in the distance, with the vision is heard the 
laughter of happy children. The desert will be conquered.264 
 
The ‘desert’ that Widtsoe describes is also a human landscape that had to be subjugated. 
As historian Ned Blackhawk has shown, the Great Basin a mere 30 years before 
Widtsoe’s arrival shook with a savage conflict between federal authorities, indigenous 
groups, New Mexicans, and Mormon settlers. This left bands of Piute, Ute, and Shohone 
peoples embroiled in bitter struggles over shifting alliances with various outside interests. 
Most histories of the period in the western United States overlook the centrality of 
violence to the colonial order, evidenced by the frequent attacks on Native peoples and 
enslavement of Piutes (usually children) by New Mexicans, Mormons, and other tribes.265 
Blackhawk locates the emergence of this violent order with the arrival of Spanish 
colonizers from the south and argues effectively that the violence was constitutive, rather 
than external to European settlement of Utah in the mid-nineteenth century. 
 This pre-history of Utah stands in sharp contrast to the story presented by Widtsoe 
in his conventional narrative of pioneers braving disease, hunger, climate and American 
Indian raids to establish fledging modern settlements in wilderness of the western United 
States. Even in his more sober technical texts, Widtsoe referred occasionally to “the 
brave pioneers who fought the relentless dryness of the Great American Desert.” 266 As 
critical historians of the American West are now arguing, Widtsoe’s scientific 
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interventions did not take place in a historical vacuum but rather in a space forged by the 
cocktail of violence, dispossession, and colonial zeal, the brunt of which was borne by 
Great Basin American Indian communities. We saw a similar exploration of this question 
in chapter one with the experiments of Elazari-Volcani on the ‘Fallaḥ’s Farm’. 
To disseminate academic knowledge on agriculture, Widtsoe sought to “assemble 
and organize the known facts of science in their relation to the profitable production of 
plants without irrigation in regions of limited rainfall.” Thus, he published Dry-Farming: 
A System of Agriculture for Countries Under a Low Rainfall in 1911. The volume was 
directed primarily at dry-land farmers, though he predicted the rapid development of the 
field of dry agriculture, which would produce more technically-oriented works for 
experts. The text is part technical field guide, part academic literature review. Most of the 
academic studies are drawn from scientists working at American and Canadian 
universities based on results from field observations in far-flung research stations like 
‘Indian Head Farm’ in the Canadian province of Saskatchewan. In the chapter “Modern 
Dry Farming in the United States,” Widtsoe credits the Mormon movement in Utah with 
the first trials in the U.S. of modern dry farming in the 1850s. However, he states that 
dry-farming is only the modern manifestation of what he calls an “ancient practice,” 
making it “improbable that intelligent men and women could live in Mesopotamia, for 
example, for thousands of years without discovering methods whereby the fertile soils 
could be made to produce crops in a small degree at least without irrigation.”267 
Therefore, Widtsoe brings a broader reach of agriculture science principles to bear on 
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‘dry farming.’  He furnishes insights from topics like climate science, soil morphology, 
soil-water retention, plant and root structure, transpiration, tillage practices, and cropping 
systems among others. These are then buttressed by descriptions of experimental results 
and anecdotal agricultural histories from around the world.  
 
How did Nassar tackle Widtsoe’s celebration of conquering the desert and its peoples? 
Would not this remind him of Zionist narratives?268 From Nassar’s text one senses a 
budding understanding of the similarities in the discourse of colonialism between North 
America and Palestine. While on occasion Nassar celebrated the ‘amazing’ success of 
American dry agriculture, curious omissions stalk the text. Two examples illustrate this.  
First, at the beginning of a section on the first experiment stations to study 
modern dry-farming, Widtsoe states, “The brave pioneers who fought the relentless 
dryness of the Great American Desert from the memorable entrance of the Mormon 
pioneers into the valley of the Great Salt Lake in 1847 were not the only ones engaged in 
preparing the way for the present day of great agricultural endeavor”.269 This ornate 
language was used occasionally by Widtsoe to emphasize the early accomplishments of 
Mormon pioneers who had arrived to Utah a generation before he had. However, this 
statement was curiously removed in Nassar’s translation, and the Arabic text picks up at 
the following sentence. Nassar seems to have omitted Widtsoe’s description of American 
pioneers “fighting the dryness” of the new land.  
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Second, Widtsoe’s English version cites the scientific study of a prominent early 
Zionist agronomist, Aaron Aaronsohn, on the carob tree (Ceratonia siliqua) among 
others that illustrated the yield potential for the tree’s protein-rich fruit under nonirrigated 
production.270 However, Nassar’s Arabic version entirely omits the Aaronsohn study but 
includes all of the other studies of the English version in the section.271 Curiously, Nassar 
did include another reference to Aaronsohn in Widtsoe’s text in the announcement that he 
had found wild emmer – the wild ancestor of wheat.272 This translation of the original 
‘Palestine’ section was accompanied by a long addendum about the impossibility of 
large-scale irrigated agriculture in Palestine. 
 
What I wish to propose based on these two clear omissions is that Nassar’s 
important omissions illustrate his consciousness of the similarities between the master-
narratives of Zionism that called for the redemption of the barren land and how they bear 
resemblance to Widtsoe’s call to conquer the Utah desert. It must be admitted that Nassar 
does not omit all references to Zionist scientists, nor does he spare admiration for the 
accomplishments of American scientists in the field of dry agriculture. However, the 
above omissions gesture to an awareness that the Palestinian national movement could 
not afford to overlook the pitfalls of American colonialism. This strain of Palestinian 
thought was not explicitly expressed until decades later;273 however, based on this early 
evidence it could be argued that the seeds for comparative settler-colonial approaches can 
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be found in the work of Najib Nassar, if not other writers. While not necessarily 
identifying Palestinians with Native Americans, Nassar saw parallels between the 
narratives of settler-colonial projects and may have wished to de-emphasize statements 
from the English text for his Arabic-reading audience. 
Perhaps equally importantly, Nassar saw a relationship between agricultural 
knowledge and dispossession of peasants. In true form he attempted to intervene to 
nurture and cultivate extensive agricultural practice in order to stem land sales and other 
dispossessions. In other words, the economic situation led him to translate the dry-
agriculture text because he thought that updated methods would make Palestinians more 
competitive. This was clearly not only a choice for rainfed agriculture but also a choice 
against irrigated production. By the time Nassar published this essay, the Zionist 
movement had already begun experiments with irrigated production. By the 1930s the 
scientific leadership had overruled the older generation of Elazari-Volcani to advocate 
strongly for the ‘mixed farming’ that required irrigation for the production of fodder 
crops for dairy farming.274 A widely read journalist, Nassar no doubt was aware of the 
widely circulating scientific literature in English and would have been aware of efforts to 
shift to irrigated production. Thus it is important to note that Palestinian intellectuals 
were advocating a preservation of Palestinian rainfed agriculture in the midst of and 
likely in opposition to the increasing efforts of Zionist organizations to incentivize and 
spread intensive irrigated production. 
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SECTION II: UNDERSTANDING RAINFED FARMING 
There are at least two kinds of explanation made by scholars and intellectuals for the 
persistence of rainfed agriculture. The first explanation is an economistic argument which 
states that the limitations of unproductiveness of grains in ‘traditional’ systems and the 
geographic circumstances (lack of water, rugged terrain), have compelled Palestinians to 
practice rainfed production of fruit and nut trees. This argument was prevalent in the mid-
1980s where scholars grappled with the transformations shaping the West Bank since 
Israeli occupation in 1967. For example, the Palestinian economist Hisham Awartani in 
his 1982 dissertation thesis on rainfed farming in Palestine notes that synthetic fertilizers, 
mechanized tillage, and chemical pesticides are needed to make local rainfed production 
more efficient. Such deficiencies lead, according to Awartani, to poor development of 
agriculture.  
This is manifested by such attributes as an exceedingly rough topography, 
excessive rockiness, irregular and strictly seasonal rainfall, and frequent 
occurrence of very hot weather. Geographic attributes have severely limited the 
area of land fit for irrigated farming and resulted in the excessive dependence on 
rained patterns of agriculture.275 
Generally those working especially from economics-oriented frameworks cite rough 
topography, lack of water resources, and chemical inputs as central handicaps to 
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Palestinian agriculture.276 As we see next, these geomorphological characteristics can 
also be read in other ways. 
In another strain of this economistic argument, Awartani documents the 
restrictions on Palestinian access to water resources in the West Bank and the extensive 
restrictions on cultivation through a complex array of military orders and land 
confiscation mechanisms. Most importantly, he argues persuasively that Israeli policy 
favored annual crops that left less of an imprint on the land. He states Israeli authorities 
were, “Curtailing all patterns of farming which entail visible and long-term attachment of 
farmers to arable land. Foremost, this applies to olives, grapes, and almonds. In contrast 
the department is far more interested in promoting annual field and vegetable crops.”277 
Halabi made a related argument in his study of land alienation in the West Bank. He gave 
the example of Military Order 1015 of 1982, which required farmers to gain “written 
permission” in order to plant tomatoes and eggplants in the Jordan Valley, grapes and 
plums in the entire West Bank.278 He astutely noted, “This order was issued to plan 
agricultural production, but it is used to prevent expansion of cultivation of land 
designated as state domain by the authorities because it is uncultivated.”279  
Benvensiti’s West Bank Data Base Project reports reproduce the claim that 
Palestinian farmers have been forced into practicing rainfed agriculture by Israeli 
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policies.280 One particular instance is particularly significant: “It is clear that West Bank 
farmers are being forced to maintain extensive rather than intensive agriculture and to 
develop traditional agriculture branches. The fact that they must rely almost exclusively 
on rainfall puts them at the mercy of climatic conditions.”281  
In these examples we see a convincing explanation of biophysical limitation that 
assumes rainfed agriculture to be little more than a product of biophysical circumstance 
and unjust policies of the Israeli government in the West Bank. This economistic 
argument no doubt speaks to crucial factors for the persistence of rainfed agriculture. 
However, this position as we will see later overlooks the agro-ecological materials and 
processes by which the situation of rainfed farming came to be.  
A second, more progressive position emerged during the 1990s in the wake of 
new interest in agro-ecological farming practices.  In 1998, the Palestinian Agricultural 
Relief Committees (PARC) undertook a major study of local agricultural knowledge 
among Palestinian farmers in the West Bank. Three agricultural towns were chosen to 
represent several agricultural systems. The study was carried out over two years by 
researchers and agronomists from PARC and supervised by a leading agronomist, Ismail 
Daiq, who helped to found PARC and later shepherded it into a major player in the 
Palestinian NGO scene. The results of the study eventually emerged in the publication of 
Daiq’s 2005 doctoral thesis at the Humboldt University of Berlin. Daiq’s goal was to 
“better understand the problems of Palestinian agriculture, and to analyze the related 
knowledge systems.” Interestingly, the study focused not on more fashionable aspects of 
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agronomic science, but rather on ‘local knowledge’ about rainfed production, a 
longstanding practice in Palestine. According to Daiq, this practice had seen a major 
decline in the West Bank because of “various policies of occupation” and the dependence 
of the Palestinian agricultural economy on Israeli markets282. Thus, rainfed farming “was 
of no interest to Israeli farmers, government, institutions or even the Israeli private 
sector.”283 
 Daiq’s study set about to remedy the lack of technical information about this 
production method through a study of the ‘local knowledge system.’ Published in 
English, the research “aims at empowering Palestinian farmers by enhancing their access 
to such information which is required for improving their production.284” The authors 
noted that a database would be created for farmers to access more detailed research 
results, “We hope that Palestinian farmers will be encouraged to continuously exchange 
their experience and knowledge with researchers, and that the recommendations 
emerging from this process will help them to achieve best results.” 
 Palestinian agricultural extension materials such as this are part of a longer 
tradition that began in the early 1980s after oppositional movements formed in the West 
Bank to supplant Israeli state programs in the arena of agriculture with local Palestinian 
organizations. The Israeli programs, from the start of the Israeli occupation of the West 
Bank, were criticized for funneling funds into high-tech production methods that 
increased Palestinian rural reliance on Israel for synthetic fertilizers, machinery, irrigation 
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equipment, pesticides and herbicides, seeds, and markets. These critics argued effectively 
that this reliance, coupled with the massive influx of Palestinian rural people as labor in 
the Israeli service and construction industries beginning in the 1970s, had left 
Palestinians increasingly vulnerable to the Israeli government.285 Groups of professionals 
like agronomists, scientists, and physicians, many of whom were recent graduates of 
Soviet-bloc and Western universities, formed committees of volunteers to provide free 
agricultural and medical assistance to Palestinian towns and villages in the West Bank. 
Today these organizations count as some of the largest institutions in the Palestinian 
West Bank after modest beginnings as popular committees in the early and mid-1980s. 
 The strategy of the committees in the early 1980s was technical extension 
support for modern agricultural production. 286  With this effort came a proliferation of 
publications. Trained in highly technical disciplines, many of these professionals sought 
to document and disseminate technical information in their respective areas of expertise. 
Themes included plant protection, chemical use, pest management, soil fertility, 
irrigation, and even tree pruning. However, this strategy later developed into a new focus 
on sustainable agricultural methods, and those organizations turned to what they deemed 
‘traditional’ farming practices for insights. For example, Daiq and Sarsour of PARC 
argue that older practices offer guidance for more sustainable land use, “Traditional 
knowledge in Palestine, especially in rainfed crops, will beget practices that fit with 
environment and fulfill the principle of sustained land utilization. This is evident and 
manifested in farmers' practices pertaining to pest management and maintenance of soil 
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and water.”287 Illustrating the more explicitly politicized nature of this discourse, they 
make the important point that, “Politically, farmers protect huge amounts of land from 
confiscation by the Israelis by reclaiming and cultivating it. They continue to cultivate the 
land and plant it with different kinds of vegetables because this food will be the only 
resort when crises occur.”288 These states show a shift of narratives from earlier 
economistic explanations for the persistence of rainfed agriculture to rainfed cultivation 
as a kind of national responsibility used to support communities and protect land from 
confiscation. 
 More rigorously researched examples of this argument come from the Arabic-
language oeuvre of George Kurzom. Kurzom generally aims to show how a strong 
independent Palestinian agricultural economy, based in ecologically-sound methods, is 
the basis for persistence on the land. He argues as much in this 1997 example: 
Indeed ‘modern’ agricultural practices have eroded many wise traditional agricultural 
practices that our farmer grandfathers developed over the generations, through their 
experience and intelligence. These practices have been confirmed by the test of time 
that they are healthy and more productive than the ‘modern’ agriculture that has led to 
the deepening of dependency of farmers and their enrollment in loans, and has caused 
deterioration of soil fertility and other intractable crises.289 (My translation) 
This passage offers many opportunities for reflection, but it is consistent with the theme 
in this and other works by a generation of technically trained experts who sought to 
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return Palestinian agricultural practices to more ecologically-sound bases in traditional 
production systems. A theme for many of these authors is the unsustainable dependency 
on Israel through the introduction of intensive capital-intensive production. Thus for 
Daiq, Kurzom, and others the important task of maintaining rainfed production involves 
the documentation and support of traditional practices to increase farmers’ independence 
and self-sufficiency.290 
Have we exhausted the features of rainfed production’s durability and 
persistence? What combination of biophysical forces enables this process? The authors 
we have considered in this section do on occasion hint to a deeper relationship with the 
land. A good example comes from Awartani’s study of rainfed production, which 
maintained a strictly economic analysis throughout. However, he digressed when noting 
that if rainfed farming were measured on “purely economic terms” then farmers would be 
better off to leave agriculture for jobs in Jordan or the Arab Gulf. He states, “this has not 
been the case, partly due to an intrinsic attachment to land, and partly due to the notably 
efficient mobilization of labour and capital inputs which have low alternative investment 
possibilities”.291 However, despite their valuable critiques in the register of either an 
‘economistic’ frame of analysis or the ‘self-sufficiency’ frame, scholars have overlooked 
how biophysical characteristics enable the persistence of rainfed agriculture.  
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SECTION III: VEGETATIVE EQUIPMENT FOR PERSISTENCE 
What about the material ecological and biophysical properties of rainfed production? In 
contrast to a handicap, does the volatility and diverse habitats of rainfed production give 
them forms of recalcitrance? Here I take up the concept of recalcitrance from Michel 
Foucault’s essay, ‘Subject and Power’, via the work of Timothy Mitchell.292 Writing on 
recalcitrance, Mitchell argues, “The forces of nature, isolated in the laboratory, the glass 
house, or a gorge at Aswan, can be more easily observed, manipulated, harnessed, 
described, and represented. But their representation is not a mere cultural construction, 
for the same forces retain their enormous power to refute what is said about them, escape 
the mechanisms of control, or produce surprising and unanticipated actions.”293 Attention 
to the recalcitrance of natural forces, then, offers an alternative account of the durability 
of rainfed agriculture. Rainfed farming’s volatility, unpredictability, and radically 
localized ideal production make it difficult to impose discursive regimes of representation 
upon it.  
There are several sources of this kind of recalcitrance that are unique to rainfed 
farming practices. Scholars overlook how the processes themselves provide a kind of 
infrastructure or equipment for the emergence of notions of belonging. I will next detail 
some of these processes. I do not attempt an exhaustive catalogue but rather some 
concrete examples that emerge from observation of West Bank agriculture and through 
gaps in academic studies. In the studies these processes are not only shortchanged, but are 
also often considered obstacles to development. I argue that nonhuman forces and 
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processes must be included in this narrative because it is an integral part of a farmer’s 
conception of being. The way that the composition of biota comes to play a role in the 
development of political being emerges from the features of rainfed farming itself. 
First, reproduction processes of certain plants have important effects on 
cultivation. It is claimed that one of the most successfully ‘modernized’ crops in the West 
Bank is a seedless, small, thin-skinned cucumber that is a staple in the diet of people all 
over the Middle East. Local seed varieties were historically grown in an open field and 
pollinated by wind and insects. However, in the 1940s Israeli plant breeders created a 
stable variety by breeding into local seed stocks resistance to two forms of mildew into 
local landraces from Japanese and Indian cucumbers.294 The resulting family of varieties 
(known as ‘Beit-Alpha’) was bred from the line of Cucumis sativus var. antasiaticus to 
be seedless and exclusively greenhouse-grown. Cucumbers are commercially successful 
around the world in industrial-scale production thanks to rainfed farming’s versatility and 
the intensive marketing efforts of the seed companies. When this production system was 
introduced into the West Bank by the Israeli agencies, it happily met a growing demand 
for year-round cucumbers in the local community. However, this switch had important 
effects. The new hybrid cucumber was parthenocarpic, meaning that its seedless fruit is 
produced without the fertilization of the plant, essentially skipping the reproductive 
process and producing a seedless fruit. Subsequently, this meant that all of the plants in a 
given greenhouse in the West Bank, rather than being relatives, were clones of each 
other. The disease and pest pressures of having a crop of genetically identical plants 
                                                
294 (Davidi, 2009)  
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confined now to a humid and warm greenhouse environment meant that the plants had to 
be sprayed with fungicides every three to four days. Also, the other trappings of intensive 
greenhouse production, fertilizers, piping, tubing, plastic sheeting, nozzles, pumps, and 
the ever-expensive water for irrigation meant that this production was massively capital-
intensive, shifting the risk in the case of unsubsidized Palestinian farmers producing for 
the subsidized Israeli market entirely to West Bank farmers. The massive chemical 
applications, threat of crop disease, soil salinization from irrigation, market volatility 
from closures, and dependence on Israel (the occupying power) for all of the equipment 
and inputs meant that such greenhouse production was a risky venture. Many farmers 
locked into this production system were unable to pay off the initial investments. 
However, a fellow cucurbit and distant relative of this hybrid cucumber offers 
another account. The fruit, known locally as fakkous (Cucumis melo var. flexuosus), is a 
light green, cucumber-like member of the melon family,295 eaten during the summers and 
prized for its juicy crunch. It enjoys a lucrative local market and, ironically, an even more 
lucrative market if Israeli vendors appear in the rural wholesale markets of Halhul and 
Hebron. There are several varieties in Palestine and preferences align along regional 
biases. Some are known by color, whereas others are named for places, such as the 
sahouri from the town of Beit Sahour. In fact, throughout the West Bank, fakkous seeds 
are only available from other farmers and small farm shops in rural areas. However, the 
fakkous does not abide by the conventions of intensified irrigated production. It is a very 
rugged plant that is open-pollinated by wind and insects and known for its climbing 
                                                
295 It may be known in English as ‘Wild Cucumber’ or ‘Armenian Cucumber’ though appearance, texture, smell, and 
flavor vary by region. It is also popular in Turkey, Lebanon, Syria and the wider region. A basic botanical 
information sheet is available here: (Stephens, 2012). 
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ability. Fakkous cannot be grown successfully with pesticides, artificial fertilizers, and 
perhaps most interestingly, irrigation. It’s believed that the varieties of fakkous grown in 
Palestine are so adapted to chemical-free rainfed cultivation that the plant will not bear 
fruit if irrigated. It is said that under irrigation, it will have impressive growth, but for 
unknown reasons, the plant will not give fruit. As such fakkous seed is traded locally, 
informally and it is grown in early spring to take advantage of soil moisture following 
winter rains. Its only production costs are labor and seed, which is often kept by farmers 
from the previous season.296 Especially in the southern West Bank districts of Bethlehem 
and Hebron, the crop is widely cultivated and is an important source of income for 
farmers for the summer months.  
There are at least two factors in this comparison between two relatives, hybrid 
cucumbers and the fakkous, that deserve attention. First, the reproductive process of the 
plants themselves comes to have important effects. In the case of the hybrid greenhouse 
cucumber, which is a main crop in Palestine today, the parthenocarpic reproduction 
without fertilization and its chemical inputs negatively affects the flavor and texture. 
Open-pollinated crops like the fakkous have a distinctive and lucrative market advantage. 
Some evidence indicates that there is a relationship between hormones released in the 
reproduction of plants (e.g. to attract pollinators) and flavanoid complexes that have a 
host of effects on the plant, including its antioxidant activity.297 Thus the flavor, texture, 
nutritional value, and structure of the fruit are altered by modifications to its reproductive 
cycle by the greenhouse production of hybrid cucumbers. This has been a theme of 
                                                
296 (Mohammad S Ali-Shtayeh & Jamous, 2005; Mohammed S Ali-Shtayeh & Jamous, 2006; Iseed, 2010) 
297 (Newton et al., 2011, p. 163; Schijlen, Ric de Vos, van Tunen, & Bovy, 2004; Vaughan, Geissler, & Nicholson, 
2009, p. 219) 
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writing in Arabic on the flavor and value of vegetables. The better flavor of non-
parthenocarpic fruits was discussed in a 1994 report on rainfed agriculture in Palestine.298 
Nassar also commented in 1927 that the higher price of apricots is because they are 
“better than those of irrigated areas”.299 Second and more importantly, the structure of 
greenhouse production rearranges flows of capital, equipment, seeds, chemicals, water in 
a highly concentrated fashion. This realignment of materials is one-directional as Israel 
restricts the production and import of farm equipment in the West Bank. Thus, in order to 
enter into this production system, the flows of materials required emerge directly from 
the set of power relations between an occupying power and an occupied people. Both the 
materials required and the primary market for this system rest in important ways on the 
volatile relationship between the Israeli government and Palestinian producers. However, 
the biological and chemical properties of the fakkous that affect its market value and 
growth pattern give it a certain grip on the land dictating where and how it is grown. 
A second example comes from the most widely cultivated plant in the West Bank; 
the olive tree. It has been shown above that the planting of olive trees in recent years is in 
part the product of increased confiscation of land by the Israeli government. Scholars 
have noted that the “presence of a tree coverage could help complicate and impede 
Israel's settlement policies”.300 We will discuss the topic of visibility, trees, and land 
rights in great length in the next chapter, but how does a tree complicate the process of 
                                                
298 (ARIJ Applied Research Institute-Jersusalem, 1994) ; 
299 “And the people of Nazareth are able to say much more than that, with regard to the ba'ali apricot trees, the value of 
the fruit of one of these trees ranges this year between 50 and 300 Egyptian qirsh. This indicates that trees 
domesticate dry areas and their fruits in that land are better than those of irrigated land and humid areas” (My 
translation).(N. Nassar, 1927, p. 164) 
300 (H. Awartani, 1982, p. 372) 
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confiscation? The olive tree is an extremely hardy and rugged plant. It requires little care 
for survival. For the highest yield under intensive production irrigation, fertilizers and 
chemicals, and severe pruning are used. However, in the practices employed for the care 
of olive trees in the West Bank, the tree persists by its own impulse of life. Olive groves 
are generally plowed twice at most, but often not at all. Historically intercropping with 
cereals and small grains was common practice.301 It is only at harvest time when the trees 
are picked and attended. This was a source of concern for agronomists as to the ‘neglect’ 
of the trees, but Nassar saw it another way in 1927: 
What else explains the success of olives in Palestine in spite of the little attention paid 
to them as well as the success of almonds and the other trees by their own grace in 
Nazareth, Mount Nablus, and Houran, all of which is conclusive evidence of the 
feasibility of the success of planting trees in dry areas.302 (My translation) 
Thus, in the hardiness of the tree, its remarkable capacity for drought and disease 
tolerance, lies the capacity for agricultural life on much of the cultivated land in the West 
Bank. In addition to other driving motivations discussed above, perhaps this remarkably 
rugged biophysical capacity also helps to explain the increase in olive tree acreage from 
53,700 hectares in 1966 to 90,000 hectares in 2006, when other major crops saw 
significant declines.303 
Third, the interaction between particular varieties of plants and the microclimates 
that provide the ideal growing conditions is highly localized. For example, many local 
                                                
301 See (Kurzom, 1997, pp. 7–15) for an interview with an elderly farmer in the Ramallah district. 
302 (N. Nassar, 1927, p. 164) 
303 (Assaf, 2010, p. 200) 
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varieties of native wheat in the hill region of the West Bank developed with lower 
amounts of rain than varieties developed in other areas, especially northern Palestine. 
This results in highly variable success of high-yielding varieties of wheat. In the early 
days improved hybrids developed by the Israeli government and companies came as a 
package with reduced costs of synthetic fertilizers. However, because some areas 
inevitably receive higher amounts of rainfall than others, sensitive relationship between 
yields and the moisture-based uptake of phosphate-based synthetic fertilizers often is 
vulnerable to minor climatic differences. This fact restricts the production of wheat, 
among other crops, to highly localized areas and sub-regions in the West Bank. 
In 1967 Israeli agricultural experts transformed the agricultural practices 
prevalent in the West Bank. The Israeli ministries boasted of the modern advances made 
in the West Bank in a flood of translated English language reports that aimed to illustrate 
to the world the benefits of Israeli administration.304 However, frustrations emerged 
among Israeli Ministry of Agriculture staff soon after taking over the West Bank. 
Officials voiced these frustrations in more academic reports intended for smaller 
circulation.  
For example, field scientists and extension agents were particularly flustered by 
cereal production. Their plans for introducing high-yielding wheat had run into some 
unforeseen complications. For decades, Israeli agronomists had been breeding wheat 
varieties from local cultivars and landraces found before the arrival of European settlers 
and crossed improved strains to boost a number of desirable characteristics like yield, 
                                                
304 (Coordinator of Government Operations in the Administered Territories, 1972; Ministry of Agriculture, State of 
Israel, 1970, Ministry of Defence, 1969) 
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pest and disease resistance, and drought tolerance. Long the basis of agricultural 
livelihood in Palestine, endless local varieties of wheat were found in farming villages. 
Moreover, wheat’s landrace or wild relative, wild emmer, is found in the hills of northern 
Palestine indicating its origin and development in the Fertile Crescent. This produced a 
massive diversity in the genetic pool of the species where it had adapted to the 
microclimatic conditions found in various villages depending on rainfall, elevation, 
temperatures, soil types, pests, and diseases among other factors. 
 When Israeli experts began to conduct field experiments in the West Bank hilly 
regions, they described two central problems with the improved varieties of wheat they 
had been growing in an industrial, chemical-intensive way on the plains areas of Israel. 
305 First, because the rainfall was lower, the high yielding varieties were not responding 
to the synthetic fertilizer applications because they require high moisture levels for 
chemical uptake. The authors stated, “the local varieties are better adapted to adverse 
growing conditions than the improved varieties with a high yield potential.”306 Second, 
because much of the wheat in the West Bank is grown in rugged hill areas, mechanized 
tillage was not possible, and this delayed planting until the soil was moist enough for 
draught animals, thereby not giving extra time often required by the high-yield varieties. 
The difficulties were expressed in plain language; “improved varieties have no advantage 
over the traditional ones in the ensuing shortened growing season”.307  
 A 1980 study expressed the frustration of officials and implied that modern wheat 
                                                
305 (Itzhak Arnon & Raviv, 1980) 
306 (Itzhak Arnon & Raviv, 1980) 
307 (Itzhak Arnon & Raviv, 1980) 
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production in such ‘marginal’ areas impractical and likely to disappear.308 As we have 
seen in the preceding two chapters, this view follows in a tradition of scientists working 
within Zionist agencies of isolating a single variable such as yield potential as the sole 
metric of evaluation for local agriculture. Such a narrow scope of measurement obscures 
many other practices and processes related to cultivation, which we will return to later in 
this chapter.  
 These kinds of details emerge only through attention to the materials and flows 
that give rise to the situation of rainfed agriculture in the West Bank. Conventional 
accounts stop short of a discussion of the seeds, biological processes, topographies, and 
practices, relegating them, at best, as obstacles to the modernization of Palestinian 
agriculture.309 But a focus on the material aspect of the question of rainfed farming 
practices in the West Bank offers another vantage point to consider how more-than-
human relationships constantly reshape the question of cultivation. Only with this 
perspective does cultivation come into view as an embodied practice, based in the 
experiences of the kinds of experimentation of farmers described above. They all furnish 
a certain productive difference that can provide the friction to drive particular claims of 
belonging and understanding of being. I argue that certain biological, reproductive, and 
geomorphological properties of rainfed production give it both qualities of durability in 
sustaining an attachment to farmland and are productive of conceptions of political being 
that are not easily read through the grid of state logics. 
 
                                                
308 (Itzhak Arnon & Raviv, 1980) 
309 (Mitchell, 2011a) 
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Interlude on Political Practice of Cultivation 
Here I pause for a moment to consider a related point made by James Scott. In his 
engaging 2007 title, he outlines a theory of “escape agriculture” in which highland 
peoples of Southeast Asia deploy strategies of cultivation to evade enrollment into state 
projects. One of the primary vehicles of this enrollment is paddy-based wet rice 
cultivation, which brings with it a host of political and social technologies of governance. 
While the work offers several fascinating avenues of exploration, my position departs in 
an important way from Scott. Scott describes ‘Zomia’ both as a Southeast Asia region 
and a concept at the geographical margins of state control. For Scott, Zomia is a ‘non-
state space’ that invariably involves the capacity for flight and escape by subaltern groups 
from elite rule. Yet how are we to think about ‘Zomia’ in Israel/Palestine? In contrast to 
Zomia’s mobility that is enabled by the practices that Scott describes, the process of 
active Israeli dispossession forces Palestinian farmers to resort to geographical fixity – of 
territory and livelihoods – as an expression of contestation and moral commitment to the 
land. In the case of my study, rainfed farming is not somehow apart from the relations of 
domination and inherent to dominant political order of colonialism in Palestine, but rather 
an emerges through the relations of domination and power to produce an alternative 
political horizon. Such a politics of substantiation does not perform to script of state 
territorialization like private property, but names a relation of belonging and attachment 
that disrupts the system itself. Despite the impressive catalogue of practices, these 
practices are made to stand apart from the state technologies of rule brought to bear on 
them. Here, in contrast, we have come to see them as constitutive of modes of political 
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being but not necessarily aspiring to the state form. 
 
 
SECTION IV: RAINFED FARMING AND BELONGING 
Among the most incisive and astute observers of the dynamic, embodied practice of 
Palestinian cultivation was Hassan Mustafa. While he does not directly address rainfed 
farming (in fact his home village of Battir is known for its ancient irrigation system), his 
works nevertheless offer an opportunity to connect the question of belonging to the 
practices of cultivation described above. His works are little known and largely 
unavailable in Palestine or abroad.310 Born in 1914 in the Jerusalem-area village of Battir, 
Hassan Mustafa studied at the American University in Cairo, graduating in 1935 with a 
degree in sociology. A driven man of formidable intellect, Mustafa was best known in 
Palestine for his work building the Palestinian rural cooperative movement, but he was 
actively involved in educational spheres in Palestine until his exile to Iraq by the British 
Mandate authorities in 1938 with several other prominent Palestinian intellectuals311. His 
tenure at a teacher’s training college in Baghdad proved to be a formative experience for 
him as an Arab nationalist. Upon his return to Palestine in 1941, he worked with the 
eminent Palestinian educator and intellectual, Khalil Sakakini, at Sakakini’s school Al-
Nahḍa College in Jerusalem. However, Mustafa’s rural origins and continued interest in 
peasant livelihood from his home base in Battir set him apart from most of his fellow 
nationalist educator-intellectuals. It was precisely this vantage point that afforded him a 
                                                
310 I am particularly indebted to descendants of Hassan Mustafa, Nadia Botmeh and Samia Botmeh, for generously 
sharing information from their family records.  
311 (Botmeh, 2006, p. 30) 
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novel approach. 
 In 1945, Mustafa published Khatarāt Rīfīyah (Rural Reflections), a collection of 
essays on rural life based on his travels and conversations with Palestinian villagers. 
While he does not detail his travels in the manner of a travelogue, his essays nevertheless 
operate as field reports or observations. He describes meeting shepherds, farmers, 
observing various local religious holidays, and living peasant life. 
 
On land, belonging, and validation 
One of the most fruitful early articulations of Palestinian nature comes in Mustafa’s 
opening essay, “al-Hawiyyah” (Identity)312, which explores the relationship between 
rural people, nature, and belonging. He argues, “Perhaps the first manifestation of this 
connection between humans and nature is the establishment of the human in relation to 
the land that he is attached to.313” Crucially, he distinguishes between identity ‘in the 
tradition of the law’ and identity ‘in the tradition of the villager’:  
 
The first identity indicates a name (ism) and some of its features, and the second 
identity indicates a settling and establishment (ithbāt) of a presence on the surface 
of the Earth within a certain limited area (nitāq). Then establishment (ithbāt) of 
identity for the villager carries the meaning of affirmation/substantiation (ithbāt) 
of his person (shakhsahu), not his image (ṣuratahu), on a particular parcel of land 
not on a piece of paper. Thus the definition of his identity is given through his 
                                                
312 Hawiyyah in English is understood as identity, but also as nature or essence. 
313 (Mustafa, 1945, p. 9) 
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person and his land and is endowed value by how he leaves his impression upon 
that patch of land that embraces him. From here comes the saying: ‘He who does 
not have land, does not have identity.’314 (My translation) 
 
Mustafa’s essay argues that the recognition of one’s being is made possible only through 
the establishment (ithbāt) of one’s presence on the land. While a cursory reading sees his 
concept of identity as conventionally essentialist, we might also see a similarity between 
establishment and embodied practice. He draws a distinction between recognition of 
identity through ‘ism’ or name, and identity through ‘istiṭān’ or settling, dwelling. 
Mustafa believed that one’s relationship to the land is constantly re-formed through the 
practice of tilling, planting, and reaping of the land. This notion of being, according to 
Mustafa, emerges through effort upon the land because the “relationship with nature does 
not know leniency, for nature’s laws apply to that relation and whosever’s work is 
connected to it quite validly does not receive mercy”.315 Thus, in contrast to an abstract 
legal right (as Mustafa puts it, “a photograph attached to a paper”), Mustafa argues that 
the link is established by responding to the land’s invitation to inhabit and work it. He 
makes this argument contrasting several times these two senses of the word ‘hawiyyah’ 
or identity. Crucially, he rejects an abstract concept of belonging that is granted through 
the law by claiming that belonging cannot be endowed or revoked, only measured by 
how a person “leaves his impression on the land that embraces him.” 316 This embodied, 
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instinctual response to the invitation from the land transcends modern efforts to know and 
thereby dominate it, because it is a responding that seeks to tend to ongoing processes.317 
In opposition to attempts to codify abstract belonging, he draws attention away from 
abstract belonging to a concrete sense of how one belongs to and knows the land, how 
one treats the life-giving force of the land.  
Mustafa describes a conversation with an old farmer (shaykh) later in the volume 
he lays out most clearly his understanding of activity required to be in ‘harmony with 
nature.’ The conversation develops his notion of belonging by inhabiting the land, which 
in turn means to work the land. The shaykh tells Mustafa: 
 
This labor, my brother, does not know equivocation. If you plant you will reap; 
there is no middle way and no alternative or hypocrisy. Nature is merciless, oh 
brother. The land demands tilling, not prayer. And the furrows of tilled soil 
demand seed, not ruse or deception, and seeds demand water, not mirage, and the 
harvest demands all of this effort which you see before you.318 (My translation) 
 
However, he qualifies this apparently narrow notion of belonging by showing how the 
opportunity to belong and benefits from belonging are open to anyone regardless of their 
social standing: 
 
Shaykh: It is as though the forces of nature and the forces of a new village, where 
                                                
317 Here there are resonances with the first sense of Heidegger’s ‘building’ which stems from a caring or a preserving 
that “tends the growth that ripens its fruit of its own accord” (Heidegger, 2001, p. 145). 
318(Mustafa, 1945, pp. 85–86) 
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everyone works together, cooperatively and honestly, to produce this fruit with 
the aid of the Almighty. Mustafa: What Fruit? Shaykh: It is the blessed fruit that 
all people enjoy with us regardless of their social status. 319 (My translation) 
 
This notion of being-in-common through inhabiting the land and care for creation ‘knows 
no mercy,’ yet it includes both human and nonhuman in the production of a yield that is 
held in common320. However, Mustafa argues that modern conceptions of agricultural 
production are rendering the vocation of agriculture ‘outdated.’ As such, some seek to 
improve the farmer and reorganize his lifestyle and practices. Mustafa offers an incisive 
remark from the shaykh character: 
 
Shaykh: You see the fallaḥ becomes a standard and another source of pride; 
people act hypocritically when they position him as a master, and sometimes they 
neglect him and position him as a servant, yet the fallaḥ knows better. He says 
this about himself: "I am the servant of the land and master of the field, servant of 
the people but master of myself."321 (My translation) 
 
On one level, the ‘advice’ coming in those days of the British Mandate especially was 
that the farmer needed be brought up and improved. Mustafa seeks to show the hypocrisy 
felt by the farmer who through his practice understands the stakes of the agricultural 
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vocation better than an expert. However, the more profound insight from Mustafa is that 
the farmer’s practice produces his identity or political being, which constantly emerges 
but does not seek validation through external abstractions like the law. Afterall, the 
farmer is the master of himself but servant of the people. Here Mustafa’s notion of being 
is at once an affirmation of his individual freedom but held in tension with his 
responsibility to being-in-common. Despite his somewhat conservative approach to 
identity as read through today’s understanding of a loaded term, Mustafa offers us a 
powerful reading of being and belonging that emerges through concrete practice and not 
juridical abstraction. While he does not directly address the issue of rainfed farming, 
Mustafa reveals a sophisticated and open understanding of attachment and belonging 
through the practice of cultivation. Mustafa’s notion leaves the nature of political being 
an open question, answered in the embodied practice of dwelling and cultivation rather 
than the legal realm of private property and rights. When put into conversation with 
Nassar’s emphasis on rainfed farming and cultivation for protection of the land from 
appropriation, Mustafa offers a powerful extension, arguing that achieving legal rights 
does not exhaust our understanding of belonging. Rather, he notes that it is only through 
the embodied practice of dwelling and cultivating that a sense of belonging is constantly 
re-made and re-secured. 
 
 
 
 
  162 
SECTION V. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the historical linkages that illustrate longstanding interest in 
rainfed agricultural practices.  Rainfed agricultural systems have been debated and 
identified by Palestinian intellectuals, often drawing conclusions about their importance 
for maintaining a presence on the land. Contrary to current economistic accounts of the 
decreasing viability of rainfed farming, I have shown how these agricultural practices 
were believed by authors dating as far back as the 1920s to enable forms of political 
being-in-common that strengthens attachment to the land without necessarily culminating 
in a state form. Crucially, the promise of rainfed production emerges out of what is 
conventionally understood as its handicaps. More specifically, its volatility, the 
recalcitrant qualities of its component parts, and the unruliness of its localized production 
afford rainfed agriculture its durability. It is a practice that enjoys remarkable durability 
and exploring how that was made enables us to explore how concrete notions of political 
being emerge out of the process. Exploring the work of Nassar and Mustafa in 
conversation with other accounts of rainfed farming illustrates the ways that such 
practices are taken up and understood to embody more durable attachment to the land. 
The next chapter explores forms of political being that emerge from cultivation practice. 
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 Chapter 4: Cultivation and Infrastructures of Recalcitrance  
 
Tree saplings, or gharsāt, are not visible from just any distance. Small animal pens, 
likewise, come into view only in close quarters. But when militarized, heavy, 
construction equipment from the Israeli Civil Administration and parks authority comes 
to raze a feature deemed to be offending, all becomes clear. It makes for a most 
incongruous scene: soldiers versus sheep, saplings versus heavy equipment. The area is 
located within an official nature reserve, and cultivation is not permitted, the farmer is 
told. The deed done, the soldiers and equipment recede. Such episodes repeat often in the 
violent engagement of Palestinians and Israeli government agencies in the West Bank. 
Even in an encounter’s wake, little is visible from a distance: a disfigured field, a military 
order, a map, broken stalks, shredded plastic sheeting.  The highland spine of the West 
Bank organizes these encounters topographically among its hills and villages. 
Palestinians return to replant their groves and rebuild their sheds.  
 From their singularly high-altitude perspective, maps of the Palestinian West 
Bank exhibit a dizzying fabric of color, shape, line, form, and symbol. Israel’s hilltop 
settlements appear in shades of blue, and Palestinian towns are scattered in shades of 
brown. Ominous outlines of walls and checkpoints also figure prominently. Some map 
features have already been built, but many others are only planned. As such, the map 
provides an important representational space within which to illustrate the ongoing 
process of material dispossession of Palestinians, whether planned or actual. The West 
Bank maps have succeeded to some degree in countering dominant Israeli narratives of 
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defense and security by visualizing the material fact of Israeli military control in its 
various spatial forms. One of most effective and important results has been the 
illustration of the “Oslo process” categorization of West Bank land into three major 
jurisdictions: the now-infamous areas A, B, and C. Crucially, the maps show how Area A 
spaces, under nominal Palestinian control, appear as an archipelago of reservations 
surrounded entirely by areas under Israeli control. The logics and consequences of this 
spatial order have been well documented. 322 The map’s satellite view of the world rightly 
shows how 60 percent of West Bank land has been categorized as Area C, or under “full” 
Israeli control. This distinction means that all Palestinian construction and cultivation 
requires approval from the Israeli military. Permits are rarely given. Palestinian homes, 
fields, cisterns, barns, and roads are frequently bulldozed in these areas. From 1997 to 
2009, Israeli government figures cited at least 2,450 demolitions of Palestinian structures 
in Area C lands. 323  In some cases, such as the one we consider in this chapter, additional 
categories such as Nature Reserve, provide the juridical basis for evacuation or 
demolition. These areas provide an especially useful vantage to consider the intersection 
of agroecological and spatial orders in our wider exploration of practices of persistence. 
The declaration of such reserves, as we will see, has a long history in Palestine that is 
deeply entangled with the contest over land and legal claims to territory. How are the 
embodied practices of cultivation productive of novel forms of political being? 
 To explore this question, this chapter considers how the declaration of state lands 
                                                
322 Much is made of Palestinian resolve (Bardenstein, 1998; I. Braverman, 2009; Irus Braverman, 2008; Cohen, 1993). 
Even more is made of the Israeli legal and technological structures of control in the West Bank (Azoulay & Ophir, 
2012; Gordon, 2008; Weizman, 2007). 
323 (UN-OCHA, 2009, p. 3) 
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has for ninety years rested on a central distinction: whether the land could be considered 
“cultivated.” The distinction on state land dates to an older process of land and agrarian 
reform instituted by Ottoman authorities and continued under the British Mandate that 
encouraged cultivation and tied parcels of land to individual people.  Those reforms 
introduced the notion that, if land was uncultivated for a particular length of time, it 
became state land. One the primary instruments of creating this distinction, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, was the creation of the Custodian of Absentee Property, whose task it was to 
manage and classify land based on its agricultural status. The Custodian of Absentee 
Property and other legal mechanisms illustrate how metrics for the evaluation of 
agriculture participate in processes of land annexation. Today, the un/cultivated 
distinction remains one of the most contested spheres of struggle between Palestinian 
villagers and Israeli authorities and settler groups. It is a battle waged at various registers: 
courts, bureaucratic mechanisms of measurement, and living organisms on the land. The 
subtle division between cultivated and uncultivated land is the basis for classifying 
“private land” and “state land,” which has been the Israeli government’s primary 
instrument of land appropriation for decades. This land categorization of private land and 
state land is made to appear separate from political calculation, but it is not separate. 
More importantly, however, this categorization offers us a way to consider how the 
concept of cultivation, while related to processes of dispossession as we have seen in 
previous chapters, also emerges as a site of politics. Embodied practices of cultivation by 
definition do not derive from a set political program. Rather, political being or 
subjectivity is made in the process.  
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 Generally, two kinds of explanations of the relationship between private land and 
state land are offered. The first may be called an “interpretist” position, in which scholars 
argue that the land tenure law has been implemented incorrectly. From this perspective, 
critical historians have described the transformation of Ottoman land tenure, beginning 
with the Young Turk revolution through 1858 Ottoman Land Code (OLC) reforms, as a 
process of gradual privatization and land alienation. Advancing this premise, recent work 
in this literature views the 1979 Israeli re-implementation of the land law in the West 
Bank as violating the intended spirit of the OLC, which placed the burden of proof of 
cultivation or noncultivation on the state, not the landowner.  
 The other explanation comes from critical legal studies, through which scholars 
aim to show how Palestinian and Israeli sides deploy competing historical narratives to 
“produce” the landscape to their advantage. In this “social constructionist” explanation, 
Palestinian farmers are locked in a back-and-forth contest of planting and uprooting with 
Israeli authorities and settler groups. This view contends that parties work the land 
strategically to more effectively mount court cases. 
 While both of these explanations have made important critical contributions to the 
literature on land politics in Palestine, this chapter seeks to build a position distinct from 
either. Specifically, this chapter does not begin from the assumption that Palestinian 
agroecological practice and, more fundamentally, the vegetative activity of the land are 
determined by juridical logics. Certainly, Palestinian farmers, by virtue of their 
subordinate position in the colonial order, must engage land-confiscation efforts in legal 
terms. However, to confine Palestinian farming and the life of the landscape to a separate 
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realm where it seeks only to influence governmental policy grants the law the capacity to 
determine agroecological life.324 In other words, the complex of forces both human and 
otherwise inhabits a register that is deeply entangled with, but not constituted by, the 
law.325 Here we return to the second sense of the ẓill-shadow as shelter, in which 
Palestinian practices of cultivation give form to the potential residing in the landscape 
and in history, thereby producing new political horizons. The chapter will explore this 
process in two main sections, using places such as the Wad Qana valley in the West Bank 
to force reconsideration of juridical bases for distinctions such as cultivated/uncultivated. 
Section 1 will explore the genealogy of laws and policies aimed at governing cultivation 
and the declaration of state land. Section 2 will consider the ways that cultivation 
practices and environmental processes raise questions about the limits of juridical logics. 
 
 
SECTION 1. GENEALOGY OF CULTIVATED LAND 
Starting high in the hill country near Nablus, the Wad Qana valley snakes down through 
the folds of the rugged West Bank hill ridge. 326 It descends through lands where olives, 
wild oaks, almonds, citrus groves, and figs crowd an unpretentious landscape. It floods 
violently during a good winter rain. For most of the year it is dry or runs at a trickle near 
springs. The Qana River is fed by springs along its descent from 600 meters, where it 
joins the Nahr Al- ͑A͑uja river on the coastal plain and finally ambles into the 
                                                
324 (Mitchell, 2011a) 
325 (Samera Esmeir, 2012; Fakher Eldin, 2008) 
326 ‘Wad’ is Arabic for ‘valley’ and it is redundant to use both Wad and valley for Arabic speakers. However, since 
‘Wad Qana’ is the proper name of a place, I will use it and add ‘valley’ for clarity in English. 
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Mediterranean Sea. Its colluvial-alluvial soils create one of the most prized areas for 
growing crops in the hill country. The ravine gathers many people, crops, religious sites, 
trees, and birds along its route from the highlands to the sea. The town of Wad Qana is a 
small group of houses collected along springs in the valley’s lower terraces. The houses 
are high enough to avoid the occasional winter flash flooding but low enough to easily 
tend to the groves on the valley floor. The springs organize the village in the valley. The 
Palestinians who inhabit Wad Qana maintained economic and familial connections to 
Dayr Istiya, the nearby “mother” village, whose prominent families owned most of the 
land in the fertile valley. 327 Dayr Istiya belongs to a group of about twenty other villages 
in the mountain ridge of the West Bank that have become known as Qura Karāsi, or 
throne villages. These villages saw the rise in the nineteenth century of family clans who 
became wealthy landlords. 328 In the case of Dayr Istiya, the agricultural lands of the 
village extended northwest into surrounding fertile valleys such as Wad Qana. As is 
common practice historically in Palestine, families moved either permanently or 
seasonally into simple homes near their fields. These outlying hamlets, or ͑izab, as they 
are known, were connected integrally into the economic and social spheres of the 
corresponding villages.329 Some ͑izab such as Wad Qana became villages. Bishara 
Doumani has shown how the area around Dayr Istiya, which would have included Wad 
Qana, was a major olive-oil producing region, feeding Nablus’ massive appetite for oil 
                                                
327 (Doumani, 1995) 
328 (`Arraf, 1996; Amiry & Riwaq--Centre for Architectural Conservation, 2003). For an interesting biography of a 
leading member of this rural feudal system, Omar Salih, see (Tamari, 2009a). 
329 ͑izab are places inhabited most of the year (usually February to November) the families who farm and tend herds of 
sheep live. The families usually stay back in the village during the coldest winter months.  These hamlets have an 
ambiguous legal status, but locals know their exact location as though they were villages. Suad ͑Amiry and Faris 
Rahhal’s pioneering study, Manāṭir: qusūr al-mazāri ͑ fi rīf Filasṭīn [Manatir: Farm Structures in Rural Palestine]” 
provides an architectural history of these unique field structures. 
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for export and soap-making.330 Hütteroth and Abdulfattah show the impressive base of 
Dayr Istiya’s 5,500 identified olive trees dating to the late 16th century Ottoman tax 
records.331 Nablus olive-oil soap was exported heavily in the nineteenth century, 
especially to the Middle East and Europe. Dayr Istiya in particular was known for its 
grains and oil from olives grown on the steep hillsides.  
Cartographically speaking, if there were a list of lost causes with respect to 
restrictions today in the West Bank, Wad Qana would be near the top. By virtue of its 
entanglement in a complex of land classifications by the Israeli government, Palestinian 
habitation has become difficult. A detailed map of the West Bank would show the town 
of Wad Qana ensnared in a matrix of walls, checkpoints, settlements, and other legal 
restrictions. Four Israeli colonies were built in the immediate vicinity beginning in 1978. 
332 In December 1983, the land was unilaterally classified a nature preserve by the Israeli 
military.333 This is based upon a classification originally made by British Mandate 
authorities as early as 1926.334 In recent times, the first in a string of demolitions began 
with a family home in 1984. Finally in 1986, the families who lived in the valley year-
round were forced out by the restrictions on farming and construction. They moved to the 
town of Dayr Istiya. Then, during the 1993 Oslo negotiations, the area (as well as all 
others so designated) was reaffirmed as a Nature Reserve, which kept it off-limits to 
                                                
330 (Doumani, 1995, p. 270) 
331 (Hütteroth & Abdulfattah, 1977, p. 136) 
332 The first four colonies were built in 1978, 1980, 1981, and 1983 (Americans for Peace Now, n.d.). 
333 (Amiry & Rahhal, 2003) 
334 The British Mandate (1920-1948) authorities instituted the Forest Ordinance of 1926, which includes Wad Qana as 
a reserve (El-Eini, 2006, p. 202). For discussions of this period from varied political positions, see (El-Eini, 2006, pp. 
189–153; Tyler, 2001, pp. 154–155). The Palestine Royal Commission maps (1937) include the Wad Qana areas a 
declared and surveyed reserve.  
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Palestinians. In other words, Wad Qana’s sedimented legal structure leaves it subject to at 
least two layers of Israel juridical mechanisms–both Nature Reserve and Area C. The 
Green Patrol rangers of the Israel Parks and Reserves Authority, as well as the army, are 
responsible for enforcement of cultivation prohibitions. Many Israelis, who are usually 
also settlers, hike in the valley. Such a hike and swim usually involves heavily armed 
escorts assigned by the “security coordinator” of a nearby settlement.335 This is part of a 
longstanding and increasingly sophisticated project to claim springs and other open 
spaces in Palestinian villages as recreation areas for Israeli settlers by visiting and 
erecting park facilities.336 Wastewater pipelines from nearby Israeli settlements often 
overflow, dumping wastewater down the valley until the relevant Israeli contact can be 
marshaled to stop the flow.337 Soldiers often close the only road Palestinians are allowed 
to use. Attempts by Palestinians to plant trees lead to demolition orders, such as a recent 
one in 2012 that condemned more than 1,000 olive saplings.338 For these reasons and 
others, Wad Qana appears as a lost cause because it is deeply tangled in this web of state 
and settler claims. 
Yet Wad Qana is an intensely contested space. Despite severe restrictions on 
planting trees (field crops are generally tolerated), farmers work actively to expand their 
groves, planting hundreds of olive seedlings each season. The sheltered, lower-altitude 
part of the valley provides a warm climate for coastal crops, such as citrus. The citrus 
groves provide a good livelihood for several farm families. These farmers live in the 
                                                
335 This is described in a recent report on Israel takeover of Palestinian springs, see (UN-OCHA, 2012). References to 
security coordination are also found on this travel guide entry for Wad Qana, (“‘Nahal Kana’,” n.d.). 
336 For a historical perspective, see (R. L. Stein, 2009) and for an extensive recent report, see (UN-OCHA, 2012).  
337 (Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem and Land Research Center, 2012a) 
338 (Applied Research Institue-Jerusalem, 2012) 
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home village of Dayr Istiya but return each day to the area to irrigate from the plentiful 
natural springs, to prune, and to harvest. They are now rebuilding older terraces, planting 
wheat and barley for the first time in years, and regularly spending the night in farm 
homes (qusūr) abandoned since 1986. They have gone on a media offensive, with the 
mayor’s office keeping Palestinian and Israeli newspapers abreast of the demolition 
orders and facilitating local research institutes to monitor the environmental situation. By 
personal initiative, locals use mobile phones to capture rough video of field demolitions 
and post it to online social media. Some local people now speak openly of original 
families moving back into their homes in Wad Qana from where they had resettled in 
Dayr Istiya.  
 
 
Shifting Cultivation 
To understand how the situation of Wad Qana emerged, we must explore the dramatic 
changes in the juridical landscape of the West Bank. This illustrates how both tools of 
measurement developed in agronomic science and law participate in the appropriation of 
land. The situation of a village-within-nature-reserve such as Wad Qana is particularly 
knotted. We will return to the nature-reserve question later. What of the areas where large 
tracts of land, about 16 percent of the West Bank, have been reclassified as state land? 
How did they come to be reclassified, and to what ends?  
Most recent scholarly analysis begins from the West Bank legal policies of the 
Israeli government in which it attempts to show that these changes hinge on a 1979 re-
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interpretation of the state land laws. As the story goes, from 1967 to 1979, Israel used 
military orders to seize private Palestinian land in the West Bank. After the so-called 
1979 turn, the state began to reclassify land as state land, based on its reinterpretation of 
the Ottoman Land Code (OLC) of 1858, Article 78. From its origin the OLC had sought 
to encourage peasant cultivation of the land, in part to bolster tax revenues. It is important 
to remember that both Ottoman and British courts, when adjudicating cases dealing with 
state lands, put the burden on the state to show that a parcel was uncultivated. The 
Israelis’ 1979 reinterpretation inverted the equation, assuming all unregistered land to be 
state land unless proven otherwise. One of the Israeli officials responsible for this shift 
said in a 1993 interview, “Basically, the land belongs to the government, or to the state, 
unless it was given by the state to a person." And later, “Under international law, the 
government which is occupying a territory has the right and the duty to use government 
land. It does not have the ownership, but it has the right to use it. It is not meant, under 
international law, to be for the use of the local population; on the contrary, it is for the use 
of the occupying state.” 339 Crucially, the official reconfigures relations by investing the 
state with the capacity to endow, validate, or revoke access to the land. This question of 
land use, specifically cultivation, haunts all discussion of the OLC and its various 
interpretations over time.  
 With regard to the state land laws, the question of cultivation is measured on two 
axes. First, the state assesses the percentage of a particular parcel that is cultivated. This 
determines how much of the parcel is in use at a given time. Second, the state attempts to 
                                                
339 (Ambrosino & Barnes, 1993) and (Btselem, 2010, p. 25), 
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ascertain how long a particular parcel has been farmed. According to the Israeli 
government’s reinterpretation, cultivation of a plot of land in the West Bank requires 
continuous cultivation of at least 50 percent of the parcel for ten years. Through these two 
axes, one spatial and the other temporal, Israel created a procedure for reevaluation of 
thousands of plots of land.  It was not always this way. The British Mandate Court 
consistently upheld previous interpretations by the Ottoman authorities that evaluated a 
plot based on “reasonable cultivation” suitable for the condition of that parcel. In short, 
less than 50 percent of the plot could be cultivated for it to be considered private. Anyone 
working land for ten consecutive years acquired it even if they failed to register it or 
stopped cultivating it after ten years.  
In the violent encounters of settler groups and the Israeli state with Palestinian 
farmers and landowners across Israel-Palestine, legal nuance has major implications. 
Technicalities can result in the dispossession of Palestinian villagers from parcels, fields, 
homes, or natural springs. Conversely, Israeli settler groups plant trees to begin 
establishing claims to cultivation based on the reinterpreted OLC.  
Thus, Braverman wonders, making reference to John Locke’s famous 
formulation, “But when two parties claim to have mixed their labor with the same piece 
of land, how can law enforcers decide which of these claims to prefer?”340 She describes 
recent efforts of settlers to perform agricultural intent by planting fruit trees, rather than 
the pine trees that the Jewish National Fund has planted to claim land for Israeli 
settlement. This important question, however, obscures the larger issue at work: Only 
                                                
340 (Irus Braverman, 2008, p. 471) 
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some people are allowed to mix their labor with the land. The law does not stand apart 
from the sphere of political contestation, simply refining its definition of cultivation. 
Rather, the law grants some groups the right to mix their labor with the land and denies 
others. For example, Braverman rightly illustrates the view of a Palestinian lawyer, 
Sulieman Shahin, who frequently represents Palestinians in land cases in Israeli courts. 
“In particular, he claims that by restricting the discussion to the single question of 
whether or not the land has been cultivated for a legally defined period of time, the aerial 
photos enable the Land Appeal Committee to ignore the conditions that have prevented 
Palestinians from cultivating their lands in the first place: occupation, closures, settler 
harassment, and so on.”341 Unfortunately, the author does not expand on this crucial point 
being made by Shahin. However, it raises the question of access to land, which is integral 
to our discussion.  
 Recent scholarship suggests that the Israeli Ministry of Justice’s reinterpretation 
in 1979, which shifted the burden of proof to the farmer, as a major break with previous 
Israeli policies.342 As a few legal historians have recently begun pointing out, 1979 may 
not have been a major break with regard to the land, as the legal structures toward 
Palestinians within Israel proper and the West Bank are tied inextricably.343 However, 
this point is not connected to the question of capacity to mix labor with the land. The 
historical process of dispossession illustrates the overlooked entanglement of legal 
definitions of land use with access to the land. The best illustration of this relation is 
                                                
341 (Irus Braverman, 2008, p. 468) 
342 (Btselem, 2002, 2010; Gordon, 2008; Weizman, 2007) 
343 (Irus Braverman, 2011; Forman, 2009; A. Kedar, 2000) 
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discussion around the origins of the so-called “50 percent rule.”  
The expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 left hundreds of villages within the new 
state of Israel uninhabited. As we saw in previous chapters, the fledgling Israeli state 
created official bodies like the Custodian of Absentee Property and tasked them with the 
classification and appropriation of that land. However, some villages in the Galilee 
remained. This geographic concentration of Palestinians became a matter of considerable 
concern for the nascent Israeli government. Plans were developed, though juridical 
mechanisms, to settle Jewish towns among Palestinian towns. In one instance, the state 
claimed almost half of an area, consisting of 396,000 dunams (97,800 acres) between 35 
Palestinian villages in the central Galilee, as state land.344 This resulted in the seizure of 
large tracts of land for settlement and illustrated to the Israeli government that the process 
of determining cultivated areas was time-consuming and slowed its settlement ambitions. 
It started building on this precedent and, crucially, endowed district courts with greater 
powers to decide state land cases. Legal historians tend to see this as a break with 
previous efforts, but they are better read on their own terms as part of a larger process of 
facilitating settlement.  
The court cases that enabled the 1979 legal precedent in the West Bank came 
from those newly empowered district courts, specifically a series of cases in the Haifa 
District Court and Supreme Court in the early 1960s.345 In the cases, judges ruled that 
most, or more than 50 percent, of a particular parcel of land must be cultivated for the 
entire parcel to be considered cultivated and thus eligible to remain under private 
                                                
344 (Forman, 2009, p. 681; A. Kedar, 2000) 
345 (Forman, 2009) 
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ownership.346 In 1979, the Israeli government began to seek other juridical means of 
seizing private Palestinian land, building on the legal foundation set in the Galilee. 
Human-rights groups overlook this historical context in their reports by focusing largely 
on the present implementation of land laws rather than their genesis over time.347 Despite 
attempts to isolate analysis (because of organizational mandate or otherwise) to only the 
West Bank, the legal experts involved in the West Bank settlement enterprise explicitly 
drew from this body of law. In a further development of the same logic, this rule was 
further amended in 1984 to allow for retroactive seizure of land. 
 As it stands today, according to the Israeli government, the state can take 
possession of unregistered ‘Miri’ land near villages that has not been cultivated for three 
consecutive years, outlying unregistered ‘Miri’ land that has been cultivated for less than 
ten consecutive years, and ‘Mawat’ land, which is less than a thirty-minute walk or 
beyond where the loudest human voice can be heard from the villages, most of which is 
grazing land in the Jordan Valley.348 These are based on the new understanding of the 
Ottoman-era land classifications, the study of which is extensive enough that it could be 
considered a subdiscipline of Middle East history.349  
The “50 percent rule” thus emerged from a historical process of dispossession 
through the law, beginning as the courts struggled to adjudicate land claims by the 
                                                
346  There is debate about the various influences and powers of different courts here. See (Forman, 2009, pp. 683–685; 
A. Kedar, 2000). These scholars acknowledge the wider process of dispossession but generally remain within the 
confines of legal technicalities. 
347 (Btselem, 2002, 2010) 
348 (Btselem, 2010, p. 25) 
349  (Mundy, 2007; Owen & Bunton, 2000); Also, a rash of recent academic work (Irus Braverman, 2011; Gordon, 
2008; Weizman, 2007) and policy reports (Btselem, 2002, 2010) have documented and historicized the state-led efforts 
to confiscate Palestinian land in the West Bank. 
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remaining Palestinians within the nascent state of Israel. In particular, it shows the 
conjuncture of metrics of measurement inspired by agronomic science, and legal 
mechanisms working in the service of consolidation of control over land. This illustrates 
the limits of recent scholarly work on land politics in the West Bank that clearly gestures 
to the question of access to land and the history of the 50 percent rule and other 
precedents but does not connect the two. In maintaining the separation between these 
processes, we continue to leave unexamined the connections that drive the legal basis for 
land politics in Israel-Palestine. This is to say nothing of the question of cultivation itself, 
a deeply contested category that we will return to later, which appears in this literature as 
an assumed legally circumscribed artifact. Such a stance assumes that both practices of 
cultivation and environmental processes are driven by legal advocacy. In short, I have 
tried to show here that, to understand the question of cultivated and uncultivated land in 
relationship to access to land, scholarship overlooks the material and historical process of 
dispossession that gave rise to the body of law. This work prefers to retain the law as an 
abstraction that can somehow stand apart from the processes that enable and sustain the 
law. In the end, this oversight serves to strengthen the notion that belonging and 
attachment to land are determined solely through the law rather than through a complex 
of many forces. 
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Cultivated vision 
As has been pointed out recently, aerial photography has become one of the most 
important technologies of ascertaining the cultivation status of a particular parcel of land. 
Israel has taken aerial surveys of the West Bank every other year since 1967.350  These 
surveys have been used to reclassify as much as 16 percent of all West Bank land as state 
land, opening it for use by the state, in Israel’s case for settlement. According to 
pioneering work by Braverman, the main state witness in land disputes before the Land 
Appeal Committee for the West Bank is a geographer at the Survey of Israel. This 
research has exposed the methods by which a particular parcel of land can be considered 
cultivated. The aerial photo analyst said, “You can’t really map people. Trees, on the 
other hand, don’t move. People move, but things stay in place. … Sometimes I spot goats 
in the aerial photo. It’s amazing to see them there. Of course, I don’t mark them into the 
map, because they move. [I only map] existing things.”351 Here we see that aerial 
photography, as Braverman rightly points out, makes much invisible in the act of making 
certain things visible. For example, the identity of cultivators and the history of 
cultivation, as well as the many climatic and seasonal aspects of cultivation, are made 
invisible in the temporal scale of the photograph. Many questions are raised by this 
method of determining cultivation. Building from this understanding of the exclusions of 
aerial photography and technologies of perception, we now consider other efforts to 
survey Palestine from the air. 
                                                
350 (Irus Braverman, 2011, pp. 179–181; Weizman, 2007, p. 118) 
351 Quoted in (Irus Braverman, 2008, p. 469) 
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 In contrast to research on the geography of the West Bank, technologies of remote 
surveillance do not originate in the West Bank–but within 1950s Israel proper. In fact, 
they emerge out of the same process of dispossession followed by massive 
reclassification of lands in the wake of 1948 we considered in the previous section. In 
cases discussed above on the “50 percent rule” adjudicated in Haifa the 1960s, Forman 
has recently shown that the Israeli state used aerial photographs taken during the British 
Mandate in its survey of 1944-45 to determine whether a particular plot had been 
cultivated.352 The massive project of reclassification of West Bank lands after 1979 was 
made possible by the biennial aerial photo survey beginning in 1967, but those cases 
depended on British aerial photographs from 1944-45, which in turn depended on other 
surveys. The deeper history of aerial mapping illustrates the centrality of photographic 
evidence for legal adjudication on matters of land use.  
The aerial survey in fact originates much earlier with a series of colonial powers 
that surveyed Historic Palestine. A German squadron of fourteen airplanes arrived in 
Palestine in 1916 to assist with planning an attack to take control of the Suez Canal from 
British and French forces.353 Beginning in 1917-18, we have the first aerial images of 
Palestine courtesy of the German Air Force, whose efforts to photograph British military 
installations and major transportation grids also provided a wealth of remotely sensed 
data about Palestine at an early stage of aerial photography.354 As British and Australian 
air power improved through 1917 and 1918, it pushed the Turkish-German troops farther 
                                                
352 (Forman, 2009, p. 681) 
353 (B. Z. Kedar, 1999, p. 22) 
354 The Bavarian State Archives have digitized many of the aerial photographs of Historic Palestine during this period, 
see (“Bildsammlung Palästina,” n.d.). 
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north, beginning an aerial photography effort of their own. Later, during the British 
Mandate, the Royal Air Force also extensively photographed the region in 1944-45. This 
draws attention to the connections between the military aerial surveys and the way those 
photos were taken up within similar logics for the purposes of dispossession through the 
law. The two modes of seeing (military-agronomic) cannot be seen apart from each other 
as we saw in the 1960s court cases in Haifa. Thus, rather than an exception, the aerial 
surveys after 1967 are profitably understood as part of larger effort. 
 New insights and forms emerge from unexpected shadows on surveys and maps. 
These shadows are given expression by human activity on the landscape. They reveal the 
map’s contradictions and oversights. Obscured in the cartographic sophistication today 
are the estimated 150,000 in Palestinians in about 250 towns who live in places that have 
been declared Area C and carry on with their lives, work in their offices, work in their 
fields, pressing through permits and checkpoints to do so.355 They constantly transgress 
and defy the map’s lines. This is where our discussion becomes less about cartographic 
representation and more about spatial practice. One could concern oneself with new 
forms of cartographic representation to address this lack, yet instead we will trace the 
itineraries of unsanctioned practices.  
 The spatial order of Israel-Palestine is constantly territorialized on this shifting 
terrain of cultivation and conservation practices, juridical logics, and spatial regimes. 
Mine is an attempt to understand how the activity of the landscape becomes visible to the 
law, how it is perceived by the camera lens and human eye, and how it comes to be 
                                                
355 (UN-OCHA, 2010) 
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validated. If space is produced through practices both representational and material, then 
the spaces that Palestinians stage have particular qualities. The production of space 
requires constant effort to secure and re-secure it as such. In contrast to most accounts, it 
remains a territorialization process shot through with contradictions and fissures. 
 Beyond the established subjectivity of the process of aerial photo analysis, 
scholarship overlooks a more profound question of the adjudication of cultivation itself. 
The distinction between that which is cultivated and that which is uncultivated is 
conventionally made to appear absolute. The emphasis on the ratio of cultivated land, the 
duration of cultivation, and the attending technologies of perception devised to measure 
the minutiae of these elements obscure larger processes of calculation.356 It narrows the 
scope of vision to overlook the question of cultivation itself, namely how and why it is 
practiced. But rather than new forms of visual representation, for our purposes the more 
important question becomes: What forces, human or otherwise, inhabit the margins 
around the technologies of perception of sovereign power? In other words, we seek to 
understand how certain practices on the land come to be sanctioned and others do not. 
Section 2 sets about to explore this question, which stands at the juncture of 
agroecological practice, environmental processes, and articulating spatial orders.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
356 Scholars of visual culture have consistently drawn attention to the political valences of ostensibly ‘objective’ 
photographic modes of seeing, especially from the air (Daston & Galison, 2010; Weems, 2011).  
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SECTION 2. UNRULY NATURE 
Wad Qana’s political-ecological journey starts in the hilly Nablus region, within the 
Oslo-process classification of Area A, or nominal Palestinian control. It weaves through 
Israeli hilltop settlements and Palestinian farming towns and into Area B, or ostensible 
joint Israeli-Palestinian control. For the rest of its journey through the West Bank hills, it 
remains in Area C, or full Israeli control. The journey at that point becomes classified as 
a Nature Reserve in a particularly beautiful series of canyon bends, where, amid several 
natural springs, the town of Wad Qana is located. The river passes by sedimented ruins of 
Byzantine-era churches, Islamic-era settlements, and Jewish sacred sites built in its 
hillsides. Leaving the nature preserve, it flattens as it hits the coastal plain, passing under 
Israel’s newly constructed security barrier near the town of ͑Izbat Salman. There, custom-
built, securitized culverts are designed to allow water but not people to pass under the 
wall. Now approaching the massively built-up area of the Tel-Aviv metro region, it joins 
the Nahr al-Auja River (Yarkon in Hebrew). The river then glides through a huge Tel 
Aviv city park before it finally tumbles into the Mediterranean Sea at the heart of the 
urban populated core of Israel. In that journey, it manages to pass through nearly all of 
the politico-juridical classifications in Israel-Palestine: Areas A, B, C, Nature Reserve, 
and Israel proper. It passes through the main geographical regions of Palestine, from the 
bucolic and hilly olive country through the grassy, gentle descents of the Western slopes, 
finally reaching the humid coastal plain. 
 The Area A, B, C geographical distinctions dating from the Oslo Interim 
Agreements in 1993 have become institutions in their own right in scholarship around 
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Israel’s systems of spatial organization and control. Scholars have rightly detailed the 
ways that Israel territorializes itself through the manipulation and production of space. 
One of the most astute observers of this mode of colonial production of space in Israel-
Palestine, Eyal Weizman, notes that, “The linear border, a cartographic imaginary 
inherited from the military and political spatiality of the nation state, has splintered into a 
network of temporary, transportable, deployable and removable mini-synonyms … that 
shrink and expand the territory at will.”357 Weizman’s innovative deployment of archival 
materials and his exploration the circulation of ideas and spatial practice within the Israeli 
government have yielded important insights into the “elasticity” of territory and its 
manipulation by Israel. He describes the “anarchic geography of the frontier” as “an 
evolving image of transformation, which is remade and rearranged with every political 
development or decision.”358 His understanding of the production of space as a process of 
flows and transformation of space, however, is not granted with the same vigor to 
Palestinian actions. Early in the book, he does recognize that the colonial spatial order 
does not retain total control, “…the agency of the colonized makes itself manifest in its 
success in holding steadfastly to its ground in the face of considerable odds, not only 
through political violence but in the occasional piece of skilful diplomacy and the 
mobilization of international opinion.”359 This admission, however, is followed by a 
detailed expose of the “architecture of occupation” with very little further mention of the 
fissures inherent to the spatial order or contestations against it. Tamari rightly points out 
                                                
357 (Weizman, 2007, p. 6) 
358 (Weizman, 2007, p. 6) 
359 (Weizman, 2007, p. 6) 
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that this leaves the spatial order of Israel-Palestine intact: 
By investing so much conceptual capital in detailing its omnipotence, Weizman 
produces a paradigm that is hermetically sealed and has the force of nature. There 
seems to be no escape from it. … It leaves unexamined its own contradictions; its 
misadventures; its control by politicians who have myopic ideological visions, 
whose thirst for land grabbing will make them choke on excessive expansion of 
limited economic capacities; and who seem to behave as if they are independent 
from the world around them.360 
Building from this debate, for this part of the chapter, I will explore that which evades the 
grasp of sovereign power. If sovereign power seeks a certain universal mandate for itself, 
then this chapter is interested in how local people working largely independent of formal 
political organization have challenged its universality. Here I take my cue from Edward 
Said’s reading of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks. 
[A]n understanding of the historical-social world is so spatially grasped by 
Gramsci as to highlight the instabilities induced by constant change, movement, 
volatility. In the final analysis, it is this view that primarily makes it possible for 
emergent and subaltern classes to arise and appear, given that, according to the 
strictly Hegelian model, the dominant mainstream absorbs dissonance into the 
problem of change that consolidates the new and reaffirmed identity.361 
Said challenges the notion that sovereign power has the capacity to totally absorb 
contestation into itself. Rather, he finds that the contingent nature of Gramsci’s 
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geographical sense highlights how dominant regimes of power are shot through with 
tensions and fissures created and exploited by subaltern groups.362 This notion of power 
corresponds with my wider discussion of shadow space as a shelter or as a domain of 
potentiality that is taken up and given form by marginalized groups. Rather than a 
departure from recent work of Weizman and others on the spatial order of the Israeli 
occupation, this chapter builds from it to fill in oversights with regard to the production 
of space in a colonial context, state territorialization, and the contestation that does not 
necessarily appeal to a state form as its goal. 
About 60 percent of the West Bank land area was classified as Area C, Nature 
Reserve, or closed military area by the Oslo Interim agreements in 1993. According to 
multiple estimates, about 16 percent of the West Bank has been classified, often 
surreptitiously, as state land by the Israeli government, mostly during the 1980s.363 When 
added to the amount of state land from the British and Jordanian periods in the West 
Bank, the total is at least 26 percent of the West Bank. Much of these areas are likely to 
lie “dormant,” unbeknownst to the Palestinian owners until they are enrolled in projects 
to develop Israeli settlements, roads, or other infrastructure at a future point. Finally, 
about 10 percent of the West Bank has been declared Nature Reserve since Israel issued 
Military Order 363 in December 1983. British Mandate Authorities set the rough 
boundaries of the Wad Qana reserve with the Forest Ordinance of 1926.364 While many 
point out that the major urban concentrations of Palestinians in the West Bank are within 
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Area A, or nominal Palestinian control, the vast majority of the land lies in Area B and C. 
Thus, as Tamari has pointed out, Area C constitutes one of the most important terrains of 
contestation.365 These areas, especially Nature Reserves, assumed by many to be off-
limits, are actually fraught with tension, fragile, and contested, especially when 
considered in historical perspective. 
 
Nature reserves as infrastructures of recalcitrance 
We have noted that the town of Wad Qana is located within an externally imposed Nature 
Reserve. The stated aim of nature preserves is to protect certain areas from cultivation of 
the land or chopping of native shrubs and trees. They were unilaterally declared on 
Palestinian land and have been heavily contested by local farmers who relied on many of 
these lands. The regulations on land use are very strict. For example, Etkes and Ofran 
state, “The Civil Administration runs the Nature and Parks Authority in the West Bank 
by authority of two military orders. The first, Order Regarding Preservation of Nature 
(No. 363, 1969), defines, inter alia, the concept of harming the nature reserves: ‘Harm’ – 
includes decimation, destruction, breakage, vandalism, picking, taking. Changing the 
form or natural position, or artificial disturbance of the natural developmental course. The 
second order, Order Regarding Parks  (373 – 1970), defines the roles and powers of the 
authorities within the declared national parks in the West Bank.” 366 As we have seen 
above, the Israeli government consistently denies any Palestinian claim to these lands, 
using both the force of the law and the blades of bulldozers to ensure that no trees, much 
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less any buildings, are erected within their boundaries. 
 It has also been pointed out that the Israeli government allows settler groups to 
build within the boundaries of its own declared Nature Reserves. This is treated as a 
contradiction to the conventional idea of Nature Reserves. A recent report estimates that 
thirty-one settlements consisting of 290 structures were located within the boundaries of 
the reserves in 2007. 367 However, it is overlooked that the Nature Reserves in the West 
Bank since their inception in early 1969 were taken up within the process of “land 
seizure” under the Ministerial Committee for Settlement.368 This meant that they were 
seen as land reserves for future settlement. Moreover, the logic and declared reserve areas 
by Israel in 1969 are consistent with those established by the British Mandate era Forest 
Ordinance of 1926. A.Y. Goor, a Mandate-era forestry official, said that, in practice, 
villagers were allowed to graze and cut from the forest reserves but not to cultivate. This 
was to ensure that “no new claims to ownership based on cultivation are allowed to 
arise.”369 We must note, as El-Eini does, that Goor was a Zionist member of the British 
Mandate Authorities who by 1947 had become the highest-ranking forestry official in the 
British Mandate government.370 Despite the British officials’ claimed need of reserves to 
control soil erosion, stabilize sand dunes, and restore the land, it was explicitly part of a 
settlement project and was widely recognized by peasants and as a means to enable the 
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establishment and expansion of Zionist settlements.371  
 
Seeing the forest for the trees 
Seeing the effects of declared Nature Reserves as justifications for dispossession, 
Palestinian cultivators rejected the British notion of pristine nature, which excluded 
cultivation. Palestinian rejections of the Nature Reserve are based on concrete historical 
reasons, namely that such reserves, dating from their inception in Palestine, were used to 
clear land for the purposes of settlement. 
However, the focus on cultivation from British authorities and later Israeli 
officials also provided a kind of infrastructure with which to contest dispossession. More 
specifically, they required the state to constantly recalibrate its definitions of cultivation. 
This political being, however, is best understood as a kind of embodied practice rather 
than a preordained logic. As such, it could be argued that the reserves have been 
important sites of Palestinian contestation for at least 90 years. F.J. Tear, a British 
Mandate forestry official, said this about the Nature Reserves they were establishing, 
“Moreover, their existence not only involves considerable friction with people but also 
creates constant embarrassment in protection of reserves from encroachment.”372  In fact, 
annual reports from the Department of Agriculture and Forests cite numerous 
prosecutions of “encroachments” on Nature Reserves, along with other punishable 
offenses such as chopping wood or grazing sheep in reserves without permits. For 
example, the number of prosecuted encroachments climbed from 121 offenses in 1934-35 
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to 306 in 1935-36. With the onset of a massive revolt in 1936, especially among peasants 
and rural classes, the reserves were overrun by local people both out of defiance and 
because the land was needed. El-Eini notes that during the uprising of peasants, 
 The Agricultural Department struggled against the effects of the Revolt, in which 
it lost several of its staff, and which made large parts of the country no-go areas. 
Most of the agricultural institutions, symbols of British presence in the rural 
districts, were razed to the ground, the animals killed and the fields burnt. 
Demonstration farms and plots were also relinquished. The Agriculture 
Department had to sustain budget cuts because of security needs, resulting in 
reduced demonstration and extension work.373 
Furthermore, four tree nurseries were destroyed, and reserves themselves were lost 
entirely, such as one in the Hebron region.374 El-Eini describes a chaotic situation for 
British officials, “With the outbreak of the Arab Revolt on 18 April 1936, soon after the 
founding of the Department of Forests, the latter lost access to many of its reserves which 
were in remote hill areas. As with the Agricultural Department, it saw the destruction of 
much of its work; licensing was difficult and over-cutting went uncontrolled.”375 
It was not until after the end of the Arab Revolt in 1939, that the Agriculture 
Department of the British Mandate was able to begin recovering work in the rural areas. 
Even the earliest reports on the status of identifying, surveying, and declaring Nature 
Reserves are sprinkled with accounts of local farmers, land owners, and others defying 
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orders to stop cultivation of lands they had historically farmed. The status of the Forestry 
Department itself was put into question by the revolt, though, in the words of El-Eini, it 
“survived” in the end. Moreover, as we saw above, Nature Reserves from the British 
Mandate were affirmed and then promptly expanded upon after the Israeli occupation of 
the West Bank in 1967. The body in charge of forest reserves in the West Bank was part 
of the Ministerial Committee for Settlement within the Israeli government. After the Oslo 
accords, Israeli officials charged that Palestinian farmers, on orders and paid by their 
leadership, began to “invade” areas that had been declared state land.376 This set into 
motion a whole series of actions by the Israeli government and settler groups to counter 
what they considered to be an somewhat effective strategy of planting older trees to make 
claims that the land had been cultivated for 10 years consecutively. While the “tree war” 
literature has shed light on the motivations and exchange of legal maneuvers between 
Palestinians and Israelis over the question of state land, they overlook important 
questions:377 What practices come to be considered cultivation, and what practices do 
not? What are the politics of this distinction?  
As we have said above, in the void between “cultivated” and “uncultivated” lies 
agricultural life on the land. Places such as Wad Qana and many others around the West 
Bank unsettle the seemingly absolute separation between the two categories effected by 
Israeli law.  Palestinian responses are best understood within the structure of colonial 
power. Cutting, planting, and grazing are responses to and through that power. Thus, the 
efforts to plant vast groves of olive trees and land “reclamation” projects that build and 
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rebuild terraces are responses to colonial power and do not exhaust local 
conceptualizations of the land. This can be seen as early as 1925, as we saw in the 
previous chapter when Najib Nassar, on visiting families in the Galilee village of al-
Mujaydil, said “that they should establish a (tharwa) treasury of 500 olive seedlings for 
each son of the village.”378 We saw the idea again with Hassan Mustafa’s distinction 
between identity as image and identity as substantiated personhood. He stated, “Then 
establishment of identity for the villager carries the meaning of substantiation of his 
person, not his image, on a particular parcel of land, not on a piece of paper.”379 We can 
see from both Nassar and Mustafa, among other Palestinian intellectuals, that clearly 
there was a difference between inhabited land and uninhabited land. However, the 
seeming absolute difference between cultivated and uncultivated is a product of Israel’s 
interpretation of the law, not practices on the ground. Crucially for this discussion, 
however, Mustafa argued that the peasant’s political being emerged not from external 
validation but from the daily life upon the land. 
 What, then, is distinct about the Nature Reserve? We saw above that the concept 
of state land in the Israeli government’s interpretation counted only stonefruit (drupe) tree 
cultivation as cultivation. However, in the Nature Reserve, tree cultivation is strictly 
prohibited. Cultivation in the Nature Reserve ruptures this dynamic because the law bans 
tree-based cultivation but allows other kinds (cereals, etc). This was done to prevent new 
claims to ownership.380 In this way, the effect of declaring places such as Wad Qana as 
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Nature Reserves provides infrastructure that Palestinian farmers can use to call into 
question the grounds for confiscation. Using, not ignoring, the legal category of Nature 
Reserve, as we will see next, they call into question the definition of cultivation and of 
“natural state” of the land with each new order or with each rupture of the wastewater 
pipe. Seen from the perspective of embodied practice on the land, the Nature Reserve 
appears in relation to a more complex mixture of forces, human and otherwise, and calls 
into question the bifurcation of cultivated and uncultivated land. 
 
Spring Water, Rain Water, Wastewater  
The Wad Qana valley itself mocks easy distinctions. Wad in Arabic can be translated as 
valley. But it can also be translated as a technical term: “intermittent stream” or “dry 
wash.” These valleys are common in Mediterranean and arid regions. In the southwestern 
United States, they might be called washes, and they are know in Latin America as 
arroyos. In Italy they are known as torrentes. By definition, they muddle any distinctions 
between river, stream, valley, and dry gully. They are defined by their unruliness. They 
might be dry during much of the year, they might be fed by natural springs, they might 
have pools of standing water for part of the year, or they might be engulfed by raging 
torrents during winter rains. Accordingly, cultivation corresponds to the rains and the 
strength of the flow from natural springs. 
 In Wad Qana, cultivation is an absent presence, a shelter allowing for the 
reimagination of the valley against and within the strictures of the spatial order of 
occupation in the West Bank. The presence is not always perceptible by technologies of 
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the state, whether in law or aerial photography. This cultivation is a human effort of 
tilling and planting but also of interpretation and imagination. Yet the plants and animals 
also have lives of their own. Wad Qana is rife with such activity. This activity inhabits 
the gap between that which is called “cultivated” and that which is called “uncultivated.” 
Sheep and goats graze across the valley; seeds lie dormant in the ground, out of satellite-
sight, awaiting the rains; wind and rain erosion cover over tillage; droughts mask the 
plots of grain; floods damage the groves; good rains bolster the springs and make more 
irrigation possible; wild plants such as ͑akkūb, lūf, za͑tar, na͑nā͑ that are important to the 
diet but also lucrative are collected; constant change marks the availability of wells, 
roads, checkpoints, and settler violence, which in good years make cultivation in some 
areas possible where they were not; the climate shifts; and, finally, local seeds adapted to 
drier conditions are sometimes more available. Certainly, other forms of contestation 
such as tree planting have been the subject of a great deal of research, what might be 
known as the tree-war debate.381 The orange groves have been allowed until now by 
Israeli authorities. Grazing is strictly prohibited but has been a significant part of Wad 
Qana’s history. The collection of wild plants is also prohibited, and farmers are regularly 
cited and fined for collecting the “protected” plants.382  
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SECTION 3. CONCLUSION: EXPERIMENTS WITH NATURE 
Farmers in Wad Qana keep planting different kinds of trees, sowing grains, gathering 
wild plants, building small buildings, rebuilding terraces, and spending the night in their 
former homes. If something is stopped or banned, new methods or other activities are 
tried. With each intervention from the park authorities, army, and settler groups, the state 
must re-establish and police its separation between cultivated and uncultivated. In this 
way, embodied practice and strategic thinking calls into question the distinction between 
cultivated and uncultivated. This inverts the notion of the West Bank as a “laboratory” 
for the Israeli government.383 Rather than the passive objects of Israeli policy, this type of 
experimentation inverts the equation and shows how shadow-spaces in fact become 
fleeting laboratories for the question of sovereignty and territory.  
 Thus the vegetative and fluvial activity of the landscape and of people in Wad 
Qana constitutes a kind of practice that interrupts efforts to secure Nature Reserves as 
such. These practices make other forms of cultivation visible and expose the strictures of 
the legal definition of cultivation. This practice inhabits both legal and extra-legal 
spaces.384 These practices strike at the heart of the land regime in the West Bank, 
deploying the categorization of Nature Reserve as a wedge to hold open a gap, a fissure, 
in between the cultivated and uncultivated. Thus, practice names the activation of a kind 
of botanical record in the landscape, only partly under human control, to carve out a new 
sense of self that does not correspond neatly to state-based political orders. It is 
constituted through concrete practice rather than abstract rights. I have attempted to show 
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in this section how these practices have historically participated in the territorialization of 
Palestinian nature. 
 The places where cultivation is most restricted in the West Bank, such as Nature 
Reserves, illustrate most clearly the problems with this distinction. They are the fissures 
in the seemingly hermetically sealed land confiscation by “state land” process. They 
neatly expose the absolute separation between cultivated and uncultivated as an effect of 
colonial power rather than a constitutive element.385 For the lived reality of Wad Qana, of 
cultivated and uncultivated, cannot be parsed by official state classifications.386 
When Palestinians work the land, they are not necessarily only appealing to the 
legal system, but rather they realize that planting the land enables them to mount a 
challenge to land confiscation and that the act will have possibly unforeseen effects. 
Reducing their actions solely to legal advocacy misses the point. Certainly, within the 
colonial framework, they are attempting to secure legal claims to the land. However, they 
in doing so they attempt to call legal belonging to land itself into question. Through 
maintaining their citrus and olive groves, farmers in Wad Qana activate both the traces of 
recent habitation of Wad Qana and the Nature Reserve legal classification as a kind of 
material infrastructure to contest their dispossession.  
The valley’s auspicious geo-morphological circumstances and its warm location 
at the edge of the central highlands, combined with the valley’s natural springs, allow for 
the cultivation of subtropical crops such as oranges. Yet these factors rarely enter into 
consideration of Palestinian contestation and certainly not into discussion of Israel’s 
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spatial grip on the West Bank. Many farmers have come to understand the limits of costly 
legal suits and the impotent challenges made in official political discourse, only to cling 
to shreds of land for limited amounts of time. 
The instances where Palestinians have most successfully challenged the process 
of dispossession have been when they have transformed the structure of the land contest 
through material practice rather than relying solely on the legal system. These instances 
demonstrate how they challenge dispossession of land at a more fundamental level by 
building more durable opposition to land confiscation.  
 To reproduce the spatial order in the West Bank, Israel must constantly police the 
boundaries, such as public/private land, state land and private land, Nature Reserve, or 
between that which is considered cultivated and that which is considered uncultivated.  
Spaces such as Wad Qana constitute fissures in the politico-ecologic landscape of Israel-
Palestine, constantly posing the question of the environmental and political future of the 
area. It follows, then, that the rightfully well-documented technologies of government 
and surveillance employed by the Israeli state cannot make a full accounting of the 
village and valley of Wad Qana. The village reemerges constantly despite restrictions; it 
has flourished into the unruly space between that which is considered cultivated and that 
which is considered uncultivated. The irony is likely not lost on the residents of Wad 
Qana and its corresponding town, Dayr Istiya, that it is precisely the declaration of the 
Nature Reserve that has enabled farmers to unsettle the political registers of sanctioned 
and unsanctioned cultivation. This is accomplished by planting in restricted areas. 
Cultivation for the state is the vexing juncture where its driving logic to consolidate 
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control over land meets the daily practice of Palestinian farmers. Planting in restricted 
areas hits at the heart of the issue because the state requires justification based on the 
status of cultivation to carryout appropriation of land. The state in this case could simply 
drive Palestinians from Wad Qana with brute force. However, the legal framework it has 
built over many decades poses many complications as the state struggles to evaluate land 
use through its layered grid of agronomic measurement. This reliance on the adjudication 
of cultivation provides the infrastructure for Palestinians, often not to stop annexation of 
land, but to make that annexation more difficult. They have come to learn from 
experience that the spaces where the law is forced to most minutely monitor land use is 
also the place where the inadequacies of its territorial logic are most pronounced and 
therefore vulnerable. Rather than attempt an escape to an outside that is external to the 
legal system, farmers pry open the incongruities of the question of cultivation from 
within its fissures. In doing so, they rely precisely on the same concept of cultivation as 
the law because they understand that the law is also inescapably bound to the concept. 
From the perspective of the map or at the level of discourse, the spatial order of 
control in Palestine appears chokingly effective. Yet from the vantage of places such as 
Wad Qana, the spatial order of the West Bank is revealed as a space shot through with 
fissures that haunt it with vexing historical traces and also shadows that harbor the 
potential for contestation if activated and given form. Difference must be constantly 
produced to hermetically distinguish peoples, natures, lands, and ideas. Each iteration of 
Wad Qana’s staging as Nature Reserve presents an opportunity for farmers to reveal the 
inadequacies and failures of land classification of the valley. In doing so the farmers also 
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reaffirm their right to political community in common without need for external 
validation. 
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CONCLUSION / Thinking Shadow Spaces 
 
In the spring of 2012 seventeen acres of farmland in Wad Qana in the central highlands 
of the Palestinian West Bank were flooded by wastewater from Israeli settlements in the 
area.387 The area has been classified as a nature reserve. Local reports allege that 
wastewater from the nearby Israeli settlement, which was established in 1991, had 
overflowed its pipes and flooded farm fields in Wad Qana. In the case of such 
occurrences, local farmers notify the office of the mayor, who in turn contacts Palestinian 
authorities, who in turn contact Israeli authorities to fix the problem. The farmers build 
their case on the fact that wastewater damages both their crops as well as the ‘natural 
landscape’ of the nature reserve. This reserve was imposed unilaterally by Israel in 1986 
(though the reserve predates the latest codification in 1986) and is used to frustrate 
Palestinian cultivation in the area. The irony of Israeli wastewater damaging an area 
classified by Israel as a nature reserve is not lost on local people. It is precisely the 
interest in - and restrictions on - cultivation enacted through legislation related to the 
nature reserve that allow the farmers to lodge complaints on the basis of damage to their 
crops. They show how the water damaged their citrus trees, wheat fields, or olive trees. 
The complaints are handled through various legal mechanisms in Israeli courts. Thus, by 
requiring the state to constantly adjudicate on the status of cultivation in the valley, the 
farmers illustrate the duplicity in the application of law and more fundamentally, call into 
question the law’s attempt to govern the relationship of farmers to the land. While the 
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complaints lodged do not directly question the structure of restrictions on cultivation, 
such situations, especially when forced by unforeseen events, instigate consideration 
about the agricultural status of the area. I argue that such events or historical traces open 
cultivation as a question rather than assuming the invariability of the ‘nature reserve’ 
category in advance. It is precisely in this spirit of an open question that I would like to 
explore some of the core insights resulting from this above dissertation. 
 In this dissertation, I have explored the relationship between practices of 
cultivation and control over land in the area of Israel-Palestine. The question of 
cultivation gives expression to this relationship. Drawing from literary and historical 
concepts, I argue that this problematic opens a productive arena of inquiry as to how 
cultivation emerges simultaneously as the site of potent technologies of representation 
and enduring practices of persistence. I further argue that understanding these two modes 
of representation and persistence requires rethinking the history of cultivation not as 
linear development but rather through a series of contingent moments. I contend that the 
two central modes of cultivation operate by summoning the traces of past events and 
folding them into the present to address a current issue. Accordingly, drawing from the 
literary concept of ẓill-shadow I propose a vernacular theory of shadow spaces that gives 
expression to the double valence of the ẓill-shadow as both a trace and a shelter. It is in 
the shadow’s capacity to shelter alternative accounts that they haunt. In this way, the 
shadow space both marks a trace or ruin in a narrative or a landscape, but also shelters 
other forms of political and social community. More generally, such an understanding of 
history and geography enables me to explore both paths that were foreclosed and paths 
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that were taken with regard to cultivation. This conceptual insight in my dissertation 
illustrates that a view of Palestine from the vantage of its shadow spaces allows political 
form to remain an open question, that is, one that does not disavow the state form but 
refuses its questions it as the telos of politics. 
 
On method 
I have shown in this dissertation that scholarly methods of analysis of the question of 
cultivation in Historic Palestine have not been adequate. A chronological account would 
not have allowed me to adequately consider the question of cultivation because it 
produces a narrative of linear development of methods, practices, and events. In contrast, 
I propose that the question of cultivation is better considered through a series of 
contingent moments in which the past is constantly brought forth and put to work in a 
present situation. Rather than assuming that a particular cause has a particular effect, this 
dissertation has attempted to show how a given effect calls its cause into being by 
summoning it from the past. This approach emerged directly from the material because I 
found that the traces of the past were constantly invoked to render the present available in 
particular ways. For example, to return to Wad Qana, this understanding of method 
means that the wastewater spewing from leaking pipes allowed farmers to invoke bodies 
of juridical categories, historical traces in the landscape, and embodied practice of 
cultivating the area to build a kind of infrastructure of recalcitrance in the present. The 
recalcitrant qualities of those practices allowed the farmers to hold ask the land question 
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inherent to settler-colonialism. In this way, the question of cultivation gives expression to 
both technologies of representation and practices of persistence. 
 What emerges from this methodological approach? In the shift from history as 
linear development to a genealogical approach, the stability of categories like ‘Fellah’s 
Farm’ or ‘nature reserve’ is called into question. In other words, by focusing attention on 
the historical traces that stitch together the present, I am better able to explore the 
moments when alternative trajectories and narratives were foreclosed. Moreover, 
however, as the double valence of the ẓill-shadow illustrates, I am better able to 
recognize that the landscape shelters a variety of different possibilities of political form. 
This methodological approach leaves the question of political form as an open question in 
the way that cultivation practices described above keep the land question of settler-
colonialism open. By too quickly overlooking possible scenarios that were foreclosed at a 
given conjuncture, then, as scholars we lose space for a more imaginative thinking of 
political community. 
 What does this more open understanding of history and geography mean for 
thinking post-colonialism in the Palestinian context? We may say crudely that the intent 
of post-colonial theory is to account for the lasting effects of colonial logics on colonized 
peoples. This aims to escape a simple inversion after the end of formal colonial rule. 
However, this attempted displacement often falls short because the critique reverts to 
standard theoretical approaches that merely invert modes of analysis inherited from 
colonial rule. This is evidenced in the way that nationalist projects have a European 
liberal state as their end goal. Such a state necessarily produces a series of exclusions and 
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its own forms of coloniality in the process. The danger of an anti-colonialism that seeks 
to ‘invert’ power relations is that it remains trapped within the very colonial categories 
that it resists. 
  I have argued that within the Palestinian context a methodological stance that 
better apprehends the situation must begin from the contingencies, fissures, and 
conjunctures that compose the present. More importantly, a focus on the shadow spaces 
offers more space for other forms of political community because it explores the 
overlooked or effaced traces that find shelter in the ruins of the established history. 
What are some of the contributions of a vernacular theory of shadow spaces? In 
Part 1 of the dissertation, I attempt to show how traveling discourses of science and law 
mediate the 'land question' in settler colonial contexts, revealing their structural 
connections. I also use the ẓill-shadow to extend the insights of post-colonial theory and 
subaltern studies in settler colonial contexts. I attempt this move by showing how 
attention to the politics of representation around cultivation illustrates its production as 
an abstract concept and alternative accounts left in its wake. 
In Part 2, my primary interventions are to offer a novel political ontology of 
Palestinian persistence by bringing together the vernacular concepts of ẓill-shadow and 
steadfastness. This vernacular theory, in it its attention to the contingent set of relations 
between historical traces, shows how political being cannot be understood as 
preordained. Rather, the politics of persistence, as explored through concrete practices of 
cultivation, helps to rethink the political status of embodied practice within a settler-
colonial context where the ‘land question’ lies at its heart. 
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My overall contribution is to offer a vernacular theory of shadow spaces as a 
framework to, first, rethink the formation of settler colonialism in Israel-Palestine and, 
second , to rethink the "grounds" (ontology) of political contestation. I do this by 
combining the double-valence of ẓill-shadow (trace and shelter) with two aspects of 
'cultivation', first, abstract object fabricated as neutral counter by science and law; 
second, political practice that produces labored landscapes and a politics of persistence.  
 
 
Postscript 
I hope to explore the question of cultivation further by conducting life histories with 
Palestinian farmers to formulate a more specific understanding of how they understand 
their own political being in relation to their practices of cultivation and other activities. 
Another way I intend to explore this topic in a more historical register is through the 
archives of early Arabic newspapers like al-Karmil in order to give more breadth to my 
discussion of rainfed farming and cultivation practices of persistence. Moreover, I plan to 
explore court testimony of cultivators in British courts during the Mandate period to 
understand the interaction between state-based attempts to adjudicate cultivation 
practices and cultivators. This extended fieldwork and archival research will bolster my 
existing study. 
The themes explored above raise an issue that requires more elaboration as this 
project develops beyond the dissertation. Namely, the position found above on the 
political ontology of being can be misread as one that flattens the power dynamic 
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between the occupied and the occupier. However, the use of a settler-colonial framework 
illustrates that the ontological status of the local cultivator whose land is threatened is 
more open to the matters of land rights and sovereignty than in other colonial situations. 
Mahmud Darwish, Edward Said, and other prominent intellectuals drew on this theme in 
the wake of the foiled efforts of the Oslo-era framework of limited Palestinian autonomy. 
Darwish expressed this sentiment beautifully when he wrote, “I belong to the question of 
the victim.”388 That is, Darwish does not believe his national identity as a Palestinian 
exhausts his political being. I believe this powerfully orients scholarly and ethical 
concerns toward the question of justice rather than essentialized national belonging.  
 
                                                
388 (Darwīsh, 2008) 
  206 
WORKS CITED 
Arabic-language sources 
`Arraf, S. (1996). al-Qaryah al- ͑Arabiyyah al-Filasṭīniyyah: mabna wa-istı͑malat aradin 
[The Arab Palestinian Village: Architecture and Land Use]. Ma`liya: Dar Nashr 
“Ilá al-`Umq.” 
Ali-Shtayeh, Mohammad S, & Jamous, R. M. (2005). Establishing a Community Seed 
Bankfor Semi-Arid Agriculture in Palestine: Structure, Management and 
Functions. Til, Nablus, Palestine: Biodiversity and Environmental Research 
Center-BERC. 
Ali-Shtayeh, Mohammed S, & Jamous, R. M. (2006). Field Guide on the Production and 
Storage Techniques of seeds of Indigenous (Baladi) Varieties of Vegetables. Til, 
Nablus, Palestine: Biodiversity and Environmental Research Center-BERC. 
 
Amiry, S., & Rahhal, F. (2003). Manaṭīr: qusūr al-mazarı͑ fī rīf Filasṭīn [Manateer: Field 
Structures in Rural Palestine]. Rām Allah: Riwāq, Markaz al-Mı͑mar al-Sha͑bi. 
Amiry, S., & Riwaq--Centre for Architectural Conservation. (2003). ͑Imarat qura al-
karāsi: min tarīkh al-iqta͑ fī rīf Filasṭīn fī al-qarnayn al-thamin ͑ashar wa-al-tası͑ 
͑ashar [Arcitecture of Crown Villages: On Feudal History in Rural Palestine in 
the 18th and 19th Centuries]. Rām Allah: Riwāq, Markaz al-Mı͑mar al-Sha͑bi 
Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem and Land Research Center. (2012a). Mustawṭinu 
Refafa Yuwāsalūn Tallawūth Manṭiqat Wād Qana bimīyāh Al Sarf Al-Siḥi 
Muḥāfathat Salfīt [Revava Settlers Continue Pollution of Wad Qana area with 
  207 
Wastewater]. Retrieved from 
http://www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/view.php?recordID=5473 
Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem and Land Research Center. (2012b). Mustawtinu 
Refafa Maṣdar Tallawūth Arady Wād Qana [Revava Settlers Source of Wad 
Qana's Pollution]. Retrieved from 
http://www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/view.php?recordID=4417 
Dakkak, I. (1981). Naḥu Barnamij Tanmawy min Ajl aṢumūd [Toward a Development 
Program of Sumud]. Al-Quds: Multaqa al Fikr al Araby [Arab Thought Forum]. 
Darwīsh, M. (1992). Aḥad ͑Ashra Kawkaban (Eleven Planets). Beirut. 
Darwīsh, M. (2008). Tibāq Ila Edward Sa͑id [Eulogy for Edward Said]. Retrieved from 
http://www.adab.com/modules.php?name=Sh3er&doWhat=shqas&qid=64962 
Darwīsh, M. (2009). Fī ḥaḍrat al-ghiyāb: Naṣ [In the Presence of Absence: Text]. 
Bayrūt: Riyāḍ al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-Nashr. 
Hreimat, N. (2001). Waqı͑ Al Buthūr Al-Baladiyah fi Falastin wa Tajrabit Ma͑had Al 
Abhāth al Taṭbiqiyah- Al Quds fī Hatha al Majāl [The Situation of Local Seeds in 
Palestine and the Experience of the Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem in this 
Field] (p. 16). Bethlehem: Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem. 
Iseed, H. ed D. (2010). Daleel Taḥsīn wa Intāj Al Buthūr al Baladiyyeh [Guide for the 
Improvement and Production of Local Seeds]. Ramallah: Union of Agricultural 
Work Committees (UAWC). 
Kurzom, G. (1997). Namāthj min Azzira͑a Al Falasṭiniyyah [Models of Palestinian 
Agriculture]. Ramallah: Ma’an Development Centre. 
  208 
Mustafa, H. (1945). Khaṭarāt Rīfīyah. Al-Quds: Al Matba͑a al- ͑asriyyah. 
Nassar, J. (1991). al-Mujāydil: iḥda qurana al falastīniyyah allati ṭaltha yad al zamān 
[Al-Mujaydil: A Palestinian Village By the Hand of Time]. Self-Published. 
Nassar, N. (1927). Az-Zira͑a Al Jāffa [Dry Farming]. Haifa, Palestine: Al-Karmel Press. 
Nassar, N. (n.d.). Rasa͗il Sāḥib al Karmel [Letters of the Owner of Al-Karmel]. (W. 
Khleif, Ed.). Nazareth, Israel: Matba’a wa Ofset al Hakim. 
 
 
 
English-language sources 
 
 
Aaronsohn, A. (1910a). Wild Dry Land Wheat of Palestine and Some Other Promising 
Plants for Dry Farming. Dry Farming Congress Bulletin, 3(3), 161–171. 
Aaronsohn, A. (1910b). Agricultural and Botanical Explorations in Palestine. 
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
Aaronsohn, A. (1911). The Jewish Agricultural Experiment Station and Its Programme. 
In I. Cohen (Ed.), Zionist work in Palestine. London: T. F. Unwin on behalf of the 
Zionist central office. 
Aaronsohn, R. (2000). Rothschild and Early Jewish Colonization in Palestine. Rowman 
& Littlefield. 
Abdulhadi, R., Chenzira, A., Davis, A. Y., Dent, G., Melissa Garcia, G., Guevarra, A. R., 
… Waziyatawin. (2012). Palestine Statement: Justice for Palestine: A Call to 
Action from Indigenous and Women of Color Feminists. Transforming 
Anthropology, 20(1), 90–92.  
  209 
Abed, G. T. (1988). The Palestinian economy  : studies in development under prolonged 
occupation. London  ; New York: Routledge. 
Abourahme, N. (2011). Spatial Collisions and Discordant Temporalities: Everyday Life 
between Camp and Checkpoint. International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 35(2), 453–461. 
Abu El-Haj, N. (2001). Facts on the ground  : archaeological practice and territorial self-
fashioning in Israeli society. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Abu-Lughod, I., & Abū-Labān, B. (Eds.). (1974). Settler regimes in Africa and the Arab 
world: the illusion of endurance. Medina University Press International. 
Abu-Manneh, B. (2006). Toward Liberation: Michel Khleifi’s Ma’loul and Canticle. In 
H. Dabashi (Ed.), Dreams of a nation: on Palestinian cinema. London: Verso. 
Abu-Sada, C. (2009). Cultivating Dependence: Palestinian Agriculture under the Israeli 
Occupation. In A. Ophir, M. Givoni, & S. Ḥanafī (Eds.), The Power of Inclusive 
Exclusion: Anatomy of Israeli Rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Zone 
Books. 
Alatout, S. (2006). Towards a bio-territorial conception of power: Territory, population, 
and environmental narratives in Palestine and Israel. Political Geography, 25(6), 
601–621. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.03.008 
Alatout, S. (2009). Bringing Abundance into Environmental Politics: Constructing a 
Zionist Network of Water Abundance, Immigration, and Colonization. Social 
Studies of Science, 39(3), 363–394. doi:10.1177/0306312708101979 
Ambrosino, M., & Barnes, G. (1993). Journey to the Occupied Lands. Frontline. PBS. 
  210 
American Economic Committee for Palestine. (1937). An Investigation Into the Status of 
Individual Mixed Farms in Palestine During 1935. Tel-Aviv: Palestine. 
Americans for Peace Now. (n.d.). Facts on the Ground: The APN Map Project. Retrieved 
October 31, 2012, from http://map.peacenow.org/ 
Amnesty International. (2009). Troubled waters - Palestinians denied fair access to 
water. London: Amnesty International. 
Annual Report of the Department of Agriculture and Forests. (1934). Palestine. 
Antoon, S. (2009). Before the Ruins: When Mahmoud Darwish met Walter Benjamin. 
Presented at the The Legacy of Mahmud Darwish: A Conference, UCLA. 
Retrieved from http://www.international.ucla.edu/cnes/conferences/darwish/ 
Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem. (2012). The Israelis Target Trees in Wadi Qana. 
Jerusalem. Retrieved from 
http://www.poica.org/editor/case_studies/view.php?recordID=4719 
ARIJ Applied Research Institute-Jersusalem. (1994). Dryland Farming in Palestine (p. 
120). Bethlehem: Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem. 
Arnon, I. (1981). Modernization of agriculture in developing countries  : resources, 
potentials and problems. Chichester Eng  ; New York: Wiley. 
Arnon, I. (1989). Agricultural research and technology transfer. London  ; New York: 
Elsevier Applied Science. 
Arnon, Itzhak, & Raviv, M. (1980). From Fellah to Farmer: A Study on Change in Arab 
Villages. Rehovot  : Settlement Study Centre  ; Bet-Dagan  : Agricultural Research 
Organization. 
  211 
Aruri, N. H. (1989). Occupation: Israel over Palestine. Association of Arab-American 
University Graduates. 
Assaf, S. (2010). Sustainable Water Supply for Agriculture in Palestine. In A. Tal & A. 
Abed Rabbo (Eds.), Water wisdom: preparing the groundwork for cooperative 
and sustainable water management in the Middle East (pp. 195–210). New 
Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 
Awartani, H. (1982). Agricultural development in the West Bank An economic and 
political study of the development of rain-fed farming in the West Bank. 
University of Bradford, Bradford, UK. 
Awartani, Hisham. (1988). Agricultural Development and Policies in the West Bank and 
Gaza. In G. T. Abed (Ed.), The Palestinian economy  : studies in development 
under prolonged occupation. London  ; New York: Routledge. 
Ayalon, A. (2004). Reading Palestine printing and literacy, 1900-1948 (1st ed.). Austin: 
University of Texas Press. 
Azoulay, A., & Ophir, A. (2012). The One-State Condition: Occupation and Democracy 
in Israel/Palestine. Stanford University Press. 
Bardenstein, C. (1998). Threads of Memory and Discourses of Rootedness: Of Trees, 
Oranges and the Prickly-Pear Cactus in Israel/Palestine. Edebiyat: Journal of 
Middle Eastern Literatures, 8(1). 
Barghouti, M. (1986). Tanmia Bimafūm Mukhtalif [A different understanding of 
development]. Al-Kateb for Human Culture and Progress, 7(78). 
  212 
Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv: Bildsammlung Palästina. (n.d.). Die Staatlichen Archive 
in Bayern. Photographic Archive. Retrieved July 11, 2013, from 
http://www.gda.bayern.de/findmittel/ead/index.php?fb=478 
Benvenisti, M. (1984a). The West Bank data project  : a survey of Israel’s policies. 
Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Benvenisti, M. (1984b). West Bank Data Base Project: A Survey of Israel’s Policies. 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Benvenisti, M., Abu-Zayed, Z., & Rubinstein, D. (1986). The West Bank handbook: a 
political lexicon. Westview Press. 
Benvenisti, M., & Khayat, S. (1988). The West Bank and Gaza Atlas. Jerusalem  : West 
Bank Data Base Project  ; Boulder, Colo.  : Distributed by Westview Press. 
Berrett, L. C., & Van Dyke, B. G. (2005). Holy lands  : a history of the Latter-day Saints 
in the Near East. American Fork, Utah: Covenant Communications. 
Blackhawk, N. (2008). Violence over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early 
American West. Harvard University Press. 
Blum, A. (1988). Extension Strategies Used To Develop a Traditional Farming Sector in 
an Advanced Agricultural Surrounding. The Case of the Nazareth Region in 
Israel. Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, 27, 299–313. 
Blum, A. (1989). Use of extension services by traditional Arab farmers in Israel and in 
the Gaza Strip. 
Botmeh, J. (2006). Civil Resistance in Palestine: The village of Battir in 1948. Coventry 
University, Coventry, UK. 
  213 
Braun, B. (2005). Environmental issues: writing a more-than-human urban geography. 
Progress in Human Geography, 29(5), 635. 
Braun, Bruce. (2002). The intemperate rainforest  : nature, culture, and power on 
Canada’s west coast. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Braverman, I. (2009). Planting the promised landscape: Zionism, nature and resistance in 
Israel/Palestine. The Natural Resources Journal, 49, 317–61. 
Braverman, Irus. (2008). “The Tree Is the Enemy Soldier”: A Sociolegal Making of War 
Landscapes in the Occupied West Bank. Law & Society Review, 42(3), 449–482. 
doi:10.1111/j.1540-5893.2008.00348.x 
Braverman, Irus. (2011). Hidden in Plain View: Legal Geography from a Visual 
Perspective. Law, Culture and the Humanities, 7(2), 173–186. 
doi:10.1177/1743872109355579 
Btselem. (2002). Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank. Retrieved from 
http://www.btselem.org/Download/200205_Land_Grab_eng.pdf 
Btselem. (2010). By Hook and By Crook: Israeli Settlement Policy in the West Bank (p. 
140). Jerusalem: Btselem. Retrieved from 
http://www.btselem.org/printpdf/118602 
Canaan, T. (1927). Mohammedan saints and sanctuaries in Palestine. London: Luzac & 
Co. 
Chang, D. A. (2010). The color of the land  : race, nation, and the politics of 
landownership in Oklahoma, 1832-1929. Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press. 
  214 
Chatterjee, P. (2012). After Subaltern Studies. Economic & Political Weekly, 
XXLVII(35), 44–49. 
Clement, G. (n.d.). David Grandison Fairchild. Everglades Digital Library. Retrieved 
March 11, 2013, from http://everglades.fiu.edu/reclaim/bios/fairchild.htm 
Cohen, S. (1993). The politics of planting  : Israeli-Palestinian competition for control of 
land in the Jerusalem periphery. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Coordinator of Government Operations in the Administered Territories. (1972). Four 
Years of Military Administration 1967-1971: Data on Civilian Activities in Judea 
and Samaria, the Gaza Strip, and Northern Sinai (p. 218). Tel-Aviv: Ministry of 
Defence. 
Daiq, I. (2005). The Local Knowledge System for Plant Protection and Soil Conservation 
in Rain-Fed Agriculture in the West Bank, Palestine. Weikersheim: Margraf. 
Daiq, I., & Sarsour, S. (2002). Agricultural Development and the Preservation of 
Indigenous Knowledge. In J.-P. Hautecoeur (Ed.), Ecological education in 
everyday life. University of Toronto Press. 
Darwish, M. (2011). In the Presence of Absence. (S. Antoon, Trans.) (Tra.). Archipelago 
Books. 
Daston, L. J., & Galison, P. (2010). Objectivity. Zone Books. 
Davidi, H. (2009). A Historical Survey of Cucumber Breeding in Israel. In L. Krasteva & 
N. Panayotov (Eds.), Proceedings of the IVth Balkan Symposium on Vegetables 
and Potatoes: Plovdiv, Bulgaria, September 9-12, 2008. Bulgaria: International 
Society for Horticultural Science. 
  215 
Davis, D. (2007). Resurrecting the granary of Rome  : environmental history and French 
colonial expansion in North Africa. Athens: Ohio University Press. 
Davis, D. K., & Burke, E. (2011). Environmental imaginaries of the Middle East and 
North Africa. Athens: Ohio University Press. 
Davis, R. (2011). Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of the Displaced. Stanford  
Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
Doumani, B. (1995). Rediscovering Palestine  : merchants and peasants in Jabal Nablus, 
1700-1900. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Dussel, E. (1994). 1492: el encubrimiento del otro: Hacia el origen del“ mito de la 
modernidad.” Plural. Retrieved from 
http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/dussel/1492/1492.html 
El Shakry, O. (2007). The great social laboratory  : subjects of knowledge in colonial and 
postcolonial Egypt. Stanford  Calif.: Stanford University Press. 
El-Eini, R. (2006). Mandated landscape. Routledge. 
Elazari-Volcani, I. (1930). The Fellah’s Farm (Bulltin 10.). Tel-Aviv: The Jewish 
Agency for Palestine: Agricultural Experiment Station. 
Elazari-Volcani, Isaac. (1938). Planned Mixed Farming. Rehovot, Palestine: The Jewish 
Agency for Palestine: Agricultural Research Station. 
Elazari-Volcani, J. (1932). Jewish Colonization in Palestine. Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 164, 84–94. 
Elazari-Volcani, J. (1935). Rational Planning of Agricultural Settlement in Palestine. 
Jerusalem: Keren Hayesod. 
  216 
Esmeir, S. (2006). On Making Dehumanization Possible. PMLA, 121(5), 1544. 
Esmeir, Samera. (2011). At Once Human and Not Human: Law, Gender and Historical 
Becoming in Colonial Egypt. Gender & History, 23(2), 235–249. 
doi:10.1111/j.1468-0424.2011.01636.x 
Esmeir, Samera. (2012). Juridical Humanity: A Colonial History. Stanford University 
Press. 
Etkes, D., & Ofran, H. (2007). Construction of Settlements and Outposts on Nature 
Reserves in West Bank | Peace Now. Peace Now. Retrieved from 
http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/construction-settlements-and-outposts-nature-
reserves-west-bank 
Expo Congo. (n.d.). Retrieved March 6, 2013, from 
http://www.expocongo.be/content.php?m=6&r=3&sr=7&l=en 
Fairchild, D. (1910). An American Research Institution in Palestine. The Jewish 
Agricultural Experiment Station at Haifa. Science, 31(793), 376–377. 
doi:10.2307/1635477 
Fakher Eldin, M. (2008). Communities of owners: Land law, governance, and politics in 
Palestine, 1858--1948 (Ph.D.). New York University, United States -- New York.  
Fanon, F. (2004). The wretched of the earth   Frantz Fanon   translated from the French 
by Richard Philcox   introductions by Jean-Paul Sartre and Homi K. Bhabha. 
New York: Grove Press. 
Fischbach, M. (2003). Records of dispossession  : Palestinian refugee property and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. New York: Columbia University Press. 
  217 
Florence, R. (2007). Lawrence and Aaronsohn: T.E. Lawrence, Aaron Aaronsohn, and 
the Seeds of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Penguin. 
Forman, G. (2009). A Tale of Two Regions: Diffusion of the Israeli “50 Percent Rule” 
from the Galilee to the Occupied West Bank. Law & Social Inquiry, 34(3), 671–
711. doi:10.1111/j.1747-4469.2009.01161.x 
Foucault, M. (1982). The subject and power. Critical inquiry, 8(4), 777–795. 
Foucault, M., Burchell, G., & Gordon, C. (1991). The Foucault effect: studies in 
governmentality: with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault. 
University of Chicago Press.  
Foucault, Michel. (1980). Power knowledge  : selected interviews and other writings, 
1972-1977 (1st American ed.). New York: Pantheon Books. 
Gidwani, V. (2008a). Capital, interrupted  : agrarian development and the politics of 
work in India. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Gidwani, V. (2008b). The subaltern moment in Hegel’s dialectic. Environment and 
Planning A, 40(11), 2578 – 2587. doi:10.1068/a40271 
Goldstone, P. (2007). Aaronsohn’s Maps: The Untold Story of the Man Who Might Have 
Created Peace in the Middle East. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
Gordon, N. (2008). Israel’s Occupation (1st ed.). University of California Press. 
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. New 
York: International Publishers. 
Great Britain. Palestine Royal Commission. (1937). Report. (p. 404). London. 
  218 
Gurvitz, Y. (2011, March 8). Palestinians handcuffed, detained for picking wildflowers. 
972mag.com. Retrieved from http://972mag.com/idf-protects-thorns-detains-
palestinians/11810/ 
Halabi, U. B., & West Bank Data Base Project. (1985). Land alienation in the West 
Bank: a legal and spatial analysis / Turner, Aron. Jerusalem: West Bank Data 
Base Project. 
Heidegger, M. (2001). Building Dwelling Thinking. In Poetry, Language, Thought. 
Harper Perennial Modern Classics. 
Hever, S. (2010). The Political Economy of Israel’s Occupation: Repression Beyond 
Exploitation. Pluto Press. 
Hope Simpson, J., Great Britain, & Colonial Office. (1930). Palestine report on 
immigration, land settlement and development. London: H.M.S.O. 
Huneidi, S. (2001). A Broken Trust: Sir Herbert Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians. 
I.B.Tauris. 
Hütteroth, W. D., & Abdulfattah, K. (1977). Historical geography of Palestine, 
Transjordan and Southern Syria in the late 16th [sixteenth] century. Erlangen; 
Erlangen: Fränkische Geographische Ges.  ; Palm und Enke [in Komm.]. 
Israel, & Misrad ha-huts. (1983). The green revolution in Judea-Samaria: 15 years of 
Israeli-Arab cooperation. Jerusalem: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Information Division. 
  219 
Israel. Misrad ha-bitahon. (1982). Coordinator of Government Operations in Judea-
Samaria, Gaza District, Sinai: A Fourteen Year Survey (1967-1981). 
[Jerusalem?]: The Ministry. 
Jabary Salamanca, O., Qato, M., Rabie, K., & Samour, S. (2012). Editors’ Introduction. 
Settler Colonial Studies, 2(1), 1–8. 
Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District, 1967-1987: Twenty Years of Civil Administration. 
(1987). Jerusalem: Carta. 
Kamen, C. (1991). Little common ground  : Arab agriculture and Jewish settlement in 
Palestine, 1920-1948. Pittsburgh  Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Karlinsky, N. (2005). California Dreaming: Ideology, Society, and Technology in the 
Citrus Industry of Palestine, 1890-1939. Albany: State University of New York 
Press. 
Katz, Shaul. (2001). On the Wings of the Brittle Rachis: Aaron Aaronsohn from the 
rediscovery of wild wheat (“urweizen”) to his vision “for the progress of 
mankind.” Israel Journal of Plant Sciences, 49(Supplement), S–5–S–17. 
Katz, Shmuel. (2007a). The Aaronsohn Saga. Gefen Publishing House Ltd. 
Katz, Shmuel. (2007b). The Aaronsohn Saga. Gefen Publishing House. 
Kauanui, J. (2008). Hawaiian blood  : colonialism and the politics of sovereignty and 
indigeneity. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Kayyālī, ʻAbd al-Wahhāb. (1979). Zionism, imperialism, and racism. Croom Helm. 
Kedar, A. (2000). Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography: Israeli Law and the 
Palestinian Landholder 1948-1967, The. NYUJ Int’l L. & Pol., 33, 923. 
  220 
Kedar, B. Z. (1999). The changing land between the Jordan and the sea  : aerial 
photographs from 1917 to the present. Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Zvi Press  ; Tel Aviv. 
Khalidi, R. (2010). Palestinian identity  : the construction of modern national 
consciousness. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Khleifi, M. (1985). Ma͑loul Celebrates its Destruction. Kino Video. 
Kimmerling, B. (1983). Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial Dimensions of 
Zionist Politics (Research Series. Univ of California Intl &. 
Lloyd, D. (2012). Settler Colonialism and the State of Exception: The Example of 
Israel/Palestine. settler colonial studies, 2(1), 59–80. 
Lloyd, David. (2012). Settler Colonialism and the State of Exception: The Example of 
Israel/Palestine. settler colonial studies, 2(1), 59–80. doi:10.7790/304 
Lockman, Z. (2012). Land, Labor and the Logic of Zionism: A Critical Engagement with 
Gershon Shafir. settler colonial studies, 2(1), 9–38. doi:10.7790/265 
Makdisi, S. (2010). Palestine Inside Out: An Everyday Occupation. W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
Mamdani, M. (2012, December 6). Settler Colonialism: Then and Now. Presented at the 
Edward Said Memorial Lecture, Princeton University. 
Migdal, J. S. (1980). Palestinian society and politics. Princeton University Press. 
Mikhail, A. (2011). From the Bottom Up: The Nile, Silt, and Humans in Ottoman Egypt. 
In D. K. Davis & E. B. III (Eds.), Environmental Imaginaries of the Middle East 
and North Africa (1st ed.). Ohio University Press. 
  221 
Ministry of Agriculture, State of Israel. (1970). Ministry of Agriculture: Activities in 
Judea and Samaria–June1967–Jan. 1970 (p. 28). Tel-Aviv. 
Ministry of Defence. (1969). Two Years of Military Government 1967-1969. Data on the 
Activities of the Civil Administration in Judea and Samaria, the Gaza Strip, and 
Northern Sinai (p. 66). Tel Aviv. 
Mitchell, T. (1988). Colonising Egypt. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Mitchell, T. (1990). Everyday Metaphors of Power. Theory and Society, 19(5), 545–577. 
doi:10.2307/657563 
Mitchell, T. (2002). Rule of experts  : Egypt, techno-politics, modernity. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Mitchell, T. (2011a). Afterword. In D. K. Davis & E. B. III (Eds.), Environmental 
Imaginaries of the Middle East and North Africa (1st ed.). Ohio University Press. 
Mitchell, T. (2011b). Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil. Verso. 
Morris, B. (2004). The birth of the Palestinian refugee problem revisited (2nd ed.). 
Cambridge, UK  ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Mundy, M. (2007). Governing property, making the modern state law, administration 
and production in Ottoman Syria. London: IBTauris. 
 “Nahal Kana.” (n.d.). iNature. Retrieved November 1, 2012, from 
http://inature.info/wiki/%D7%A0%D7%97%D7%9C_%D7%A7%D7%A0%D7
%94 
Newton, A. C., Akar, T., Baresel, J. P., Bebeli, P. J., Bettencourt, E., Bladenopoulos, K. 
V., … Patto, M. C. V. (2011). Cereal Landraces for Sustainable Agriculture. In E. 
  222 
Lichtfouse, M. Hamelin, M. Navarrete, & P. Debaeke (Eds.), Sustainable 
Agriculture Volume 2 (pp. 147–186). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.  
Owen, R., & Bunton, M. P. (2000). New perspectives on property and land in the Middle 
East. Cambridge, Mass: Distributed for the Center for Middle Eastern Studies of 
Harvard University by Harvard University Press. 
Pappé, I. (2006). The ethnic cleansing of Palestine. Oxford: Oneworld. 
Penslar, D. (1991). Zionism and technocracy  : the engineering of Jewish settlement in 
Palestine, 1870-1918. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
Penslar, D. (2000). Technical expertise and the construction of the rural Yishuv, 1882–
1948. Jewish History, 14(2), 201–224. doi:10.1023/A:1007120221297 
Porath, Y. (1974). The emergence of the Palestinian-Arab national movement, 1918-
1929. London, Cass. 
Prakash, G. (1999). Another Reason (illustrated edition.). Princeton University Press. 
Rabah, J., & Fairweather, N. (1993). Israeli Military Orders in the Occupied Palestinian 
West Bank, 1967-1992. East Jerusalem: Jerusalem Media & Communication 
Centre. 
Rasā͗il Fallāḥ [Peasant Letters]. (1912, June 15). Filasṭṭīn. Jaffa. 
Robinson, G. E. (1997). Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution. Indiana 
University Press. 
Rodinson, M. (1973). Israel: a colonial-settler state? Monad Press; distributed by 
Pathfinder Press. 
  223 
Said, E. (2000). History, Literature, Geography. In Reflections on Exile and Other 
Essays. Cambridge  Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Said, E. W. (1979). Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims. Social Text, (1), 7–58. 
doi:10.2307/466405 
Schijlen, E. G. W. M., Ric de Vos, C. H., van Tunen, A. J., & Bovy, A. G. (2004). 
Modification of flavonoid biosynthesis in crop plants. Phytochemistry, 65(19), 
2631–2648. doi:10.1016/j.phytochem.2004.07.028 
Scott, J. C. (2012). Decoding Subaltern Politics: Ideology, Disguise, and Resistance in 
Agrarian Politics. Routledge. 
Scott, P. J. C. (1987). Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. 
Yale University Press. 
Scott, P. J. C. (1999). Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human 
Condition Have Failed. Yale University Press. 
Scott, P. J. C. (2009). The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland 
Southeast Asia. Yale University Press. 
Shafir, G. (1989). Land, labor, and the origins of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 1882-
1914. Cambridge England  ; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Shehadeh, R. (2010). A rift in time  : travels with my Ottoman uncle. London: Profile 
Books. 
Sivan, E. (2010). Jaffa, the orange’s clockwork. Momento! Films. 
Sivaramakrishnan, K. (1999). Modern forests  : statemaking and environmental change in 
colonial eastern india. Stanford: Stanford Univ Press. 
  224 
Skaria, A. (1999). Hybrid histories  : forests, frontiers, and wildness in western India. 
Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Stein, K. W. (1987). The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939. UNC Press Books. 
Stein, R. L. (2009). TRAVELLING ZION. Interventions: The International Journal of 
Postcolonial Studies, 11(3), 334–351. doi:10.1080/13698010903255569 
Stephens, J. M. (2012, February 1). Cucumber, Armenian / Cucumis melo L. (Flexuosus 
group). Retrieved March 1, 2013, from http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/mv056 
Sufian, S. (2007). Healing the land and the nation  : malaria and the Zionist project in 
Palestine, 1920-1947. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Swedenburg, T. (1995). Memories of revolt  : the 1936-1939 rebellion and the Palestinian 
national past. Minneapolis  Minn.: University of Minnesota Press. 
Tamari, S. (1981). Building Other People’s Homes: The Palestinian Peasant’s Household 
and Work in Israel. Journal of Palestine Studies, 11(1), 33–66. 
Tamari, S. (1983). In League with Zion: Israel’s Search for a Native Pillar. Journal of 
Palestine Studies, 12(4), 41–56. doi:10.2307/2536244 
Tamari, S. (1991). The Palestinian Movement in Transition: Historical Reversals and the 
Uprising. Journal of Palestine Studies, 20(2), 57–70. doi:10.2307/2537198 
Tamari, S. (1992). Soul of the Nation: The Fellah in the Eyes of the Urban Intelligensia. 
Review of Middle East Studies, 74-83(5). 
Tamari, S. (2004). Lepers, Lunatics and Saints The Nativist Ethnography of Tawfiq 
Canaan and his Jerusalem Circle. Jerusalem Quarterly, (20). 
  225 
Tamari, S. (2006). City of Riffraff: Crowds, public space, and new urban sensibilities in 
war-time Jerusalem 1917-1921. In P. Misselwitz & T. Rieniets (Eds.), City of 
Collision (pp. 302–311). Basel: Birkhauser. 
Tamari, S. (2009a). The Last Feudal Lord in Palestine. In Mountain against the sea  : 
essays on Palestinian society and culture (pp. 130–149). Berkeley  CA: 
University of California Press. 
Tamari, S. (2009b). An Architectural Laboratory of the Extreme? Reflections on 
Weizman’s Hollow Land. Jerusalem Quarterly, 10(1), 21. 
Tyler, W. (2001). State lands and rural development in mandatory Palestine, 1920-1948. 
Brighton  ; Portland, Ore.: Sussex Academic Press. 
UN-OCHA. (2009). Restricting space: The planning Regime Applied By Israel in Area C 
of the West Bank. Jerusalem: United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA). Retrieved from 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/special_focus_area_c_demolitions_december
_2009.pdf 
UN-OCHA. (2010). Area C Humanitarian Reponse Plan Fact Sheet (Fact Sheet) (p. 8). 
Jerusalem: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
UN-OCHA. (2012). How Dispossession Happens: The Humanitarian Impact of the 
Takeover of Palestinian Water Springs by Israeli Settlers. Jerusalem: United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. 
Vaughan, J. G., Geissler, C., & Nicholson, B. (2009). The new Oxford book of food 
plants. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. 
  226 
Veracini, L. (2010). Settler colonialism  : a theoretical overview. Houndmills, 
Basingstoke  ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Wainwright, J. (2005). The geographies of political ecology: after Edward Said. 
Environment and Planning A, 37, 1033–1043. 
Warrior, R. (n.d.). Edward Said and Nationalism. In American Indian Literary 
Nationalism (pp. 179–224). Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico. 
Weems, J. (2011). Interpreting a 1930s aerial survey photograph: the artfulness of 
technological images. History and Technology, 27(2), 223–231. 
doi:10.1080/07341512.2011.573275 
Weizman, E. (2007). Hollow land  : Israel’s architecture of occupation. London  ;;New 
York: Verso. 
Weizman, E. (2011). The least of all possible evils  : humanitarian violence from Arendt 
to Gaza. London  ; New York: Verso. 
Widtsoe, John A. (1919). Dry-Farming: A system of agriculture for countries under a 
low rainfall. New York: Macmillan Company. 
Widtsoe, John Andreas. (1947). How the Desert was Tamed: A Lesson for Today and 
Tomorrow. Deseret Book Company. 
Wolfe, P. (2006). Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native. Journal of 
Genocide Research, 8(4), 387–409. 
Wolfe, P. (2007). Palestine, Project Europe and the (un-) making of the new Jew. Edward 
Said: The Legacy of a Public Intellectual, 313. 
  227 
Wolfe, P. (2012). Purchase by Other Means: The Palestine Nakba and Zionism’s 
Conquest of Economics. settler colonial studies, 2(1), 133–171. 
Young Bear, R. A. (1992). Black Eagle Child: the Facepaint narratives (1st ed.). Iowa 
City: University of Iowa Press. 
 
